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ABSTRACT  
Although different patterns of political participation among self-aware minority groups have 
spurred much debate in the academic circles, especially in stable democracies, this issue remains 
understudied in the newer post-communist societies and notably so the post-conflict countries of 
former Yugoslavia. Much of the existing research conducted in established democracies has 
demonstrated that increased levels of national minority political involvement are directly related 
to democratic development, but that these groups are shunning more traditional forms of 
engagement, notably political party membership in favour of direct engagement through informal 
participation. Nevertheless, there is very little understanding of what national minority political 
participation represents in post-conflict states, as much scholarly research has termed it as 
underground, invisible or inexistent. Despite this, there is evidence that in these states formal 
political participation of national minority groups is still strong, but it remains unknown to what 
degree this occurs, what factors influence this behavior and to what degree is this behavior 
present among autochthon minority groups. As active political participation of national 
minorities plays an important role in the democratization and stabilization of such societies, this 
represents an important gap in our knowledge.  
This thesis aims to investigate the level of conventional political participation and the trigger 
factors for such engagement of two significant, yet contrasting national minority groups in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), namely Jews and Poles. To do this, a mixed-method approach 
embedded in the transformative paradigm is employed, combining qualitative and quantitative 
findings of fieldwork. The thesis assesses eight indicators of formal political participation and 
reveals whether we can observe new trends when it comes to conventional engagement of these 
two, but also whether their influence remains limited due to their inability to formally participate 
in the government. It finds that both groups are political communicators, which choose to opt out 
of political party membership or financial support to electoral campaigns, because they feel 
alienated from formal politics due to constitutional limitations. However, this exit from the 
highest forms of political participation is not coupled with total disengagement, as both groups 
are actively engaged in other forms of formal political activism. This thesis concludes that new 
trends of political behaviour are emerging among the two observed groups, and especially so 
among their youth.                                                                                                                           
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent scholarly literature on political participation, much attention has been devoted 
to claims that in established democracies people turn away from engaging in politics, notably 
from voting and political party membership (Putnam, 1993, 2000, Norris, 2002, Mair and Van 
Biezen 2001, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, 2005, Stoker, 2006). Turning away from the 
Western world of stable democracies, the importance of active citizen participation in political 
processes is also not novel in the academic discourse in newer democracies of post-communist 
Eastern Europe, where the common emphasis is placed on the argument that the rates of political 
participation are astonishingly low among the general population (Van Biezen, 2003, Millard, 
2004, Howard, 2003). Despite this, none of the academic studies aimed at examining political 
participation levels in post-conflict states of South-East Europe, namely those that emerged 
during the wars of Yugoslav secession. Furthermore, understanding the interaction between 
political processes and individual trigger factors which spur political participation has been left 
out of such findings, and remarkably even more so when it comes to national minority groups 
which constitute large ethnic communities across the Balkan Peninsula. Considering that social 
and political experiences of national minority groups in post-conflict and post-communist, or 
better socialist societies, are significantly different from majority populations, understanding 
their present-day political activism in newly established democracies in ways that not only 
monitor the levels, but also connect their historical motivations and experiences to present day 
trigger factors is a gap in knowledge that this thesis will unravel. Furthermore, there is a missing 
link between examining national minorities’ understanding of political participation processes 
and their importance for minority group’s political effectiveness. It is only through understanding 
the national minority past and present political engagements and the reasons for which they 
choose to (dis) engage in politics that these groups can hope to gain political influence on a level 
on which they desire.  
Hence, the main aim of this thesis is to tackle the issue of national minority political 
participation in a new, post-conflict democracy, Bosnia and Herzegovina, through a comparative 
case study of two groups, Jews and Poles, and provide a clear understanding of the nature of the 
their current political participation. By examining the level of their political participation and 
understanding whether the current rates of political engagement is related to the historical 
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circumstances that they encountered after their arrival to the country, this work will seek to 
identify the factors that trigger (-ed) their political participation, the understanding of the 
importance and patterns of political participation for national minority groups, as well as point to 
new and emerging trends among different generations of the members of both communities. But 
to understand such interactions and explain how political participation is understood and why I 
have chosen to examine only certain political activities, I will first offer a theoretical background 
rooted in the wider literature on political participation.  
 
Understanding Political Participation  
Conventional and Unconventional Political Participation in Theory – The Differences 
 
In conventional political science literature on political engagement (Verba and Nie, 1972 
and Barnes and Kaase 1979), political participation is most broadly defined as a behaviour 
and/or individual’s attitude to politics. Specifically, two major subtypes of political participation 
exist – formal and informal. Formal or conventional political participation relates to legal, 
everyday political processes which occur within the system’s legal norms. More precisely, it can 
be described as a form of political engagement “that a dominant political culture recognizes as 
acceptable and that is related to institutionalized actions”.1 It is presumed to take place in an 
ordinary and politically stable society and as part of democratic development. Conversely, 
informal political participation, often referred to as “protest participation”, most commonly 
occurs during the time of political upheaval within a particular state and is often violent (Tarrow 
1998, Putnam, 2000). Hence, it relates to those modes that are illegal or fall short of law of a 
specific society, which primarily concern political actions or practices that are directed against 
the system itself and aim at transforming it. This unconventional type of political behaviour is 
not typical of a natural political process and has a great destabilization effect, since it tends to 
create social tension.  
However, contrary to this classic typology of political participation (Verba and Nie, 
1972, Barnes and Kaase, 1979), recent studies of political engagement, such as that of Norris 
(2003), reiterate that the ways a citizen interacts with the act of politics has alerted, and that 
                                                          
1 Conway, M. 1991. Political Participation in the United States. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press. 
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today we can observe repertoires (type of participation), agencies (organizations through which 
citizens choose to participate) and targets (what/whom the citizens desires to affect) of political 
participation. With such interpretations, Norris, but also other scholars2, acknowledge that in the 
last two decades, the differences between formal and informal participation have become 
imprecise insofar as boycott and demonstrations are becoming more popular and legal forms of 
engagement, whose targets are much broader and include multinational corporations and local 
businesses, as well as media or specific political groups. Despite this, considering the nature of 
this study, I will purposefully concentrate only on formal political participation of the two 
national minority groups that I choose to investigate as part of this research. The reasons for this 
are rooted in the results of the preliminary research that I conducted for the purposes of this 
study3, which showed that both groups do not deem unconventional political participation 
important and that they do not believe that informal engagement is a way to channel political 
participation positions of national minority groups in present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
Conventional Political Participation 
 
Authors such as Milbrath (1977) and Goel, Verba and Nie (1972) single out anywhere 
from four (Milbrath) to twelve (Verba, Nie) sub-categories of conventional political 
participation4. The following types5 represent the most universal ones:  
 
a) Regular participation in voting; 
b) Participation at local elections; 
c) Participation in activities of an organization dealing with community issues; 
d) Active participation in solving community problems; 
                                                          
2 See bibliography for works of Verba et al. (1995), Van Deth (2001) and Van Deth et al. (2007).  
3 Due to lack of any formal and informal data on all types of political participation and for both constituent peoples 
and national minorities in BiH, I first conducted a preliminary study to investigate the scope of political activities 
that the two particular groups engage in.  
 
4 See bibliography for works of Milbrath and Goel (1977) and Verba and Nie (1972).  
 
5 Kluienko, E., 2007. Political Participation: Theory, Methodology, and Measurement with the Help of the Guttman 
One-Dimension Continuity Scale. In: Golovakha, Yevhen. (ed). Ukrainian Sociological Review 2004-2005. Kiev: 
Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. p. 134.  
4 
 
e) Attempts to convince others to vote; 
f) Active work for political parties and/or political candidates during campaign times; 
g) Contacting representatives of local authorities in order to consult on certain issues; 
h) Presence at political meetings (at least one) for the last three years; 
i) Contacts with state or local government officials regarding a certain issue; 
j) Contacts with participation in establishment of a group or organization for solving local 
problems; 
k) Financial support of a party or candidate during an election campaign;  
l) Membership in a political club or organization.  
 
However, considering the specificities of the transformative paradigmatic approach applied in 
this study6 for the purposes of examining the level of political participation of two single groups 
in a specific cultural context, one must take into account that due to BiH’s current political set-
up, not all factors listed above may be applicable or examined. The reason for this is that in 
certain countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, several contexts from above are 
incompatible with the current political situation. Moreover, some of the above also do not apply 
to the two very specific groups that will be examined. That is why I will selectively concentrate 
on only a few factors, and in order to avoid the superposition of western categories on non-
western societies.  
Conversely, regardless of the mode of political participation that is being examined, it 
must be noted that political engagement is not an isolated process, but that it largely depends or 
better, is influenced by several aspects which, in turn, help to determine the types of participants 
and their preferred mode of involvement. Considering these common notions pertaining to 
political participation, at least in Western literature, political participation can be defined “as the 
real actions through which people are involved in political processes (relations) and influence or 
try to influence them in the ways normal and/or legitimate.” 7 Lastly, and since this study relates 
to measuring the level of conventional political participation, various forms of this behaviour 
must be considered.  
                                                          
6 See Chapter 2. 
 
7 Milbrath, L., 1965. Political Participation. In: Long, S. (ed.). The Handbook of Political Participation. Vol. 4, pp. 
198-207.  
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The first aspect that must inevitably be examined is the influence of socio-economic 
status of group members, which represents one of the first indicators that will be further 
developed in the later part of this study. When referring to the socio-economic position of 
participants, we usually take into account individual factors, including age, gender, educational 
levels, profession, income and religious preferences. Political scientists such as Milbrath and 
Goel (1977), Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Verba, Schlotzman and Brady (1995) argue that 
some of the indicators of the socio-economic status, notably education, profession and religion 
raise the level of people's civic skills at the institutions. The underlying argument is that the 
longer the people live, the more skills and knowledge they are able to acquire through social 
contacts, which, in turn, can raise their awareness about the importance of political participation. 
Alternatively, these authors propose the so called individual resources model, which is driven by 
the notion that individual skills and resources such as knowledge, but also money, time and 
levels of individual’s self-confidence can indeed impact the levels of political participation, as 
these factors directly allow people “ to meet the economic and psychological costs of political 
participation”. 8 
Conversely, two more perspectives, the social capital and the cultural view, are essential 
for the context in which this study took place, as well as its subjects. When it comes to the social 
capital perspective, I refer to the characteristics of social organization which pertain to norms, 
trust and social networks that may have an impact on the efficiency of a certain group or a 
society, in a broader perception. Within the social capital perspective, special attention is given 
to voluntary organizations, which, as Putnam (1993) argues, can generate social capital by 
encouraging interpersonal trust and enabling social relations networks, since participation in 
associations encourages individuals to develop cognitive skills, civic virtues and a sense of 
efficacy.9 Here, the focus is not on private or non-political associations, such as sports clubs, 
self-help groups and alike, since they do not (at least not to a degree that political associations 
do) contribute to the public sphere as much as political organizations do. What is essential to 
consider in this constellation is the existence of informal social networks that are almost always 
                                                          
8 Rosenstone, St. J. & Hansen, J.M., 1993. Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America. New York: 
MacMillan.  
 
9 Badescu, G., 2003. “Social Trust and Democratization in the Post-Communist Societies”. In: Social Capital and 
the Transition to Democracy. Badescu, G. and Uslaner, E.M. (eds.). London and New York: Routledge. pp. 120-
140.  
6 
 
associated with “weak ties” in comparison to “strong ties”. However, “weak ties are more likely 
to link members of different groups, rather than strong ties that concentrate on a particular 
group”.10 Lastly, cultural perspective (i.e. religion) relates to political participation in a sense that 
it assesses individual cultural values and attitudes on political participation typical of a particular 
group11. But to further understand the channels through which modes influence the creation of 
trigger factors which motivate individuals to engage in political processes, we must also discuss 
the motives for political participation.  
 
Motives for Conventional Political Participation  
 
It is indubitable that the motives for political participation, both conventional and 
unconventional, differ greatly in stable and unstable political systems. Hence, in analyzing the 
level of conventional political participation of national minority groups in unstable societies, we 
must examine what are the motives for conventional political participation, since, as stated 
above, these societies most often tend to turn towards unconventional political behaviour. In 
traditional literature on measuring political participation,12 the motives for political engagement 
are divided into two main groups. The first category represents the so-called purely political 
motives, which are founded on people’s notions about the necessity of political participation and 
the feeling of participation (the sense of civic duty). Of course, this scenario is based on the idea 
of a perfect citizen (homo politicus). According to Verba, political participation is closely related 
to standards of active citizenship. Hence, only highly self-conscious individuals will also show 
high levels of political self-consciousness. Alternatively, there are non-political, “rational-
selfish” motives for political involvement. These motives rely on the assumption that people 
participate in politics in order to resolve their personal problems, which most often relate to their 
social status, prestige and feeling of significance. In the cases in which conventional political 
                                                          
10 Granovetter, M.S., 1973. “The Strength of Weak Ties”. In: American Journal of Sociology. no. 78. pp. 1360-1380.  
 
11 In approaching the main research topic of the large scale research essential for the study, all of these perspectives 
were taken into consideration when developing “type of participants” part of the survey. See Chapter 2 for more 
details.  
 
12 Here, the reference is made to Verba, Nie and Kim’s measurement factors used in their book entitled 
“Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison” (1987), since the scale used in this study has 
proven widely effective, valid and easy to administer across different cultures.  
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participation is spurred by latter motives, the underlying argument is that no form of political 
participation will occur if there is only group benefit or, in other words, if personal benefit is 
missing or has to be shared with the group. Hence, we can talk about selective stimuli for 
political participation, or the ones referring to any actions that individuals find appealing enough 
to motivate them to engage in political processes.  
As it is quite clear, citizens are at the centre of the political participation process; as such, 
political engagement is an underlying characteristic of a democratic society, be it an already 
established democracy or a country on its way to democratic consolidation. Therefore, one 
cannot go about without considering, aside from the specificities related to the theoretical 
underpinnings of the very process of political participation itself, the link between political 
participation and democratization and why does this correlation matter in regards to national 
minorities.  
 
Why Study Political Participation of National Minorities? The Case for Minority Rights 
Perspective and the Democratic Theory Argument  
 
 In its more generic sense, political participation, as clearly indicated above, is an essential 
component of an established and successful democratic state. The nature in which citizens 
engage in political participation processes and the levels of such engagement are the main 
determinants of the democratic quality of a country. At a more advanced level of democratic 
consolidation lie the national minority rights to political participation, and as Bieber (2008) 
points “minority political participation is where minority rights and social attitudes towards 
minorities meet”13 to explain the degree to which the choice of state’s approach to national 
minority political participation determines their actual levels of political engagement. Here, one 
meets the need to enquire about what are, in fact, minority rights that states choose to adopt an 
approach to or disregard. Formally, “minority rights include approaches to avoid discrimination 
and affirm cultural distinctiveness of the community”14. However, this definition is very narrow 
in a sense that it only recognizes the cultural aspects of a particular community and excludes 
                                                          
13 Bieber, F., 2008. “Introduction”. In: Political Parties and Minority Participation. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - Office 
Macedonia. p. 5.  
 
14 Ibid, p. 5.  
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other aspects which minorities, it order to be fully participative, must also posses. Potier (2001) 
argues that minority rights, as such, are undefined and international standards15 are “vague and 
invasive, not last the definition of minorities themselves”16. Much of the international legal 
frameworks, as well as national legislations undermined the meaning of the term ‘minority right’ 
as the attribute ‘cultural’ was only scarcely expended to include educational and linguistic rights, 
and not rights to political participation. However, as Bieber (2008) points out, this neglect has 
been reduced in recent years, mainly, again, through international instruments such as the Lund 
Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life drafted by 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) High Commission on National 
Minorities.17  
 Conversely, the above argument demonstrates that minority right to political participation 
can be assessed from two different perspectives – the democratization aspect and the minority 
rights aspect. In the reminder of this part I choose to analyze the democratization perspective as 
this presents the standpoint which accounts not only for the democratic consolidation argument, 
but also engages in contributing to the broader understanding of what political participation 
means to national minority groups, how and why they can and should engage, as well as provide 
viewpoints on factors that have influenced the studied groups’ behaviour in relation to formal 
political engagement. The minority rights perspective, although plausible and fully encouraged, 
is not adept to this study as it implies that national minorities must actively partake in the process 
of decision making18 and that without political participation their other rights are further 
weakened. Considering the peculiarities of the case study of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s two 
national minority groups, and the preliminary study conducted together with national minority 
                                                          
15 The High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe 
(OSCE), the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe and the 
Copenhagen Criteria for the admission of new members to the European Union all provide understandings and 
explanations for advances in the promotion of rights related to national minority communities.  
 
16 Potier, T., 2001. “Regionally Non-Dominant Titular Peoples: The Next Phase in Minority Rights?” In: Journal on 
Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe. pp. 2-3.  
 
17 Bieber, F., 2008. “Introduction”. In: Political Parties and Minority Participation. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - Office 
Macedonia. pp. 5-6. 
 
18 Chapters 1, 4 and 5 describe different aspects of national minority statuses in BiH when it comes to participation 
in the political decision-processes.  
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members in BiH, this is yet another reason why I chose to drift away from the minority rights 
perspective.  
 
Political Participation and Democratization 
 
From its birth in ancient Greece, democracy has been closely tied to citizen participation. 
The concept of direct democracy, as practiced in Greek city-states was deemed ideal and as such 
presented the central argument of theories proposed by Jean Jacques Rousseau and later on by 
Marx and Engels (Behrouzi, 2006, Held, 2006), who advocated the essentiality of full citizen 
participation. But, as democracy as a political system progressed in its course, so did its new 
models with the varying approaches that they adapted in regards to the importance and the 
degree of citizen participation.  
At the dawn of the 20th century, the predominant model of democracy in the West turned 
to liberal democracy, where the notions of citizen’s rights and liberties prevailed, but the degree 
of citizen participation varied greatly – from extreme minimalist or procedural theories of 
democracy (Schumpeter, 1976) which argue that citizens should only participate in the elections 
and leave the elected individuals to construct political opinions to advocates of participatory 
democracy where only active citizenry equals the highest degree of democratic accountability 
(Patman 1970, Macpherson, 1983). In mid-1980s, the ideals of strong citizen involvement in the 
political processes were further argued by scholars such as Barber (1984) and later on Tam 
(1998). However, and this especially relates to the post-Cold War settlement and the emergence 
of new states in the European East, the population diversifications and the notion of borders 
moving across the people, and not people across borders, resulted in an unrealistic scenario for 
the implementation of strong participatory democratic model. Going further to South East 
Europe and the Balkan Peninsula, this model faced even greater difficulties, for the newly 
emerging ethnic majorities completely undermined smaller groups that once dwelled as fully 
participative citizens mostly due to the legacy of Yugoslav citizenship19 (Sekulić, Massey, 
Hodson, 1994). Another case for the failure to institute participatory democracy in the case of 
                                                          
19 See pages 27-29 of this dissertation for more details.  
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these newly emerged states was that this model assumed full citizen’s will to participate20,  a 
notion which became questioned by scholars such as Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002 and 
2005). In their studies the main argument contra the participatory model finds its basis in the 
claim that most citizens who not opt to participate in politics voluntarily, but instead choose 
others to make decisions for them. However, this theory fails to address the issue of power abuse 
by the elected officials, an issue of special importance for national minority groups who are often 
governed by the majority.   
Contrary to the model of “stealth democracy”21 proposed by Hibbing and Theiss Morse 
(2002 and 2005), the deliberative democracy22 is an interesting counterargument to consider 
especially in relation to national minority political participation. In particular, scholars such as 
Fishkin (1991) and Dryzek (2002) call for encouraging citizens to discuss political issues in an 
informed manner and, in turn, call for the increase in quality of political participation, rather than 
quantity. Later studies, principally that proposed by Stoker (2006), calls for an improved 
interaction between citizens and political institutions and suggests a “politics for amateurs”23 
which ignites citizens to engage in those modes of political participation to which they can relate. 
Hence, this model is particularly apt for this study insomuch as it considers political participation 
of national minorities in a post-conflict, new democracy where constitutional propositions do not 
allow for their active participation on all levels. Stoker’s interpretation proposes active citizen 
participation even in cases in which they do not seek representation, political autonomy or 
engage in formation of political parties, but simply strive to engage for other reasons, both 
political and socio-economic, insofar as the whole process of their engagement is informed and 
habitual.  
 
                                                          
20 See Chapter 2 for classifications of citizens according to participation levels used in this study.  
 
21 Hibbing, J. and Theiss-Morse, E., 2002. Stealth Democracy: Americans Belief about How Democracy Should 
Work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
22 Deliberative democracy emphasizes decision justification from citizens and their representatives in a sense that 
both must justify the laws that they impose on each other. Deliberative democracy allows for multiple forms of 
decision-making as long as they are justified. As Gutmann and Thompson (2004) state “the most important 
characteristic, then is its reason-giving requirement”. Source: Gutmann, A. & Thompson D., (2004). Why 
Deliberative Democracy? Princeton University Press. p. 10.  
 
23 Stoker, G., 2006. Why Politics Matters: Making Democracy Work. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
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Political Participation of National Minorities: Explaining the Patterns of Political 
Engagement in Newer and Post-Conflict Democracies  
 
 The relationship between political participation of minorities and democratization has 
been especially salient in transition countries which emerged after the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
since all of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including South East Europe, “are 
characterized by deep ethnocultural diversity both within and across neighbouring states, where 
democracy has never had a strong foothold”24. The issues surrounding political participation of 
national minorities in the democratization context, and the relationship that exists between the 
two is markedly relevant to the political situation in post-conflict and newly formed democracies 
that emerged after the break-up of Yugoslavia. The case is more so problematic in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the specificities of which will be explained shortly, due to the fact that the role of 
political participation as a process in closely related to the ongoing debates of democratic 
consolidation since the collapse of Yugoslavia. However, due to a complete lack of data on 
citizen involvement in BiH, of all ethnic origins (including constituent groups and national 
minorities), the open question for participation and democratization theories remains the one of 
how strong this aspect of democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina really is. 
 To further understand the above relationship, it must be noted that most of the academic 
literature on political participation patterns of populations in post-communist states do not 
engage in assessing specific group behaviours related to political engagement and the analysis of 
factors which contribute to (non) participation, but mostly offer explanations and statistical basis 
for further studies. What has been noted in the wider literature available on these states, however, 
are two general trends that are common to all post-communist/post-socialist states – the so called 
post-socialist “period effect”25 and the legacy of communist experience. The term ‘period effect’ 
was comprehensively defined by Norris (2003) who states that it is a “particular major historical 
event which had a decisive impact upon all citizens in a society at one point.”26 In those terms, 
                                                          
24 Robotin, M. & Salat, L., (2004). A New Balance: Democracy and Minorities in Post-Communist Europe. Central 
European University Press. p. 15.  
 
25 Norris, P., 2003. ‘Young People and Political Activism: From the Politics of Loyalties to the Politics of Choice?’ 
Report for the Council of Europe Symposium: Young People and Democratic Institutions: from Disillusionment to 
Participation. Strasbourg.  
 
26 Ibid, p. 9.  
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the last major ‘period effect’ experienced by all post-communist/post-socialist states was a 
complete crumble of the old communist and authoritarian government which was replaced by a 
new, democratic political system. However, one aspect did not come naturally. Rose and Shin 
(2001) explain that democratisation in the countries which emerged after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall was born from scratch, meaning that the pillars of 
liberal democracy, such as civil society, free elections and multi-party governments emerged not 
out of the citizen need for a more effective addressing of social needs, but as an elite response to 
the requirements posed to them by the newly chosen system. They call this “democratisation 
backwards”27 which is characterised by small, urban and elite-led leadership which scarcely 
influenced citizen political participation. Nevertheless, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
this “democratisation backwards” occurred much later and was mostly led by the international 
community which engaged in its post-war recovery. Hence, it can be concluded that the ‘period 
effect’ phenomenon did occur in BiH, but the large gap in the available literature does not shed 
light on whether this has altered, in any way, the political participation rates of any groups and 
especially national minority communities in BiH. This is why this dissertation will shed light on 
these effects (rapid social, economic and political changes), notably by assessing the trigger 
factors that motivate the groups studied to engage in political processes. 
 On the other hand, when discussing political participation of national minority groups in 
post-communist/post-socialist states, one of the main queries posed is whether the legacy of the 
communist/socialist experience influences the patterns of their current political participation. 
Different authors (Rose and Shin, 2001, Howard, 2003) underline that the experiences of the 
communist past have had a negative influence on political participation rates at present times. 
Alternatively, they shed light on political participation under the roof of one-party regime where 
political engagement equalled holding of uncompetitive elections and was fostered by presence 
of communist-led social organizations which aimed at controlling and influencing the daily lives 
of people. Tworzecki (2003), Rose and Shin (2001) and Howard (2003) all point to the fact that 
this type of political participation was mandatory and hence consider it a factor that could have 
an influence on participation rates today. In fact, their main argument is that the fact that under 
                                                          
27 Rose, R., and Shin, D., 2001. “Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third-Wave Democracies”. In: 
British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 31.   
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newly emerging democratic veil, people realized that participation turned from compulsory to 
voluntary, thus feeling the power of choice.  
 However, due to a complete lack of in-depth academic studies of national minority 
political participation in these states, not to mention Bosnia and Herzegovina, the above 
arguments only accentuate that there is very little understanding on how the ‘period effect’ trend 
and the communist legacy influence current rates of minority political participation today. The 
altering political realities which developed after more than three years of continuous bloodshed 
in BiH offer little comparison with states that went through more peaceful regime change. 
However, the unique experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its many ethnic groups, notably 
its national minorities with their specific constitutional status, can only represent a vital element 
in analyzing the influences of such broadly recognized effects on political participation. This is 
why the reminder of this chapter will shed light on these specificities and help us move along the 
political participation trail of small national minority groups in BiH.    
 
 
Political Participation of National Minorities in Context: Understanding Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and its National Minorities  
 
Often referred to as “Yugoslavia in miniature”, Bosnia and Herzegovina, a small state at 
the heart of the Balkan Peninsula, can rightfully be considered a country of minorities. The 
reasons for this are manifold, but most can be traced back to the country’s post – Second World 
War history, which from 1945 until 1991 was part of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY).28 Yet, the colourful ethno-national picture of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a 
difficult case for political participation theory. The consociational political system29 that was 
instituted in BiH in 1995 by the Dayton Peace Agreement, reflects, or more so, mirrors the 
segregation of BiH’s citizens in everyday life. Caught in a limbo of queries pertaining to their 
                                                          
28 The country changed its name several times. From 1918-1929 it was called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes – SHS, from 1929 it changed its name to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, from 1943 until 1946 it was named 
the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia, only to be renamed the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia when a 
communist government was established. In 1963, it was renamed again to the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, a name which stayed until the dissolution of the country in 1991. 
 
29 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed explanation of consociational arrangements.  
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majority-minority statuses, the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina can be well defined as either 
a majority or a minority, depending on where one goes or, better, resides. Subject to different 
ethno – national rhetoric, the issue of who can be considered a minority and where, lies at the 
core of Bosnia’s many social ills. Not only does this problem penetrate the lives of ordinary men, 
but rather retains a different form once it reaches the ‘power-sharing realm’, where the issue of 
minorities30 becomes a state-wide issue.  
When examining the minority status issue within broader context of the overall 
population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it becomes rather clear that the question of minorities, 
whoever they are, is saturated with both political and social significance. And while the country 
continues to enjoy relative peace, the legacies of the Dayton era still hold an unyielding grip over 
contemporary social policies and power-sharing politics, both of which severely underscore 
country’s internal stability and undermine its Euro-Atlantic path. Despite the fact that Dayton 
Accords (and consequently Dayton Constitution outlined in Annex IV of the former) were 
designed with the ultimate aim to end a three and half-years of bloodshed, the unintended 
consequence of the constitutional arrangement turned into institutionalisation of the historical 
divisions31. In the context of political participation, this meant granting a right to ethnic 
entrepreneurs to propagate exclusive, rather than integrative political agendas. Thus, the 
consociational arrangement proposed by the Dayton Constitution, notably on the decision-
making level, echoes societal divisions at other levels, hence penetrating into the citizen’s realm. 
This is precisely why the issue of minority statuses is politicized on all levels, even among the 
ordinary citizens, a factor that underpins socio-political divisions, but also the right to political 
participation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
Understanding the patterns of political participation of national minorities in the 
democratic context might be an easy task, but when considering a new post-conflict democracy, 
it tends to become somewhat of a “mission impossible”. This is especially so in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, where the issue of political participation of different (ethnic) groups is politicized 
through narratives of territorial belonging, statistical data and ethnic background, all of which are 
factors that contribute to the endless debate of who and where is one a minority. The statistical 
                                                          
30 For the purposes of introducing this complex constellation, a general term “minorities” is used in the introduction 
in order to enunciate the scope of the issue, or the fact that both national and territorial/statistical/constituent 
minorities face the same problem.  All of these terms will be dealt with separately later in the study.  
 
31 See Bieber (2004 and 2010).  
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differences in the number of constituent peoples across the country significantly contribute to 
state’s shattered internal stability, overstressing and strengthening the pre-existing nationalistic 
discourses. Nevertheless, when examining the term ‘minority’ as it pertains to BiH, one should 
consider several situational aspects, all of which are important in a more general context of this 
thematic, but which this dissertation does not account for due to its particular focus on Jews and 
Poles from BiH: 
 
• If we understand minorities according to Capotorti’s definition32, then in the case of BiH 
we can deal with terms such as ethnic, cultural or national minorities. 
 
• In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we can differentiate between two 
understandings of the term minority. One is the so called constituent minority.33 These 
minorities consist of members of the three constituent peoples34 in BiH, but refer to those 
who live on the territory where they do not constitute a majority (e.g. Serbs in the 
Federation of BiH, Bosniaks and Croats in Republic of Srpska). The second 
understanding of the term ‘minority’ refers to national minorities, or members of any of 
                                                          
32 According to Francesco Capotorti’s definition of minorities from 1979, it is “a group numerically inferior to the 
rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members - being nationals of the State - possess 
ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only 
implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.” 
Although, there is no uniform agreement on the definition of minorities, Capotorti’s is probably the best one to use 
in the context of BiH since it is two dimensional and encompasses both the subjective (solidarity towards members 
of the minority group, usually referring to preserving cultural identity) and objective elements (ethnic, religious or 
linguistic characteristics).  
 
33 A term first used by a philosophy professor from Sarajevo, Ugo Vlaisavljević. Despite its wide use, the term 
constituent minority will not be used in this study, however, as the current constitutional set-up is based on the 
principle of constituent peoples. If we consider the theoretical approach to the term “constituent peoples”, Gro 
Nystuen (2005) argues that under no circumstances can three dominant groups be considered minorities. Moreover, 
this is not only a theoretical, but also a constitutional supposition and a dominant approach of all relevant political 
actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, no such attribute as the word “minority” can be attached to constituent 
peoples. With this in mind, this dissertation will term them territorial or statistical minorities, as it is solely these 
aspects that can denote their minority status.  
 
34 As per the Preamble to the BiH Constitution, Article II.4, Article II.6 and Article III.3 (b) (“The General 
Framework Agreement,” 1995). There articles define three constituent peoples - Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. In BiH, 
these groups represent a majority, but statistically can be considered a minority in different parts of the country, 
depending on their actual population numbers in a specific region, canton, town or village.  
 
16 
 
the seventeen constitutionally recognized national minority groups.35 Under the Dayton 
Constitution, the latter group is also referred to as “Others”.  
 
• The previous aspect does not account for the fact that citizens of BiH who do not view 
themselves as members of any of the three constituent groups36 are also considered a 
minority (these groups usually view themselves as citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and prefer to be referred to as Bosnians. Just like national minorities, they fall under the 
category of “Others”).  
 
But, in order to understand the complex network of these relations and examine the causalities of 
the primary issue, one must first adequately answer the question of what it means to be a 
“minority” in a divided society and how does this type of dilemma influence political 
participation of national minorities. 
 
Who are the “Constituents” and who are the “Others”? - Revisiting the Minority Dilemma 
in the Context of Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 
 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, both political participation and political representation rests 
on the concept of “differentiated citizens”37, whereby identity (ethnic, cultural or religious) plays 
an enormous role in the process of decision-making and political involvement. Hence, the 
concept of citizenship is crucial in fully understanding political participation of national minority 
groups in BiH, more so as it plays an enormous role in regard to their access to this minority 
right. When it comes to the role of citizenship and the right to political participation, the word of 
the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political rights which also covers the right to political 
                                                          
35 Montenegrins, Roma, Albanians, Ukrainians, Slovenians, Macedonians, Hungarians, Italians, Czechs, Poles, 
Germans, Jews, Russians, Slovaks, Turks, Romanians, Ruthenians.  
 
36 The Constitution is based on the principle of ethnic constituency or the principle of “constituent peoples”, which 
implies that each “constituent group” has equal rights to governing the state. Thus, the Constitution does not deal 
with the term “citizen”, but instead divides the people living in BiH into three “constituent groups” – Bosniaks, 
Serbs and Croats. The Constitution also mentions a non-constituent group of people, referred to as “Others”. 
 
37 According to Mintz, Tossutti and Dunn (2010) the term “differentiated citizen” refers to the process of granting 
“special group-based legal or constitutional rights to national minorities and ethnic groups”. Source: Mintz, E., 
Tossutti, L. and Dunn, C., (2010). Democracy, Diversity and Good Government: An Introduction to Politics in 
Canada. Pearson Education Canada.  
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participation (more specifically the right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the 
right of equal access to the civil service) is that “every citizens and not ‘everyone’ or ‘every 
person’”38 have these rights. Hence, all citizens must be able to freely exercise these rights. 
However, when citizens are constitutionally divided across ethnic, cultural or religious lines this 
right is easily violated. Thus, the very approach to the concept of “minority” is dubitable in the 
context of post-Dayton BiH.  
In the post-war period, the dilemma of who can be considered a minority escalated to a 
point where the term “minority”, as understood by most European democratic countries39, started 
being severely abused; each group, despite its constitutional status40, adopted the use of the term 
solely under the umbrella of their territorial and/or statistical (under) representation. In this 
constellation of events it is easy to understand how such territorial and statistical disputes cause 
an almost artificial sense of crisis, which often escalates into conflicting debates and results in 
talks where words such as “secession”, “referendum” and “underprivileged” are omnipresent.  
 Thus, in order to better understand and analyze the correlation between the word 
“minority” and the implications that it has on the concept of political participation in post-war 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, I will systematically examine the three theoretical explanations of the 
term, which take into account the statistical, socio-political and legal factors, but also the 
peculiarities of each group, including those characteristics which describe identity and time and 
spatial presence.41 All of these dimensions are essential in understanding the many gaps in 
interpreting the statuses and rights of both de facto and de jure minorities in BiH, but also in 
bridging their current status to the issue of political participation. 
 
 
                                                          
38 Vertischel, A. 2010., Understanding Minority Participation and Representation and the Issue of  Citizenship. In: 
Political Participation of Minorities: Commentary on International Standards and Practice. Eds. Weller, M., and 
Nobbs, K. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 92.  
 
39 See Capotorti’s definition on page 15, footnote 28.  
 
40 It can be said that Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats have a preferential constitutional status over “Others”, as they are 
granted the ultimate right to participate in the decision-making processes on the highest level, as well as to be 
elected. This is not so for the “Others.  
 
41 Hodžić, E., Stojanović, N., 2011. Novi – stari ustavni inžinjering? Izazovi i implikacije presude evropskog suda za 
ljudska prava u predmetu Sejdić i Finci protiv BiH. Sarajevo: Analitika, p. 43.  
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The Statistical Approach  
 
According to the statistical approach to the concept of minorities, for a group to be 
termed a minority it has to be numerically smaller compared to the rest of the population. Hence, 
a statistical minority is a group which accounts for less than 50 percent42 of the entire population. 
However, the statistical approach does not encompass just merely numbers, but takes into 
account the three essential dimensions of the term “minority” per se, thus examining: 
 
a) The identity criteria  
b) The moment of observation (time variable) 
c) Territorial presence (spatial variable) 
 
The above criteria are, then, further divided according to the sub-traits of each dimension, for it 
is precisely from these subdivisions that we can examine, in greater detail, the peculiarities of 
each case.  
The identity criterion is probably the broadest one, encompassing traits which include 
permanent (descriptive) and contingent (dependent) characteristics.43 Thus, permanent attributes 
include differences in gender, skin colour, and eye shape and all other birth-given or physical 
attributes which cannot be changed (or are difficult to change). The contingent characteristics, on 
the other hand, include all those personal traits which are much easier adjusted, including 
citizenship and ideological orientation. The contingent characteristics are not imbedded in an 
individual by birth, but are brought on by outside factors, such as education, socio-political 
circumstances at any given period of life or even economic aspects. However, there is one 
specific idiosyncrasy when it comes to identity criteria – where do the identity traits pertaining to 
religion and language fall under? Are they permanent or contingent criteria? Both undeniably fall 
under the identity criteria, and are probably the most important ones when examining the issue of 
minority statuses in BiH, but the only possible answer is that linguistic and religious traits 
depend on the specific context in which they are examined. To illustrate, let us take the example 
of Canada, where both English and French are official languages. If a person from Quebec (a 
                                                          
42 Ibid, p. 44.  
 
43 Ibid, p. 44.  
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French speaking part of Canada) moves to Toronto (in the English speaking zone) and starts 
speaking English, he/she will not be seen as a French-speaking Quebecoise, but will be 
considered an English speaking Canadian. Thus, in this case, the language criterion is contingent.  
 Nevertheless, in many other societies language and religion are seen as hereditary traits, 
as something that stays with an individual for the rest of his/her life. This is certainly the case in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the issue of language is not so relevant (considering that both 
territorial and national minorities44 speak a variant of the same language and that it is difficult to 
pinpoint to their ethnic background just from their accent), but the religious factor is the 
underlying characteristic of all communities, as it used as the main denominator of one’s ethnic 
background. What is more, religion in BiH is inseparable from identity claims, and as such can 
be considered the main destabilizing factor, influencing political participation at least within the 
citizen’s realm. Thus, religion (and language), unlike in the case of Canada, are not contingent, 
but rather permanent ethnic traits which are carried from generation to generation. It is, than, to 
no wonder that religion in BiH is closely tied to the term “nation” (nationality and ethnic group), 
whereby an individual is labelled as a member of a certain ethnic community based on his/her 
last or first name. 
 The second dimension considered under the statistical approach to the term “minority” is 
closely related to the time aspect. What this means is that, depending on the time of observation, 
a certain group, can be termed either a majority or a minority. Hodžić and Stojanović (2011) 
provide the examples of Switzerland and Italy, where each citizen can become a majority or a 
minority in a matter of minutes.45 Thus, it is clear that the time dimension encompasses primarily 
the contingent criteria (notably political orientation). However, if one observes a historical period 
or any other longer time stretch, it can be argued that demographic changes influenced by 
immigration, wars, births, etc., can also create a situation in which a former majority becomes a 
minority. Here, again, we can examine the case of BiH. If we look at the pre-war map of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina from 1991 (see Map 1), we can observe an intricate mosaic of different colours, 
each indicating one of the three ethnic groups.  
                                                          
44 This statement does not apply to national minorities who converse in their minority language within their closed 
communities (e.g. Roma in BiH), as they all fluently speak Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian when speaking to the rest of 
the population.  
 
45 Because of the institution of citizen referendums, citizens can be in a majority or a minority depending on the vote 
they give and the size of the group which voted the same as he/she did. Source: Ibid, p. 44.  
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Map 1 
Ethnic Composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina prior to 1992-1995 War46 
Three major ethnic groups are relatively evenly spread across the entire territory 
 
Examining the same map from post-1995 (see Map 2),47 we can notice a shift in colours, or 
delineate strict single colour areas, which now designate many more majority regions and a very 
few mixed-colour provinces.  
                                                          
46 Source: Office of the High Representative (OHR)., 2005. Ethnic composition before the war in BiH (1991).  
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Map 2 
Ethnic Composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the 1992-1995 War48 
Three major ethnic groups have strong territorial presence, without major “island” spots. This is 
especially the case with the Serb group, which has no majority areas outside of the territory of 
Republic of Srpska (designated in red). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
47 Note: The white inter-entity boundary line (IEBL) line represents a division line between a Croat-Bosnian 
Federation of BiH (51% of the territory) and Republic of Srpska (49% of the territory). This territorial division of 
the country was introduced through the 1995 peace settlement agreement known as the Dayton Peace Accords.  
 
48 Source: Office of the High Representative (OHR)., 2005. Ethnic composition of BiH in 1998.  
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As it clearly stands, these time-relative changes were brought on by demographic switches 
induced by the war, thus influencing the long-term statistical representation of different ethnic 
groups across the country.  
 Lastly, the preceding dimension considered by the statistical approach, and the one that is 
essential in the case of BiH’s issue of political participation, is territory, or spatial relativity. 
Hodžić and Stojanović (2011) claim that “person X can be a majority in his city, a minority in 
his region, and then again a majority in his country”.49 Illustrating this statement on the example 
of BiH, and taking into account all previous statements, we can with certainty claim that in the 
case of BiH this is probably the most essential dimension of all. To clarify, let us observe the 
following scenario – a Croat woman who lives in Banja Luka is a minority in her city, because 
Banja Luka is overwhelmingly populated by Serbs. She is also a minority in her region, because 
she lives in Republic of Srpska (RS), where there is an insignificant Croat population. However, 
she is a majority in Bosnia and Herzegovina, her country, because the Constitution of BiH 
recognizes her as a majority or one of the three constituent groups, granting her equal rights to 
those who belong to the Serb or Bosniak majority, respectively.  
 Hence, we can conclude that in the post-war period in BiH, the statistical dimension of 
the minority question is extremely relevant. This is notably so in regards to understanding 
identity and territorial dimensions, both of which contribute to the issue of artificially and 
politically created dispute over the right to political participation of non-constituent groups.  
 
The Socio-Political Approach   
 
Despite an overwhelming relevance of the statistical approach, it is not necessarily the 
case that minorities are solely defined by statistical factors. To illustrate, we can consider the 
case of South Africa, where the black majority was considered a minority during the years of 
Apartheid. Thus, although the black-African population in South Africa constituted a majority, 
they were a minority in both social and political sense up until 1994. Hence, one can argue that 
territorial minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (e.g. Croats in Republic of Srpska) can also be 
considered as socio-political minorities, although this cannot be legally accepted due to the fact 
that on the state-level (not territorial – entity level), these groups are a majority in a sense that 
                                                          
49 Ibid, p. 45.  
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they enjoy all social, political and economic privileges granted to them by the Dayton 
Constitution. However, it can be concluded that in the case of BiH, territorial (or statistical) 
minorities are also minorities in the socio-political context.  
 
The Constitutional Approach 
 
Despite the fact that a single group can be considered either a statistical or a socio-
political minority (or both), it does not mean that it is a de jure minority. What this means is that 
under the Constitution of its state that particular group cannot be considered a minority. The 
reasons of this vary from state to state.  To illustrate, let us consider the case of Switzerland. 
Switzerland is a federal state, whose federal and cantonal legislation does not recognize or define 
neither the term “majority” nor the word “minority”.50 Yet, Article 70 of the Federal Constitution 
states that the traditional “indigenous linguistic minorities shall be respected”.51 Consequently, 
Article 4 of the Swiss Constitution recognizes four national languages52, of which Rhaeto-
Romansh is the least spoken one.53 In this context, the Romansh speaking minority must fluently 
speak either German or French, in cases in which they are state officials or members of the 
Federal Parliament. Nevertheless, they are not a de jure minority, considering the fact that their 
language is recognized as a national one, and that all citizens have equal rights.  
On the other hand, when considering most East European states, we cannot observe 
anything similar to the Swiss model, but can with certainty say that these countries base their 
system on the principle of the nation-state of a single nation, with constitutional recognition of 
specific minorities.54 In the case of BiH, the term “nation-state” as such, cannot be applied, as 
                                                          
50 Only some certain subnational (cantonal) constitutions recognize the notion of minority. This is the case with 
Canton of Grison, which uses the term in relations to education.  
 
51 Biaggini, G., 2004. Federalism, Subnational Constitutional Arrangements, and the Protection of Minorities in 
Switzerland. In: Tarr, A., Williams, R. and Marko, J. ed. 2004. Federalism, Subnational Constitutions and Minority 
Rights. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, p. 222.  
 
52 German, French, Italian and Romansh (since 1938, following a referendum).  
 
53 Only 0.6% or approximately 40.000 Swiss speak this language as their mother tongue. Source: Ibid, p. 214.  
 
54 An example is the Republic of Croatia, whose Constitution states that the “Republic of Croatia is hereby 
established as the national state of the Croatian people and a state of members of other nations and minorities who 
are its citizens: Serbs, Muslims, Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews and others, who are 
guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian nationality and the realization of ethnic rights in accordance with the 
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there is not one, but three dominant nations. However, what we can talk about is the existence of 
de jure and de facto minorities. If we are to consider solely the constitutional approach, then we 
can say that territorial minorities in BiH are not de jure minorities; however, they can be deemed 
de facto minorities. Hence, this complex constellation causes a number of disputes, but with one 
predominant belief – territorial minorities in BiH do exist and mainly include Bosniaks and 
Croats living in Republic of Srpska. An alternative belief, although arguable55, is that Serbs are a 
minority in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH). One way or the other, the 
opposing interpretations of the term “minority” have an enormous effect on political 
participation rights, but also participation levels and individual motivations of national minority 
group members in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is precisely what this thesis aims to 
show.  
 
From a Definition of National Minorities to Who They are in BiH: A Short Overview 
 
The term “national minorities” is omnipresent in social sciences terminology. Yet, when 
examining any of the issues related to national minorities it is crucial to note that there is no 
universal or legally accepted definition that would adequately address these social groups. 
Despite the fact that institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe (CoE) 
and the OSCE have pioneered the promotion of minority rights, they have failed to establish an 
all-encompassing definition that would pertain to wide-ranging diversities of these groups. As 
Thornberry (1991) states “there seems to be only general agreement that there is no generally 
agreed definition of ‘minority.’”56 Conversely, nationalism scholars such as Anderson (1991) 
and Gellner (1997, 1983 and 2006)57 in their seminal texts approach the issue of minority 
definition through the prism of ethnicity and nation, thus examining them within a wider context 
of nation-state creation, but without analyzing or defining the term ‘minority’. On the other hand, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
democratic norms of the United Nations and countries of free world.” Source: The Constitution of the Republic of 
Croatia. Available at: http://www.constitution.org/cons/croatia.htm 
 
55 Due to lack of recent census data; the last census was conducted in April 2014, but this data has not been 
published to date.  
 
56 Thornberry, P., 1991. International Law and the Rights of Minorities. Oxford: Clarendon. p. 164.  
 
57 See bibliography for more details on their works. 
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Smith argues that: “most nation-states are polyethnic and many have been formed in the first 
place around a dominant ethnie, which annexed or attracted other ethnies or ethnic fragments 
into the state”.58 Clearly, while some definitions find their basis in international legal documents, 
others relay on academic sources, but linguistically the term “national minority” necessarily 
dictates that, within a given context (i.e. a state), there must also exist a “majority group” to 
which one has to refer. This is precisely what Smith’s assertion tells – it reinforces majority as a 
‘monolithic cultural bloc in opposition to the minority.”59 This is done in order to recognize both 
groups’ civil rights and liberties (including the right to political participation) on one hand, and 
relate to minorities’ distinct cultural identities and their right to refuse to be culturally assimilated 
with the majority on the other. In addition, when analyzing and applying these two concepts in a 
post-conflict society, one has to recognize that the issue of political participation of national 
minorities in a post-conflict state, such as BiH, is problematic from yet another aspect: the fact 
that most minority discourses were created in developed, post-industrial societies results in a 
situation in which they cannot be successfully applied in Western Balkan contexts, where 
internal migrations occurred mainly as a result of major imperial collapses and foreign influence 
that governed these regions over centuries.60  
Hence, considering the peculiarities of the discussed context, maybe the best definition to 
use for this work is that of Francesco Capotorti, which states that national minorities represent:  
 
“a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant 
position, whose members - being nationals of the State - possess ethnic, religious or 
linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if 
only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, 
religion or language.”61 
                                                          
58 Smith, A., 1991. National Identity. London: Penguin Books. P.  
 
59 Thornberry, P., 1991. International Law and the Rights of Minorities. Oxford: Clarendon. p. 7. 
 
60 Vlajčić, K. and Fetahagić, S. 2009. (Zlo)upotreba principa garantiranih mjesta: politička participacija 
nacionalnih manjina BiH u lokalnim izborima 2008. Sarajevo: Asocijacija Alumni Centra za Postdiplomske 
Interdisciplinarne Studije (ACIPS). p. 6. 
 
61 Capotorti, F. (1979). Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. UN 
Documents, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1979/384. p. 568. 
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Capotorti’s definition, although radical, is two-dimensional, and thus encompasses both the 
subjective (expressing solidarity towards members of the minority group, usually referring to 
preservation of cultural identity) and objective elements (a national minority is a group of people 
– citizens, which is numerically smaller than the rest of the population, a non-dominant group 
whose members have particular ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics that are different 
from the rest of the population).62 Other prominent authors, such as Eide and Deschenes offer 
similar definitions, but all agree on several important elements that, in theory, define a national 
minority:  
 
• A numerically small or a group of people that is smaller than the rest of the population;63 
• Minority groups can have distinct ethnic, linguistic and religious backgrounds. Not all of 
these elements have to exist in all minority groups simultaneously;  
• These groups are traditionally present on a single state’s territory.64  
 
However, in the case of BiH, there are several problems associated with the above definitions of 
minorities. The main reasons for this lie, firstly in BiH’s recent history and secondly in its 
constitutional peculiarities, both of which will be further discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
62 Vlajčić, K. and Fetahagić, S. 2009. (Zlo)upotreba principa garantiranih mjesta: politička participacija 
nacionalnih manjina BiH u lokalnim izborima 2008. Sarajevo: Asocijacija Alumni Centra za Postdiplomske 
Interdisciplinarne Studije (ACIPS). p. 6. 
 
63 Note that minorities are considered citizens of a state (State A) in which they live and in which they constitute a 
minority. Other identical minority groups can live in other states, but not be citizens of State B, nor citizens of their 
kin-state. 
 
64 Recent (see bibliography for the work of Boris Krivokapić pp. 93-103) studies have started noting a difference 
between autochthon minorities and alochtone minorities. The former have been traditionally present on a territory of 
a single state, while the latter are „new“ minorities, usually going back two or three generations, and have arrived 
due to migration (either political, social, economical, etc.) 
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National Minorities in BiH 
 
The present status of national minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be observed 
in isolation from the common legacy of Yugoslav citizenship. It is beyond the focus of this thesis 
to assess the very formation and causes for the creation of common Yugoslav identity, but what 
is essential to note is the term “Yugoslav” was first introduced in 1961 to accommodate people 
who did not have a preferred nationality. As Petrović (1983) states, Yugoslav identity was a 
“treated as a residual category for those who offered no particular national identity”.65 Hence, 
former Yugoslavia was an instance where the attempts to integrate people of different language, 
religion, ethnicity and historical experience became a state-wide plan for a common policy of 
equality among many nationalities that inhabited its republics and provinces. However, as 
Sekulić et al. (1994) point “behind the social fact of ‘Yugoslav identification’ lies a diversity of 
motives, inclinations and rationales”66, among which, they argue, is political participation. As 
post-war socialist propaganda grew, so did the feeling that all people, regardless of their ethnic, 
religious or linguistic differences, fought alongside each other to end foreign occupation. When 
the Partisans took the power from the occupying forces at the end of World War II, they 
“stressed the unity of all nationalities in the federal republic”67. The new government used 
common Yugoslav identity as a symbolic representation of the state and provided equal 
opportunities to all to share patriotism and historical rituals (Chirot, 1988, Smith, 1986). 
Alternatively, nationalism was perceived as a divisive tool, and so to claim Yugoslav, instead of 
an ethnic identity was to condemn those who “betrayed the memory of war and to identify with 
the efforts of the Partisans to create a progressive, socialist society”68. Thus, the Communist 
Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ), as a political arena, was common ground for all groups, regardless of 
their ethnic belonging to politically contribute and prove their loyalty to the Yugoslav state. The 
                                                          
65 Petrovic, R., 1983. The National Composition of the Population. In: Yugoslav Survey, Vol. 24 (3 August). pp. 21-
34.  
 
66 Sekulić et al., 1994. Who were the Yugoslavs? Failed Sources of a Common Identity in the Former Yugoslavia. 
American Sociological Review. Vol. 59, No. 1. p. 84.  
 
67 Ibid, p. 85.  
 
68 Ibid, p. 85. 
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common identity was especially important to Yugoslav republics that were ethnically mixed, so 
it was to no surprise that in 1961, 1971 and 1981 population censuses the highest number of 
people expressed themselves as “Yugoslav” in BiH.69 The situation did not change much in the 
last Yugoslav census which took place in 1991. Hence, it is obvious that in order to adequately 
assess the issue of political participation of national minorities in BiH today and understand the 
legal basis for their rights to political participation, one should observe the statistical data 
relating to national minority numbers and their territorial dispersion across BiH.  
Currently, the records pertaining to the numbers of national minorities in BiH can 
officially be acquired only from the 1991 census documents,70 according to which the Socialist 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SRBiH)71 in 1991 had seventeen national minorities (see 
Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
69 1961 (8.4%), 1971 (1.2%) and 1981 (7.9%). Source: Yugoslavia Government Printing Office., 1982. Statistički 
Bilten SFRJ, no. 1295. Belgrade.  
 
70 See footnote no. 23.  
 
71 At the time one of the six republics constituting the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Refer to 
part 2.1. of the paper for more details. 
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NATIONALITY 1991 (numerical data) 
Montenegrins 10.071 
Roma 8.864 
Albanians 4.925 
Ukrainians 3.929 
Slovenians 2.190 
Macedonians72 1.596 
Hungarians 893 
Italians 732 
Czechs 590 
Poles 526 
Germans 470 
Jews 426 
Russians 297 
Slovaks 297 
Turks 267 
Romanians 162 
Ruthenians 133 
 
Figure 1 
National minorities (nationalities) according to 1991 census73 
 
Besides the fact that the above presented data goes back to 199174, and as such is mostly 
unusable for the current context of political participation of minority groups in BiH (notably in 
regards to participation on the local level), there are several other issues which need to be taken 
into consideration: 
1. The 1991 census also included „Yugoslavs“, a category which after the breakup of SFRY 
became irrelevant. 5.6% percent (or 242.682 people)75 of SRBiH's population denoted 
                                                          
72 Bolded categories denote those national minorities which numbered more than 1000 members. 
 
73 Statistički godišnjak Federacije BiH. (2008). Federalni zavod za statistiku, Sarajevo. 
 
74 In fact, the last census in BiH was held in April of 2013. However, no official results were published to this date. 
This why this dissertation deals with data from 1991. 
 
75 Vlajčić, K. and Fetahagić, S. 2009. (Zlo)upotreba principa garantiranih mjesta: politička participacija 
nacionalnih manjina BiH u lokalnim izborima 2008. Sarajevo: Asocijacija Alumni Centra za Postdiplomske 
Interdisciplinarne Studije (ACIPS). p. 8 
30 
 
themselves as Yugoslavs. Many of SRBiH's minorities listed themselves as member of 
this category/group. 
2. Data presented as part of this census also includes individuals who expressed territorial 
belonging (i.e. Herzegovina), instead of their nationality (224 people).76 However, it is 
assumed that this number does not include a significant portion of minorities, if any at all. 
3. It is interesting to note that at the time of the census, Montenegrins, Slovenians and 
Macedonians were the “constituent” people of SFRY, as they lived in Montenegro, 
Slovenia and Macedonia, respectively, and where they belonged to a majority. Thus, in 
today's context in BiH, members of these national minority groups can be referred to as 
„new minorities“.77  
4. Lastly, the term „nationality“ as used in the 1991 census, is highly confusing, as its 
lexical meaning continuously changed from 1948 until 1991 (ethnicity, ethnicity or ethnic 
background, nation, ethnicity or ethnic group, and finally nationality). Therefore, in the 
present context, the term „nationality“, as used in Table 1 is irrelevant. 
 
This is the background against which this thesis takes an interest in investigating the level of 
political participation of two significant national minority groups, more precisely Jews and 
Poles78 from Bosnia and Herzegovina. It also examines the reasons for their political 
participation, or its lack thereof, as well as trigger factors that motivate them to participate. The 
research conducted in this dissertation ties in with the historical narrative of these two groups or 
better the presence and reasons for political participation and modes of engagement during three 
different periods in Yugoslav and Bosnian history. It must be noted that the original goal of this 
work was to investigate political participation of national minorities in BiH by linking in-field 
                                                          
76 Ibid, p. 8 
 
77 Although, it can be argued that the difference between “new” and “old” minorities appeared relatively recently 
and that, as such, is not formulated in the context of international law, this division is omnipresent in many states. 
This is especially true for countries that emerged after the breakup of the Soviet Union, as well as Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) and South-East European (SEE) politically fragmented states. Thus, it can be said that 
“old” or “autochthon” minorities include all those religious, national (ethnic) and linguistic minorities who have 
historically been present on a specific geographic territory (i.e. a state). “New” or “alochtone” minorities are all 
other minority groups, which live on a specific territory, but have moved there due to wars, changes of national 
borders or immigration. Thus, their legal minority status has just recently started to be discussed in the international 
legal context. (i.e. Chinese in BiH). 
 
78 As most relevant according to size, historical influence, current participation rates and availability.   
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data with the multicultural theoretical framework. However, repeated fieldwork with several 
minority communities demonstrated that political participation rates are generally of equal level 
among most groups, while trigger factors appeared to differ and that they depended on the 
historical context of a specific group. Hence, this work aims at answering to what degree is 
political participation of Jews and Poles, as most relevant according to size, historical influence, 
current participation rates and availability, in BiH really present? In answering the main query, 
this dissertation will also pose several sub-questions: 
 
SQ1: What are the trigger factors for political activism of these two groups in BiH? 
 
SQ2: Have these trigger factors remained the same or have they changed through history? 
 
SQ3: How do these groups envision political participation? 
 
SQ4: What factors influence their political action/engagement/affiliation? 
 
SQ5: What types of participants are these groups (active, communicators, passive or voters)? 
 
Within the general framework of the previously defined theme, three main hypotheses will be 
tested: 
 
H1: Bosnia and Herzegovina faces an increased pressure from self-aware minority groups which 
seek their right to political participation. 
H2: Jews and Poles are not active participants in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political life. 
H3: Factors that trigger (-ed) political participation of Jews and Poles in BiH have changed 
through history. 
 
The above hypotheses are additionally strengthened by the following six sub hypotheses: 
 
SH1. It is indispensable for the issue of political participation to be examined within the 
context of a democratic state. 
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SH2. The basis of liberal democracies founded on the principles of freedom and equality 
of all individuals/citizens based on the code of “one person, one vote” is slowly being 
abandoned in favour of “collective/group rights”.79 
  
SH3. The application of the principle of “collective rights” can help in overcoming the 
issue of political non-participation of national minority groups.  
 
SH4.  The right to political participation and national minority integration is not realized 
in a way as to paralyze the existing state apparatus. 
 
SH5. National minorities must participate on all levels. 
SH6. The existing political and constitutional set-ups in BiH do not allow for adequate 
protection of national minority rights to political participation. 
 
This illustrates the context in which this thesis situates the political participation of Jews and 
Poles from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as such it will aim at pointing to most common trigger 
factors for political activism, discovering how these groups view political participation and what 
influences their political action. To do so, after a comprehensive methodological description 
offered in chapter two, chapter three gives a theoretical overview of sources of minority political 
power in democratic states. As a politically complex and ethnically fragmented state, BiH is a 
country where these possible models could have different, yet plausible implications. Therefore, 
this part will theoretically present how national minorities are dealt with and defined in state 
constitutions and sub-state constitutions, asymmetrical regional federalism models, multinational 
federations and lastly consociational systems. This chapter will, thus, place, national minorities 
in a context of political arrangements and help in understanding what is so different in BiH and 
how and whether these models can serve as a possible functional basis for full political 
participation of   national minority groups in this country. Moreover, it will offer a theoretical 
background to understanding the current political divisions in BiH, a matter which will be 
                                                          
79 Rights held by groups, rather than individuals. The term “collective” or “group” rights has often been used in 
relation to indigenous, minority and other marginalized groups. Source: Jones, P., 2010. "Cultures, group rights, and 
group-differentiated rights". In: Dimova-Cookson, M. & Stirk, P. Multiculturalism and Moral Conflict. Routledge 
Innovations in Political Theory. 35. New York: Routledge. pp. 38–57 
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discussed in the fourth chapter. In addition, this chapter forms the background against which the 
fourth chapter offers a comprehensive analysis of the political and constitutional status of all 
national minority groups in BiH. The chapter will examine whether there are any sources of 
political power for national minorities in BiH, and if so, where do they lie? Lastly, and connected 
to the latter question, this chapter will help in answering what type of political participation can 
one talk about in the case of BiH's national minority groups and do these systems, at least to an 
extent, really determine the factors that trigger these communities to participate. After the 
analysis of sub-state political divisions in BiH and what they mean for its national minorities, the 
fifth chapter will investigate the historical perspective on political participation of Jews and 
Poles in BiH by offering a historical account of political participation of these two groups, from 
the periods of their arrival (Jews from the Ottoman Empire and Poles from the arrival of the 
Austro-Hungarian rule, respectively) until the break-up of Yugoslavia. In particular, this chapter 
will help in understanding the empirical part of this work, but most importantly the following 
questions: what type of political participation to examine? what indicators to use? are these 
groups still triggered by the same factors as during history? what factors to use in determining 
the level of political participation? Hence, the historical analysis chapter will be of crucial 
importance in later analysis of research results, the author’s choice of indicators and correlations 
that will be made and presented in light of current political set-ups and their linkage to political 
participation of national minority groups.  
The concluding parts of the dissertation consist of two chapters. The sixth chapter 
observes whether the Six Position Model (Verba, Nie) predictions and analysis will be valid and 
of use for future empirical approaches to examining the level of conventional modes of political 
participation of Jews and Poles in BiH. Furthermore, the research data will show whether 
culture-specific motives and models of political participation factors constitute a valid 
participation measurement in predicting the level of political participation of national minority 
groups. Lastly, the data will show whether the predictors taken from my own hypothesizing and 
observation (predictors of socio-demographic characteristics, civic skills, social capital, 
individual and collective values and evaluation of country's economy) alongside classical 
theoretical studies on political participation mentioned above hold true for the two specific 
national minority groups living in BiH. The seventh, concluding chapter situates the whole 
subject and research problem into the empirical framework within which the following questions 
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will be addressed: can the patterns identified be a starting point for examining other national 
minority groups?; do high/low levels of political engagement imply a change in the BiH's 
constitutional set-up?; what is the likelihood for formation of minority political parties?; are both 
groups the same in terms of their political behaviour? Moreover, this chapter will offer a brief 
analysis of what the approaches applied in this study are inclined to teach us and how they 
contribute to the discipline of studying political participation of national minority groups in post-
conflict and pre-determined power-sharing systems. It will outline several policy related issues, 
as to provide a basis for future work in several other disciplines that tackle the issue of minority 
socio-political and economic inclusion. Hence, the concluding remarks will systematically 
formulate the most important research results and answer several questions which are deemed 
important in relations to national minority political participation rights in BiH.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter presented and discussed the underpinning definitions and questions used and 
presented in this dissertation. In particular, this chapter has offered a wide definition of political 
participation in general, but also its subtypes, as well as provided a rationale for focusing the 
reminder of the work only on conventional political participation. The definitions of the main 
concept of political participation are rooted in the wider literature and are necessary for 
understanding the application of the indicators and measurements of it which are presented later 
in the study. This understanding of political participation as a broader concept is also relevant to 
the issue of national minority political engagement, notably so because national minority 
political participation, at least in states that emerged after the fall of the Berlin Wall, is closely 
related to the aspect of democratization and less so in terms of minority rights perspective. This 
is mainly so because the patterns of political participation in those states largely relate to 
existence of active participation which is indispensable for the process of democratic 
development. National minorities have an essential role in this process, hence assessing their 
levels of political participation and not theorizing about their right to it, is important in 
understanding the future trends that can develop both on state level, but also within groups when 
it comes to new trends in political engagement. In particular, there is a need to understand 
whether these groups, especially in post-conflict and highly divided societies such as BiH, where 
formal political participation is subject to limited constitutional rights of such groups, engage in 
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formal political participation and if they do, whether they follow a historical pattern of triggers 
that motivate them to continue today or whether there is evidence that these groups have new 
motives embedded in the idea of power and/or social (in) injustices. In order to address these 
issues and understand the relationships that exist between these concepts, the following chapter 
will present the methodological framework within which this research is posited.  
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY  
Introduction  
The present chapter outlines the research design and describes the methods that have been used 
in testing the research questions that underpin this work. It explores the research questions in a 
deeper manner and, given the nature of the research, examines it within an ontological and 
epistemological position in order to discuss how both affect the addressing of the above outlined 
questions. For the purposes of a clearer design, this chapter will be divided into two parts, the 
first of which will focus on the research design used in the dissertation, as well as the 
epistemological approach, while the second describes the practical execution of material 
collection and data analysis, but also issues related to positionality, reflexivity and research 
ethics.  
 
Part I 
Paradigm, Ontology, Epistemology and Methodology 
Introduction 
The main aim of this research was to examine to what degree is political participation of Jews 
and Poles, as most relevant according to size, historical influence, current participation rates and 
availability, in BiH really present? The ambition to investigate this topic was enhanced by recent 
debates in Bosnian, but also wider European policies employed to enhance national minority 
rights to political participation within a broader democratic development context. These present 
discourses have put a rather controversial topic for most post-communist states into the agenda, 
but much of the research posits this discussion within the umbrella of democratization theory 
and/or a legal narrative related to Central and Eastern European countries. The missing link in 
this retrospect remains that of former Yugoslav national minority groups, where the scenario of 
people moving across borders has been replaced by one of borders moving across people, thus 
creating not new minority groups, but new contexts within which their rights are posited. Hence, 
in terms of local (BiH’s context) parity, the question of national minority political participation 
remains crucial for the development of internal policies that will aid in the process of resolving 
the constitutional discrimination of seventeen recognized national minority groups living in post-
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Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereby these groups, which are citizens of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina cannot remain excluded from the process of political participation and ultimately 
political-decision making. Therefore, the foundational research question posed in this 
dissertation is to what degree is political participation of Jews and Poles, as most relevant 
according to size, historical influence, current participation rates and availability, in BiH really 
present?  
 Although the principal research question is region-centric, within this there are differing 
theoretically proposed issues, capable of generalisation,  that merit further discussion before the 
main question can be answered. Such research is instrumental for three reasons: first, it suggests 
the research potential that analyzing questions of national relevance have on democratic 
development studies in general and regional ethnic studies on a micro-level; secondly, this type 
of research can be used as a pilot study in which the very first ideas about the behaviour of 
national minority groups in post-conflict, transitional societies are shaped and uncovered, and as 
such can be used to generate new research ideas in this or similar contexts; and thirdly, given the 
complexity and multi-faceted dimension of researching political participation patterns of national 
minority groups in a post-conflict and ethnically divided society, it has allowed me to realize, on 
a methodological level, that although interviews and focus groups are an essential way of gaining 
first-hand insights into an un-researched topic where groups that are central to the research study 
are gaining voice for the first time, they should be used as one of many methods of data 
collection. 
 This last point is ever more relevant since it suggests that political participation of 
national minorities, be it framed by national actors to satisfy their own political goals and feed 
campaigns, a new policy development mechanism or as a multi-faceted diversity approach to 
governing a multi-ethnic state, obliges the researcher to adopt different methods and types of 
analysis. In deciding about this, I have not decided on the employment of different methods just 
according to methodology inductivism, but also reflection which occurred during the preparatory 
research carried out before enrolling in the doctoral programme. Consequently, this dissertation 
applies a mixed-method research, thus requiring explicit explanation of its paradigmatic 
foundation. 
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Articulating a Paradigm for Mixed-Methods Research  
 
All research projects require a researcher to articulate the basis for claiming to know what 
he or she knows. The original Kuhnian perspective stating that paradigm is a “way to summarize 
researchers’ beliefs about their efforts to create knowledge”80 has been challenged by modern 
researchers in a variety of ways, notably in the context of mixed-method research. For the 
purposes of this dissertation, paradigm is understood as defined by Morgan (2007) as a “system 
of beliefs and practices that influence how researchers select both the questions they study and 
methods that they use to study them.”81 Hence, a paradigm is seen as a guide that researchers use 
to frame their research. According to Shannon-Baker (2016), there is an ongoing debate about 
the usefulness of paradigm for mixed-method studies82, but although this is the case, paradigms 
help new “researchers align themselves with other researchers who follow similar beliefs.”83 
Furthermore, by providing a discussion on the paradigm, researchers offer their readers 
knowledge of the potential influence of their works84 and this is why an explanation of 
paradigmatic foundations is especially beneficial for mixed-methods research, which this 
dissertation also utilizes. 
In view of the above and considering that the present dissertation discusses the matter of 
political participation of two specific national minority groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
post-Dayton reality, this research takes as its basis the transformative-emancipatory paradigm, 
which is “characterized by the intentional collaboration with minority and marginalized groups 
or those whose voice is not typically heard in particular issues.”85 Hence, the context within 
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which transformative-emancipation is employed is precisely the one where there is a need for a 
framework that entails work toward social justice with marginalized groups.86 More precisely, 
the transformative paradigm “directly engages the complexity encountered by researchers and 
evaluators in culturally diverse communities when their work is focused on increasing social 
justice.”87 Greene (2008) goes on to say that the transformative paradigm is concerned with 
tensions that occur as a result of unequal power relations that saturate the context within which a 
particular research takes place88. The power battle translates into economic, religious, ethnic, 
gender and many other privileges that different groups enjoy. The importance of the 
transformative-emancipatory paradigm that is applied in this research lies in the fact that it has 
allowed me to engage directly with the researched groups in the context of an unequal political 
right of the access to political participation of national minority groups in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, a matter that relates to an unequal political power relation between the constituents 
and the “others”.  Hence, this paradigm is suitable for this dissertation in its entirety, meaning 
also from its axiological, ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions.  
The transformative paradigm finds its basis in the early works of Guba and Lincoln 
(2005) who defined a paradigm as being inclusive of four assumptions – axiology (beliefs about 
the meaning of ethics and morals), ontology (beliefs about the nature of reality), epistemology 
(nature of knowledge and the relationship that exists between the knower /researcher/ and the 
observed) and lastly the methodology (process of systematic investigation).89 The following sub-
sections of this chapter will critically assess the four assumptions mentioned above, as well as 
discuss the chosen methods and how they align with the transformative paradigm, the data 
analysis process, as well as matters of positionality and reflexivity. In addition, a separate sub-
part will critically assess the axiological assumptions or better ethical issues and challenges that I 
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faced as a researcher during the process, a matter of extreme importance when working with 
different social groups and communities. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
Ontological Assumptions of the Research  
 
Ontology concerns the interaction between social structures and individuals, as well as 
the study of being.90 Guba and Lincoln (2005) state that the ontological assumptions are those 
that respond to the question ‘what is there that can be known?’ or ‘what is the nature of 
reality?’91 The two broadest configurations of ontology, as described by O’Gorman and 
MacIntosh (2015) are subjective and objective perspectives92. Objectivism in general asserts that 
reality is made of solid objects which are tested and measured, or better that social phenomenon 
and meanings exist independently of social actors. Contrary to this, a subjective approach “looks 
at reality as made up of the perceptions and interactions of living subjects.”93  
This research takes the ontological approach of the transformative paradigm, falling 
under subjectivism, which holds that reality is socially constructed. However, it does so with 
awareness of power issues and by recognizing that different versions of what is believed to be 
real exist. Likewise, the argument is that “damage is done when differences of perceptions of 
what is real are accepted, and when factors are ignored that give privilege to one version of 
reality over another, such as the influence of social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, gender, 
and disability lenses in the construction of reality.”94 The ontological assumption extends to 
include social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, racial, age and other relevant contexts in 
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order to determine whether they govern the access to power of marginalized groups. As Neuman 
(1997) states, transformative paradigm scholars believe that social reality is historically bound, 
that reality has many layers (surface and deep structures), and while the visible reality is easily 
observable, the deep structures can only be seen through historical orientation.95 These 
assumptions justify the use of historical analysis of the two groups that are examined in this 
research, as they explain the two distinct realities that emerge among the two groups in relations 
to the factors that trigger their political participation, as well as the level of participation that they 
exhibit. Furthermore, the analysis of historical socio-economic, cultural and above all political 
positions of these groups, as presented in Chapter 7, shows that different levels of power are 
associated with characteristics of the participants. As transformative researchers need to be 
aware of societal values and power related issues in the determining the reality that holds 
potential for social transformation, the historical analysis about studied groups’ political habits, 
patterns of participation, access to power, societal treatment and cultural obstacles as related to 
political activism were essential to unravel and discuss before embarking on establishing any 
truths about them in the current contexts. Furthermore, the use of mixed-methods, quantitative 
for the measurement of the level of political participation and qualitative for examining the 
beliefs about current political realities for national minority groups as related to constitutional 
rights and the absence of the notion of ‘citizen’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitution, as well 
as trigger factors that create political participation impetus in the studied groups’ cases, provide a 
critical analysis of the framing of the research focus and illuminate on the participant 
community’s responsiveness to research dimensions applied in the study. 
 
Epistemological Assumptions of the Research  
 
 Epistemology concerns the identification of acceptable knowledge or better it helps 
answer the question of “how do I know what is true?”96 In addition to this, epistemology aids in 
formulating the approach which researchers use to look at how individuals understand the world 
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that surrounds them and defines the relationship between the researcher and participants.97 In 
view of the fact that this thesis accepts the transformative paradigm, the epistemological 
assumption that underpins this research is concerned with understanding the culture of 
participants and building trust. As Mertens (2007) states: “the transformative paradigm’s 
epistemological assumption leads to a cyclical model of research that includes the establishment 
of partnerships between researchers and the community members, including the recognition of 
power differences and building trust through the use of culturally competent practices.”98 Hence, 
true knowledge in this approach is embedded in, as Neuman calls it (1997) “collective meaning-
making by the people”99, which posits individual and group action in the context of improving 
the lives of people. The transformative epistemological assumption believes that knowledge is 
constructed in the way that participants frame it.  
 Another point to consider is the one that concerns the nature of the relationship between 
researchers. Mertens (2012) raises these questions in the context of power and privilege and 
argues that in order to understand varying dimensions of reality and how that reality is tied to 
power issues, the researcher must create a very close and interactive link with the researched 
community, which, in turn, relates to knowing and understanding their socio-historical positions, 
as well as build relationships that account for power differences and trust-building. Several 
scholars, such as Christians (2005) challenge the notion of neutrality and objectivity because of 
power-relations that must be acknowledged when addressing cross-cultural communities in 
meaningful dialogues.100 Hence, building a close collation with the researched group is the key. 
This thesis is, therefore, posited within the epistemological assumption described above. It is an 
interpretation of the situation of national minority political participation in post-conflict divided 
society with significant minority-specific rights to political participation of small, culturally and 
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ethnically different minority groups. In addition, this epistemological approach greatly justifies 
the use of mixed-methods research as community participation was needed at the beginning, 
throughout and at the end of the research, with the aim of bringing forward more general 
conclusions about their patterns of political participation, the factors that trigger their political 
activism and a view about their role in the socio-political reality in BiH, which, in all present 
literature, is ignored and overwhelmingly misunderstood.  
 
Research Methodology  
 
 The transformative paradigm within which this research is posited, leads to reframing of 
the existing understanding of national minority political participation. This, in turn, calls for 
corresponding methodological decisions, which also need to be reframed. What this means is an 
opting for the use of mixed-methods research, as specified on several occasions in the text above. 
Additionally, Mertens (2007) claims that there must be a “conscious awareness of the benefits of 
involving community members in data collection decisions with a depth of understanding of the 
cultural issues involved, the building of trust to obtain valid data, the modifications that may be 
necessary to collect valid data from various groups, and the need to tie the data collected to 
social action.”101 As pointed in the section on epistemology, the cyclical method of research lies 
in the hands of the researched group (community) and it allows for their participation at all 
times. This is why mixed-method research is applied in this thesis.  
 Consequently, the decision to apply a mixed-method research was a result of preliminary 
research that was undertaken prior to enrolling in the programme with the aim of establishing 
research guidelines that were developed together with community members. From the 
ontological and epistemological points, meaning factors that relate to power issues and the 
potential for social change and establishment of a relationship in order to make the study 
culturally responsive, were the key elements that led the choice of methodology in this study. 
The inclusion of qualitative methods, namely interviews and focus groups, was critical in the 
preliminary, but also post-quantitative research phase, since there was a need to establish a 
dialogue with both groups. The awareness about the contextual and historical factors that 
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influence present-day political participation of both groups was key in determining which factors 
were to be analyzed and taken as indicators from traditional political participation measurements, 
as well as creation of a set of interpretations which were developed in order to realize the 
political potential that the two groups carry. The information that was gathered through the use 
of both qualitative and quantitative data was steered in such a way as to allow the information to 
feed the research, the context and inform the next level that could bring about the change for 
these communities, and, on a more generalized level, to similar groups.  
 
Methods and Methods of Data Collection 
 
Although scarce and limited mostly to Western democracies, studies of national minority 
political participation in post-conflict and post-communist transition states rarely employ mixed-
method research. However, similar research that has been undertaken in established democracies 
suggests that this approach is vastly useful for two reasons – firstly, the quantitative data often 
produces the very first results ever recorded, making sense of large sets of data and allowing for 
comparison between groups, and secondly, the qualitative data sheds light on a small set of 
variables that might be specific of only one group and allows the researcher to posit particular 
findings against the context in which the research has evolved. The data analysis used in this 
dissertation was both quantitative and qualitative in its design and influenced by the above 
described ontological and epistemological foundations. This multi-method analysis recognizes 
the complementary of both types of findings, and as argued by Cappoccia and Freeden (2006) 
and Bergman (2008), breeds confident and well-rounded research results. As quantitative 
methods and its corresponding measures and indicators of measures are specified in much detail 
in the subsequent parts of this chapter which explains the measuring of political participation, the 
following subsection will shed light on the qualitative approach that was applied and the 
corresponding data analysis that resulted from the interviews and focus groups.  
  
A Qualitative Approach  
 
 The study of people and the social world they dwell in is the subject of social sciences, 
and hence, a researcher must position him/her-self in the observed community. This allows for 
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understanding the meanings that the studied groups apply to certain concepts and the experiences 
they share with the context within which a concept takes place. In scholarly research this is 
achieved by inquiring into people’s views, their understandings of the contexts in which they live 
and experiences that shape their lives within these realities. In this dissertation, and in alignment 
with the transformative paradigm approach, these relations were established by in-depth 
interviews and focus groups that were conducted throughout the research process and sometimes 
also simultaneously during quantitative phase.  
 In line with the above, the qualitative research that took place as part of this dissertation’s 
making sought to describe, understand, posit and most importantly explain the situation in its 
context – how two specific national minority groups describe and define political participation, 
against which background do they understand it, what drives their need or its lack thereof to 
participate in different political forms and how do they relate it to their minority status and the 
post-Dayton political context. This has been achieved by providing striking opinions and 
descriptions of these group’s thoughts and opinions in order to allow for a deeper understanding 
of their roles in political engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To embark upon understanding 
the background of these complex relationships and with particularly understudied groups, this 
research, again in alignment with the transformative stance, was particularly dependent on the 
historical events which helped unravel the patterns of these groups’ political participation and 
how they unfold over time. Hence, the historical analysis, which was a difficult process due to 
severe lack of scholarly data and writings on the groups since their arrival, helped record the 
situation as it once was, but most importantly helped me realize and observe the patterns of 
political participation, which later formed the questions that were discussed during both 
interviews and focus groups.  
 Accordingly, the qualitative approaches that I used in my dissertation allowed me to 
remain flexible in terms of how to define the structure of my work. I took advantage of the 
patterns that emerged as previously unknown, sometimes not so main-stream, but nevertheless 
essential for these groups, an approach that helped me make sense of much new data that I 
consider a new interpretation. Posited against this, I feel the need to comment on the fact that 
qualitative research often implies that new concepts are uncovered as the outcomes of the 
research process and not a pre-formulated idea, which, in broader terms, implies a grounded 
theory approach. As Bryman (2001) argues, many projects, although claiming that they are 
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coming from a grounded theory perspective and are inductive in nature, are in essence not so.102 
This is precisely the case with this dissertation. Although new in its entirety, from the groups 
observed, the variables applied and the paradigmatic foundation, this dissertation follows an 
inductive approach. This was done with the aim of presenting the situation of both groups in 
relation to their right to political participation and the power that they current have or not have in 
this regard, but also to provide some understanding of the post-conflict multi-ethnic context as 
the potential catalyst for change the way these groups are thought of and the ways in which they 
observe themselves. Hence, this research was not conducted within grounded theory approach.  
 
Methods of Data Collection for the Qualitative Approach  
 
 Recent studies of political participation patterns of different groups, but mainly youth in 
long-established democracies, such as those of Henn at al. 2002, O’Toole et al. 2003, Sloam, 
2007103 have all noted that there is a divergence in the way the researcher as the knower and the 
participants perceive political participation. All these studies argue that most people associate 
politics with politicians and political parties and can thus form negative views about the whole 
process of political participation. This, in turn, negatively influences their interest in politics and 
leads to apathetic answers. To illustrate, let us consider the study of Henn et al. from 2002 in 
which the authors used both qualitative and quantitative methods to study British young people 
between the ages of 18 and 24. The surveys showed that the participants were very disinterested 
in formal politics, but focus groups revealed results that showed that they (the participants) were, 
in fact, very opinionated and knowledgeable about issues that concern them104. Due to a severe 
lack of literature on mixed-method use for researching political participation of minority groups, 
I opted to look at studies that apply a similar method to other groups (e.g. youth). I am of belief 
that qualitative methods, especially focus groups and interviews, allow people to speak about 
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sensitive issues in their own language and help researchers explain the results they generate 
through quantitative means. Hence, I used qualitative approaches to generate views of studied 
groups, gather their inputs on how my own research should be constructed in order to produce 
results that would be valuable to them as groups that need participatory empowerment and then 
to contextualize these findings to the post-Dayton reality in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 Related to this is the research design I opted to apply for the present study. I was led by 
the logic of the research questions outlined in Chapter 1. I considered the specific historical 
characteristics of political participation of both groups (early activism, communal organization, 
ideological orientation through different periods, existence of radical political involvement and 
movements, as well as present day democratic forms of political participation including electoral 
participation, party activism and sponsorship, communication with politicians, being informed 
about politics and interest in being active in minority associations). These forms of formal 
political engagement were considered in order to understand and describe the specific activities 
that both Jews and Poles participated in during history, but also those that they engage in today. 
However, qualitative methods were not appropriate for political participation forms such as 
electoral participation, party activism and sponsorship, as they would fail to generate findings 
about the wider population. Instead, surveys were used and the procedure is described in detail in 
the section that follows below.  
 In contrast to the above, membership in minority associations and various types of 
communication with politicians, besides being included in the surveys (in order to assess the 
level) were also discussed through focus groups and interviews in order to generate answers on 
what are the trigger factors for such political engagement, have they remained the same through 
history or do differing socio-political and economic circumstances influence their prevalence, 
and how do these groups envision political participation in the minority context. This means that 
it was especially important to understand how the two studied national minority groups conceive 
their political engagement and experiences of involvement and whether they are aware, as 
groups, of the power that active political participation can bring to them. In this constellation, 
focus groups and interviews were necessary in order to provide in-depth context to the generated 
quantitative findings. Hence, the following section will outline the type of data and research 
techniques used in this work.  
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A Focus Group Discussion as a Selected Method  
 
In order to acquire in-depth data on the two groups that have never been studied in BiH, 
but also elsewhere and connect their presence and patterns of political participation with the 
trigger factors and the ways they perceive political participation, I opted for focus groups with 
members of Jewish and Polish minority associations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The choice of 
focus groups was made on the basis of data that is acquired through this process, notably the 
discussion between groups that produces great deal of data which, in turn, generate a wealth of 
insights necessary for the understanding of group political behavior in complex political settings 
(Nagy Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006). As existing studies of political participation conclude that 
in unstable or repressive societies political oppression and/or dissatisfaction is a driving factor 
for opting to participate in politics (Riesman and Glazer, 1965), the primary objective was to 
discover whether this conclusion also holds true for two representative national minority groups 
in BiH. However, in doing so, I had to take into account their current constitutional rights 
(power) and historical, as well as socio-political circumstances in which they dwell. Why I opted 
for focus group discussions is, thus, explained by the reasoning that individual discussions would 
only limit the interaction of a larger number of people that focus groups generate. Throughout 
the process, nevertheless, I was aware of the general disadvantage of this method, as focus 
groups can often generate discussions which overshadow individual’s true feelings and 
perceptions.105 I reduced this possibility by carefully selecting the respondents based on a set of 
different criteria, which included age, location and the level of activity in the minority 
association.  
 Overall, I conducted seven focus groups. Two were held in Sarajevo and two in Banja 
Luka, while three single sessions were conducted in the cities of Gradiška, Zenica and Tuzla. 
Each of the focus groups consisted of 8 to 10 respondents and lasted anywhere from 1 to 2.5 
hours. They were conducted in Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian language. Participants from the two 
national minority groups were not mixed.106 Within groups, they were selected according to age. 
Consequently, there were three age groups, 18-30, 31-50 and 50 and above. This choice was 
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based on reasoning proposed by Ritchie and Lewis (2003) that people of similar age and 
experience feel more comfortable in each other’s presence when discussing sensitive issues. All 
participants were approached through their associations, initially by contacting the public affairs 
office, and later on, as we got closer, also individually. For the participants based in Sarajevo and 
Banja Luka, I had very close personal connections with several members of the association and 
these contacts were made easier. However, my personal friends did not take part in this research. 
The discussions took place during traditional gatherings or other times during which the 
associations were visited by their members due to various occasions (movie projections, 
women’s club meetings, youth club meetings, Sunday school). All focus groups, including the 
gathering of participants and data collection took place in the first phase of the research, between 
June and September 2014. The participants who took part in focus group discussions were not 
asked to fill out the surveys.  
 
Interviewing as a Selected Method  
 
During both the preliminary and mid-term research that I engaged in for this dissertation I 
also conducted eleven semi-structured interviews. Interviewees were selected on the basis of 
purposive sampling (Patton, 2002), which means that they were chosen according to a specific 
set of political, ethnic and geographical criteria. All interviewees were highly politically engaged 
individuals, influential representatives of the particular minority group or active members of the 
association (employed by the association). I define ‘highly politically engaged individuals’ as 
political party members or leaders of their associations, as well as minority representatives in the 
minority consultative body of the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Six were from the 
Jewish associations (Sarajevo and Tuzla) and five were from Polish associations (Gradiška and 
Banja Luka).  
All the interviews with Jewish representatives were conducted face-to-face. Interviews 
occurred in participants’ offices or public places (mostly restaurants and cafés). The five 
interviews that I conducted with Polish participants were conducted over the phone due to my 
physical inability to travel extensively during the given time. All interviews lasted between 1.5 to 
2 hours. Just as focus groups, all interviews were conducted in Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian and  
interviewees were briefed about the general terminology used by the researcher and its meaning. 
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An on-line consent form was sent via e-mail and returned to the researcher with a signature. 
Apart from the researcher and the participant no other persons were present during interviews. 
Interviews included the following questions:  
1. What is your opinion about (Jews’/Poles’) involvement in politics? 
2. Would you agree that your association is a place from which active political 
participation can originate? 
3. What motives you to be so highly involved in politics?  
4. Did the social, political and economic changes play a role in your decision to engage 
in politics so profusely? 
5. What forms of political inclusion models would you suggest under the current 
political set-up in BiH? 
6. What forms of formal political participation would you single out as most relevant to 
your group?  
 
Although, the framework of these questions is broad, they were designed to allow for individual 
perceptions, stories and opinions to dominate the discussion and explain matters that were 
deemed important to the interviewee him/her self. This approach was in-line with the 
transformative framework which this study uses as its basis, and hence is not only useful for 
studies on ethnic groups, but also when seeking an understanding into different processes that 
concern these groups and how it can help them gain more power. In addition, due to a complete 
lack of data about these groups, such choice of questions allowed for generation of new data that 
could not be predicted from policies and reports that generally represent the only insight about 
these groups in BiH. Lastly, it is important to stress that none of the participants refused to 
participate in the focus groups and interviews.  
Methodologically, the aim of the interviews and focus groups was to acquire “personal 
reports” on political behaviour/participation of single group members with the ultimate goal of 
uniting all data on all indicators on political participation (see section on quantitative methods) 
levels of Jews and Poles living in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This method was chosen in order to 
meet one specific characteristic of political participation and that is cumulative involvement, 
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which, according to various cross-cultural studies conducted across Eastern Europe, but also 
elsewhere, has been registered as typical for mixed societies.107 
 
Data Analysis  
 
As a qualitative method, focus groups produce a large volume of verbal data, but the 
process of uniting all the data into a readable summary and drawing useful conclusions is often 
daunting.108 Although, the analysis of focus group data differs from study to study109, the method 
that was applied in this work included three stages – preliminary (what I predicted to achieve), 
identification (identifying emerging concepts) and organization and analysis (reading notes and 
transcripts, cutting out unnecessary information, creating indicators for measuring political 
participation). In the first step, identification, which occurred before the scheduled session, I 
made outlines of what I predicted to achieve. I used this approach in order to have a clear picture 
of what is that I should learn from the discussion. At this point, I would outline concepts and 
ideas that I expected to acquire from the conversation, and these depended on the age group that 
I was discussing with, their geographical belonging and their level of engagement in the work of 
their minority association. As focus groups occurred in the preliminary part of my research, in 
order for me to become close to the groups, gain their trust and consequently feedback, the 
preliminary phase was constructed with the purpose of designing the study. Again, as a result of 
the transformative foundation of my work, the aim was to include the groups in the construction 
and active participation in the research process. Secondly, this phase acted as a benchmark for 
how detailed the analysis of the focus groups had to be. The analysis turned out to be complex, 
because my purpose at this stage was directed at analysis (how people perceive political 
participation, what triggers them, what do they think it is, what is their place in the process, how 
do they think they influence it, etc.).  
On the other hand, the identification phase was reserved for identifying emerging 
concepts. This phase was probably the most important, because it helped me in avoiding the use 
                                                          
107 See bibliography for the work of Eduard Kluienko.  
 
108 Manheim, J.B., et al., 2001. Empirical Political Analysis: An Introduction to Research Methods. Longman 
Publishing Group. p. 359.   
 
109 Ibid, p. 360.  
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of traditional indicators of political participation that are more prevalent among majority groups 
or more traditional of western societies. In this phase, I also opted to observe only formal 
political participation, as non-conventional means of participation (as described in Chapter 1) 
emerged only on two occasions as trustful or known means of political engagement. The last 
phase, organization and analysis, was the most time consuming. Since in the beginning I opted 
for the use of recording the sessions in order to be sure that the context of the participants was 
taken into account and understood, this meant that there was a need to produce a transcript and 
read through it in order to narrow down the concepts that emerged in the first phase of the 
process and give these contexts and concepts actual meaning. Hence, content analysis was used 
in order to help identify discussion themes, sort participants according to participatory groups 
and use this information to support what was later to emerge as quantitative data. All of these 
steps helped my research in a way of highlighting the larger significance of the political 
participation process and patterns of the two observed groups.   
Similarly, just as useful of a qualitative method for groups studied within the 
transformative paradigm, are interviews. However, interviews, and notably so semi-structured 
ones, are very time consuming, costly, tend to become overly personal and open to bias.110 
Sometimes, interviews can be difficult to conduct due to reserved or reticent participant, or 
become a personal history, unless the interviewer is able to steer the discussion into the primary 
and planned direction. However, for the transformative approach, interview participants are 
individuals whose experiences are highly valued, especially if we take into account that this 
approach tries to avoid situations of power being imposed by others. In order to preserve the 
information that was gathered during interviews, interview notes were analyzed immediately 
after the interview in order to make comments about my interpretation of the conversation and 
observe words, situations, stories or descriptions that were repeated on several occasions during 
the conversation. Additionally, upon completing an audio transfer to my personal computer, I 
created complete transcripts of the whole interview. My aim was to complete the whole process 
within three days of the interview for several reasons:  
 
                                                          
110 Gorman, G.E. & Clayton, P., 1997. Qualitative Research for the Information Professional: A Practical Handbook. 
London: Library Association Publishing. p. 125.  
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1. Some interviews were scheduled close to each other, first with one group and then with 
the other. I wanted to observe similarities, patterns and ideas that emerged and that I 
could potentially use in making up the questionnaires and discussions, thus in order to do 
this I wanted to have a list of terms that I could think of, read about and develop further 
into main ideas. 
2. To have a fresh memory of the conversation and avoid forgetting important data, ideas 
and stories. 
 
All participants during both focus groups and interviews were informed of the research scope 
and purpose and all of them read and signed the ethics statement. Following the qualitative 
research stage was the quantitative one, which included the highest number of participants, and 
was used to produce the first numerical data related to the main research question. The 
subsequent section, hence, explains the details related to this research approach.  
 
A Quantitative Approach – Analyzing questionnaires  
Participation Position and Indicators of Political Participation  
 
A) Participation Positions  
 
When examining the level of political participation of a group or an individual, one factor is 
essential – participation position. In determining people’s positions in light of political 
participation, one must consider the so called “politicization panorama”111 in the society, a term 
referring to classification of respondents on the basis of the type of their political engagement. 
Different Western authors, determine various types of political positions, and hence British 
sociologists Parry and Moyser (1992) single out three positions of political participation in the 
United Kingdom: ordinary voters, active and practically inertial.112 On the other hand, Olson, an 
                                                          
111 Kluienko, E., 2007. Political Participation: Theory, Methodology, and Measurement with the Help of the 
Guttman One-Dimension Continuity Scale. In: Golovakha, Yevhen. (ed). Ukrainian Sociological Review 2004-
2005. Kiev: Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. p. 136.  
 
112  Parry, G., Moyser, G. and Day, N., 1992.  Political Participation and Democracy in Britain. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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American political sociologist, suggests the following division: political leaders, activists, 
communicators, citizens, marginal and isolated.113 The Six Position Model is also supported by 
Verba and Nie, but the main conclusions about political participation developed according to 
these different empirical models are: 
1. Political involvement of citizens significantly differs; 
2. Political participation can be presented hierarchically: 
 
The drawbacks of these conclusions are several, but the major problem lies in the fact that people 
are linked to certain positions of political participation. Alternatively, these conclusions might 
not stand for a non-stable and democratically underdeveloped society. Consequently, the choice 
of indicators that are more specifically outlined in the section below is not accidental, since 
several situational variables (political system in BiH, culture and traditional forms of political 
participation that have proven typical of these groups throughout history) were taken into 
consideration in choosing the most appropriate ones. The aim was to group the indicators 
presented in order to determine the real level of formal political participation separately for both 
groups. The main criterion applied was the popularity of political participation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which, if we take into account the increase in number of political parties and party 
members, can be termed to be on the rise.  
 
B) Indicators of Political Participation  
 
Building up on participation positions, when assessing it in relations to the level of 
political participation of a particular group, one must consider different types of political 
involvement, from those that are more general and applicable to larger portions of a specific 
group to more complicated and demanding forms of participation which are specific only to 
smaller fractions of a group or not specific at all. After analyzing previous studies on political 
participation, such as the work of Nie and Verba, a list of eight empirical indicators was 
developed along with subsequent questions and presented in a form of questionnaire and 
distributed to participants. The main criterion that was taken into consideration when choosing 
                                                          
113 Olson, M., 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.  Harvard University 
Press.  
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these particular indicators and not others was the popularity and scope of these political 
behaviours among the two examined groups, which was observed through previously held focus 
groups and individual interviews. Hence, not all existing varieties of specific forms of political 
participation were used, and hence voting was chosen as an indicator, but subtypes of voting 
(e.g. local and general elections) were not specified, mainly because this research is interested in 
voting as a kind of political participation and not its particular sub forms.  
Furthermore, when it comes to developing the questionnaire, each of the eight general 
kinds of political participation were represented by a single indicator. The purpose of this was to 
collect a number of factual statements on respondent’s level of political involvement and how 
he/she sees him/her self in the sense of political behaviour. The answers offered were either 
scaled (1 indicating no history of particular behaviour and 5 relating to full practice of a 
particular action),114 presented as “yes” or “no” questions or offered as multiple choice statement 
with the possibility of providing only a single answer. There were no open-ended questions. The 
following is a list of empirical indicators for the chosen kinds of political participation, placed in 
no particular order (the indicators are not grouped according to how demanding they are). They 
will help determine whether the participants engage only in electoral forms of participation, or 
go further through expressive and/or verbal and cognitive types of behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
114 1 - Completely disagree, 2 – disagree, 3 – I don’t know, 4 – agree and 5 – strongly agree. 
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Indicator Operationalization  Question asked 
1. General involvement in 
political communication 
Contacts and/or 
communication with political 
actors 
Do you contact or 
communicate with 
representatives of political 
parties or movements? 
2. Verbal communication Oral expression Do you talk about politics 
and discuss political issues? 
3. Non-institutional practices of 
involvement  
Non-associated activity that 
favours certain political actors 
Do you or have you ever 
done something in favour of 
a certain social and political 
movement or party, a 
politician or a representative? 
4. Cognitive involvement  Using information about 
politics that is consumed from 
mass media 
Do you read about politics in 
newspapers, watch TV and/or 
listen to the radio? 
5. Personal influence on 
forming opinions in small 
groups 
Using propagandistic talks and 
agitation for the learned social 
and political position 
Do you attempt to persuade 
your friends or other people 
that your political opinions 
are right? 
6. Institutional involvement  Membership in civil society 
groups 
Are you an active member115 
of a social/political 
association or a party? 
7. Occasional involvement 
(motivated by a problematic 
situation) 
Relations with political actors 
in order to achieve a personal 
goal or solve a problem 
Do you apply to political 
authorities in order to solve a 
problem? 
8. Electoral involvement  Voting (general) Do you always vote/take part 
in elections)? 
 
Figure 2 
Empirical indicators of political participation of Jews and Poles in BiH 
 
 
                                                          
115 The term “active member” will be defined as an individual’s regular participation in party’s or association’s 
activity.  
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Survey Sample Data – Procedures and Participants 
 
 Measuring political participation, at least its conventional modes, is a research process 
that can rely on questions used in classical studies of political activism, notably those conducted 
by Nie, Verba and Kim (1978). Nevertheless, considering the specificities of particular groups 
that represent the subjects of this research, the survey was composed in such a way as to include 
questions that will, besides the conventional modes of political participation, measure the 
influence of the above mentioned perspectives in order to the determine which type of 
participants these two particular groups represent in the society. In other words, are we looking 
at active or passive participants? The hypothetical model of factors that determine political 
participation included: 
1. Socio-demographic traits; 
2. Civic skills; 
3. Social capital perspective; 
4. Individual and collective values; 
5. Evaluation of the economy of the country and individual’s own economic situation at 
present and in the future.  
 
In order to adequately measure each of the five factors, a set of predictors was developed for 
each one. The socio-demographic characteristics were represented by age, education and 
profession, while civic skills took into account the self-assessment of one’s capability to write a 
letter against a government decision. On the other hand, three different predictors, namely 
membership in organizations, socializing with members of the group with whom the respondent 
is not familiar and general trust in people were used as predictors of social capital. When it 
comes to individual values, two predictors (opportunity to present one’s requirements to 
politicians and respondent’s and ability to trust in political decisions) were used alongside 
collective values which were assessed by looking at evaluation of politicians’ sensitiveness to 
ordinary citizen opinions and citizens’ understanding of what happens in politics. Lastly, the 
indicators of the political system included the evaluation of the political system at present and in 
the last four years, while the evaluation of the economic system included indicators of the 
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present economic situation and the overall economic situation in the country in the last four years 
and economic self-assessment (individual’s household) at present and in the last four years.   
 
Participants 
The sample included a total of one hundred participants from each group (Jews and Poles 
from BiH) aged 18 and above, for a total of two hundred participants. The mean age for Jews 
was 57, while for Poles it was 47. Participants from both groups were members of their 
respective group’s association (Association of Jews and Association of Poles in BiH). Data was 
collected from six different communities based in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Gradiška, Mostar, Tuzla 
and Zenica. The selection of participants was random and participation was on voluntary basis. 
Only seven participants that were approached directly refused to fill out the questionnaire. Five 
of these participants believed that their answers would not contribute to my study as they 
expressed themselves as “apolitical”, while two did not explain the reasons behind their decision 
not to participate.  
The Predictors 
 In revealing the importance of the type of participants that are typical of Jewish and 
Polish national minority groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina, several predictors were outlined in 
the text above. The choice presented here is not fortuitous, as there are several hypotheses which 
will be presented and tested in order to answer a more general question of what types of 
participants these two groups represent.  
a) Age 
The first significant predictor that will be taken into consideration is participants’ age. The 
supposition is that age is a stronger predictor of active participants in comparison to passive 
participants.116 This means that the younger the participant, the less likely he/she is to participate 
in politics. When it comes to “voters”, the prediction is that they constitute the oldest group. 
However, what will be essential in considering this group is that their political behaviour does 
not go beyond voting, meaning that they do not engage in any other type of political activity. 
                                                          
116 The prediction made in this study corresponds to impact of age in classical studies of political participation, as 
demonstrated by Milbrath and Goel (1977), Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Verba, Schlozman and Brady 
(2000).  
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These assumptions rest on classical studies of political participation and their assumption that 
younger individuals participate in politics less than older ones.  
b) Education 
The primary hypothesis when it comes to participants’ education is that the more educated the 
respondent, the more likely he/she is to belong to the active type.117 In order to distinguish 
between different education levels, participants were asked to choose what type of education 
they have completed and were presented with the following options: elementary school, 
secondary (not complete), completed secondary, higher education (university) and advanced 
degrees (master’s and doctoral). This supposition is based on theoretical perspectives of socio-
economic status that argues that education offers people the necessary knowledge and skills to 
participate in politics118, including participation in social networks that can inform them about 
politics and the importance of citizen political action. Knowledge allows active participants to be 
educated about political acts as it provides them with necessary skills to understand and 
consequently participate in political acts.  
 
c)  Membership in organizations  
Membership in organizations, both social and political, is considered to be a significant indicator 
in predicting the types of political participants.119 The primary argument is that the more active 
an individual is in social or political organizations, the more knowledge and skills he/she has 
about the importance of political participation. Moreover, through organizational membership, 
people are able to develop skills and knowledge, cognitive and organizational skills and civic 
virtues which give them a sense of what it means to be politically engaged. Hence, participants 
who are active in social and political organizations are highly likely to fall under the category of 
active participants. 
 
 
                                                          
117 As shown in classical works of political participation of Conway (1991), Parry, Moyser and Day (1992), 
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Verba, Schlozman and Brady (2000), as well as studies on political participation 
in post-communist states including those of Norris (2002) and Markowski and Tucker (2005).  
 
118 Conway, M., 1991. Political Participation in the United States. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.  
 
119 Foley, M. W. and Edwards, B. (1996). The paradox of civil society. Journal of Democracy, 7. pp. 38-52. 
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d) Self-assessment of civic skills (internal efficacy) 
Self-assessment of civic skills is a significant predictor, which will be examined through two 
sub-predictors “ability to write a letter to government representatives” and “socializing with 
unknown people in order to exchange views on their social networks”. This predictor 
hypothesizes that the former sub-predictor is more characteristic of middle-active 
(communicators) to active participants. The same is true of latter participants, whereby the 
assumption is that active participants have more developed social networking skills which help 
them in acquiring more information about different political matters. In turn, social networking 
contributes to participants tending to become more active in organizations.  
 
e) Belief that politicians are attentive to people’s needs and opinions (external efficacy)  
This predictor of external efficacy120 allows us to test the hypothesis that the higher the 
respondent evaluates the statement that “politicians are attentive to people’s needs and opinions”, 
the more likely they are to belong to passive participants. This is because they are usually 
unaware of the type of communication and difficulties connected to it when it comes to 
addressing people’s needs and opinions on behalf of politicians.  
 
f) Evaluation of the economic situation of the participant’s household  
In Uslaner’s and Brown’s (2005)121 study on civic engagement, the underlying argument is that 
with a fast increase in economic inequality the level of optimism about the future is more 
pessimistic among active participants, while the opposite is true of passive participants. This is 
an important predictor in determining the types of participants, but it remains to be seen whether 
this assumption applies to respondents of the present research, and whether it holds that younger 
participants who are less likely to participate in politics are also more optimistic about their 
future because of age and because they have less experience in socio-economic inequality in the 
society.  
 
                                                          
120 Ingelhart, R., 1979. Political Action: The Impact of Values, Cognitive Level, and Social Background. In: Barnes, 
S.H., Kaase, M., et al. (eds.). Political Actions. Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies. London: Sage 
Publications. pp. 343-381.  
 
121 Uslaner, E.M., Brown, M., 2005. “Inequality, Trust and Civic Engagement”. In: American Political Research, no. 
33 (6). pp. 868-894.  
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The Importance of Assessing the Type of Participants in Relations to Political 
Participation: What the Empirical Analysis Contributes To? 
 
Whether citizens constitute an active or passive political body represents a query that is 
essential in assessing political participation within a society, but becomes even more relevant on 
small group basis, such as minority groups. In fact, assessing the type of participants in relation 
to political participation in transition democracies constitutes a viable factor in discussing 
democratization levels among members of a particular group, which, in turn, enables one to 
consider the overall democratization process in a particular society. Types of participants are 
always easily characterized by typical and straightforward patterns of political behaviour, which 
include their general interest in politics, voting and more direct participation, as through 
membership in political associations or engagement in electoral campaigns. By now, it has 
become very clear that passive participants contribute to these three factors the least, while active 
participants contribute the most. However, this general notion pertains to general political 
participation, but when it comes to other, less conventional modes of political participation, it 
will be interesting to evaluate whether passive participants contribute more to other political acts, 
aside from voting and political membership. As some recent studies in post-communist states 
have shown (e.g. Lithuania, Romania), passive participants contribute to voting the least, but are 
more active in other political acts than a more specific category of voters.122   
In constructing a survey on the type of political participants several classical theoretical 
approaches to measuring political participation were taken into consideration in order to 
adequately choose the predictors that are most closely associated with determining the types of 
participants, or better, whether they fall within the categories of passive, active or voters groups. 
Hence, in a more general sense, three types of participants were determined through this survey – 
active, passive and voters – as characterized by their political behaviour which relates to either 
simple interest in politics, to voting and full political participation. The fundamental benchmark 
is that active participants are most interested in politics, that they, besides voting in elections, 
also participate in other political acts (membership in organizations, communication with 
politicians, etc.) and are more likely to engage in further political activities. On the other hand, 
                                                          
122 The category of “voters” will be introduced in order to differentiate between participants who are deemed active 
when it comes to voting, but passive when it comes to other forms of political participation. Their behaviour will be 
assessed on the same basis as passive and active participants.  
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voters are quite interested in politics as they always or almost always vote, but are not 
characterized by further involvement in political life. Lastly, passive participants are not at all 
interested in politics, as they contribute to voting the least, but can turn out to contribute more to 
other types of political activity than voters, but only at times of concerning issues that are of 
interest to them (temporary participation). 
Consequently, in constructing such a survey, the predictors taken from my hypothesizing 
and observation alongside classical theoretical studies on political participation123 were taken 
into consideration. This was done in order to examine whether they hold true for the two specific 
national minority groups living in Bosnia and Herzegovina which are the subject of this study. 
The predictors of the resources (age, education and self-assessment of civic skills), social capital 
perspective (membership in organizations and socializing with unknown people), as well as 
attitudes (evaluations of the economic situation of one’s household) are considered very relevant 
in the post-conflict, transition period in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and after preliminary research 
conducted for the purposes of designing the survey (through individual interviews and focus 
groups) they were expected to significantly differentiate between the types of participants of 
these two groups. Hence, with the purpose of testing the initial observations, and in line with the 
above predictors and classical theoretical observations, several hypotheses are expected to be 
either confirmed or rejected through this survey: 
H1. Active to middle-active participants participate in most political activities and vote in 
elections. 
H2. Voters almost always participate in elections and represent the largest participatory group. 
H3. Passive participants are least educated and rely heavily on media sources to learn about 
politics. They show high level of interest in domestic political events.  
H4. Belonging to social networks and personal attitudes significantly influence the type of 
political behaviour. 
H4.1. Active participants have the most social network resources, developed networks 
and support the political system. They are the most educated participants. 
                                                          
123 Conway (1991), Parry, Moyser and Day (1992), Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) , Foley, and Edwards (1996), 
Verba, Schlozman and Brady (2000), Uslaner and Brown (2005). 
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H4.2. Passive participants are young, have the least social network resources and more 
developed networks when compared to active participants. They do not strongly support 
the political system.  They support the economic system because they focus on improving 
their economic situation. This is why they are not much interested in politics.  
H4.3. Voters belong to the oldest group, have the lowest levels of social network 
resources and least developed networks. They are the most pessimistic when it comes to 
the support of the economic system and the benefits it can bring them.  
H5. Older generations are more politically active compared to younger voters.  
Starting with these five hypothesis and three sub-hypothesis, the expectation is also to answer the 
question of whether we can observe a shift from formal and elite directed forms of participation 
among minority participants (e.g. voting, political party membership) to more informal, issue-
specific engagement in politics by passive minority participants and whether they will form a 
new, catalyst group of minority participants in BiH with the tendency to influence more than the 
other two categories.  
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Part II  
Positionality, Reflexivity and Ethical Issues  
 Research that involves humans as participants often commences with an ethical tension, 
and often ends up as a process of asking people to participate and engage in procedures that they 
are unfamiliar with, did not request to or seek to know and that, in many cases, do not directly 
benefit from the research itself.124 Although this last case does not stand for the transformative 
paradigm within which this research is posited, whereby participants in the research are expected 
to benefit from the results and were engaged in the research process throughout the entire period, 
the tension that arises out of individual participant’s perception that he or she is only a mere 
subject of research, rather than somebody who benefits from it, is a tension that is very often 
present in researching social groups.125 In practice, this issue is resolved with providing the 
participants with a free and informed consent form, which is a matter of procedural ethics.126 
Nevertheless, ethical research in practice goes beyond the practical procedures, which is why a 
researcher must also be aware of the principle of reflexivity, which, as Guillemin and Gillam 
argue “is also a bridge to the procedural ethical issues that can often seem out of place in the 
everyday practice of social research”127  
 In regards to the connection between reflexivity and transformative paradigm within 
which this research posits national minority groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the constant 
questions that I engaged with myself were: what do I know about these groups? and how did I 
come about this knowledge? One of the most obvious answers that emerged every single time I 
thought about these questions was my insider status, the fact that I lived alongside these groups, 
that my knowledge of the context within which my research was taking place was wide and deep 
and that, throughout the process, and notably towards the end of my research, I have become 
personally close to these groups. Hence, in this respect, reflexivity was a process of my own 
                                                          
124 Guillemin, M. & Gillam, L., 2004. “Ethics, Reflexivity and ‘Ethically Important Moments’ in Research”. In: 
Qualitative Inquiry, Vol. 10 (2). p. 271.  
 
125 Ibid, p. 271.  
 
126 Ibid, p. 271.  
 
127 Ibid, p. 271. 
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critical scrutiny, something that has followed me from the beginning to the end of the whole 
procedure. Engaging with groups about which I had decent, but still limited knowledge and 
operating within the research environment in which not much is known about them, often made 
me question how I can improve the validity of the research that was never carried out before and 
how many limitations will this research have. In contrast to this, connecting my epistemological 
approach with my reflexivity, my position as a researcher implied that my research was 
conducted in a particular way – my research participants had a say in how my research was 
framed, what contexts were relevant for their patterns of political participation and factors that 
trigger it, what experiences and stories from other similar contexts can help in the process of 
their empowerment, what questions should be asked, how questions should be answered, how 
particular research findings pertain to them and how can they be used for their advantage. 
Although, this approach ensured that the autonomy of the research participants was safeguarded 
in a way that they played an active role in the whole process, I was especially reflexive on my 
primary research aims and questions when I found myself in situations in which older or highly 
politically engaged participants sought to steer the focus in a different direction. Although, as 
implied by the paradigmatic approach I used, their concerns, stories and ideas were highly 
accounted for in terms of their overall contribution to the goals of my research, I took a more 
careful approach when talking with similar group or individuals in future occasions. Hence, in 
this context my reflexivity into the whole process made me think of new ways in which I would 
ask the questions and word them, the way I would frame questions and the period in the research 
process when I would ask these questions. Overall, the way I asked myself certain questions and 
the way I analyzed qualitative data (a process described above) enabled me to continuously 
develop skills that made me more aware of my role as a researcher and of my status within the 
researched community.  
 Related to the precedent discussion is my role as a researcher. Quite obviously, in this 
research I was an insider, a person born and raised in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but an outsider in 
terms of belonging to the groups that I researched. Hence, I ultimately arrive to answering the 
question of what impact has my insider status had on my research. Kanuha (2000) defines insider 
research as a process during which a researcher conducts research with a population to which 
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he/she belongs to.128 Hence, the insider as a researcher shares linguistic, historical, experiential 
and other characteristics with the researched group. This collision of insider epistemology is 
greatly considered by Asselin (2003) who argued that it is best for the insider researcher to 
gather data with her or his ‘eyes open’ but assuming that she or he knows nothing about the 
phenomenon being studied.129 Furthermore, she points that, just as I claim above, the researcher 
might come from the studied culture, but may not know much or even understand the subculture, 
or in my case, different ethnic groups that I live alongside. This situation is reflected in three 
subtypes of insider qualitative researchers which Adler and Adler (1987) went further to identify: 
a peripheral member researcher (the one that does not participate in the core activities of group 
members, an active member researcher (the one who is involved in main activities, but does not 
commit to goals and values of the researched group) and a complete member researcher (a 
member of the group or somebody who becomes affiliated with the group during the process).130  
 Reflecting on my personal type of researcher, I cannot say that I was, during any stage of 
my work, just a peripheral researcher, but rather an active member researcher since I 
intentionally became engaged with the studied groups, in their religious and holiday activities 
and in their daily lives, all in order to fully understand first their history and how they viewed 
themselves in terms of historical influences on their present political activism, to how they 
understand their political role in Bosnian post-Dayton reality. I must admit that towards the end 
of my research, notably because I was engaged with these groups very closely for almost four 
years, I just about became a complete member researcher. This is especially true of the Jewish 
community in Sarajevo, which, at one point, funded my research and became very interested in 
the results and the benefits of this study for their community. This complete membership role 
enabled me to own a certain degree of privilege in a sense that I had frequent, fast and complete 
acceptance by my participants. I claim this because my participants often told me that they were 
                                                          
128 Kanuha, V. K., 2000. “Being” Native versus “Going Native”: Conducting Social Work Research as an Insider. 
In: Social Work, Vol. 45 (5).  
 
129 Asselin, M. E., 2003. “Insider research: Issues To Consider when Doing Qualitative Research in Your Own 
Setting”. In: Journal for Nurses in Staff Development, Vol. 19 (2).  
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‘happy’, ‘excited’, ‘humbled’ and ‘honoured’131 that I researched their group. My participants 
were very open with me, but this feeling of openness emerged the most when I spoke to Jews 
from Sarajevo, as they saw me as a real insider, a Sarajevan. What this meant for my research 
was that I was able to gather in-depth data about the studied groups, as there was a great degree 
of trust and openness that I believe would not have been easily acquired have I been an outsider. 
At the preliminary stages of my research, as well as during the mid-point, I felt as I had complete 
access into these groups. I was always welcomed, I had very personal conversations with most of 
my interviewees and focus group participants, especially the youth.  
 Although the certain shared experiences that I indeed held in common with the studied 
groups were very valuable during the entire process, I did, however, many times reflect on the 
questions I might receive from outsiders about the validity of my research. My primary questions 
to myself were – do my participants really tell me everything, or do they, because I am an 
insider, skip certain points assuming that I know the context well? If this is true, does this mean 
that I am not hearing full stories? Due to this, I always made sure to tell my participants to 
explain the background of the issue, to talk to me like I did not know anything or knew very 
little. This way I assured that the research was guided by the participant’s experiences and not 
my own. As is clear, there are many benefits of the insider status, but I am fully aware that this 
situation can inevitably cause issues of questioning my influence on the participants. However, I 
am of the opinion that the opposite researcher status cannot make one immune to the influence of 
personal perspective, and, considering the nature of the groups I study in this dissertation, much 
of the information would not have been available to me were I an outsider.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter outlined and critically examined and explained the main methodological approaches 
applied in this study. The first part concentrated on the transformative paradigm and discussed 
the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the chosen paradigm, as well as the choices 
of methods, indicating a mixed-method approach and justifying the reasons for such predilection. 
The qualitative methods which included focus groups and interviews were explained alongside 
data analysis, giving both approaches a dose of validity in terms of their application. In the 
                                                          
131 These words emerged the most during the focus groups and interviews, but mostly personal conversations that I 
had with members of different Jewish and Polish participants across BiH.  
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following chapters I apply the methods described here to present and analyze data on 
conventional political participation of Jews and Poles in BiH. In addition to this, the chapter 
commented on positionality and reflexivity issues, a part in which special focus was placed on 
my insider status as a researcher. Thus, this chapter offers a methodological reasoning for the 
applied approach for the overall research on political participation of national minority groups in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is the main topic of this work. Moreover, and related to the fact 
that transformative paradigm research considers social reality as historically bound, this part 
serves as a basis for understanding the strong focus on the historical chapter that will follow later 
in the study. But, in order to first understand the connection between representations as a source 
of minority power essential for research under the auspices of the transformative paradigm, I 
now turn to discuss these concepts as they relate to representation and political participation of 
national minorities in different democratic systems.  
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CHAPTER 3: MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN DIFFERENT 
DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS 
 
Introduction 
After theorizing political participation in its more general scope, I now turn to the question of 
representation, as representation and participation are termed to be intertwined insofar as they 
require each other’s presence in order for a state to be termed as highly democratic.132 
Established democracies or better strong democratic states are expected to have institutions of 
direct democracy, but it is often the case that, as Young (2002) calls them “anti-representation” 
positions emerge even in most stable democracy. The latter scenario largely depends on the 
existence of radical democrats who see representation as an ill of the very value of democracy. 
They suggest that “representation alienates political will at the cost of genuine self-government, 
impairs the community’s ability to function as a regulating instrument of justice”133. The major 
objection to representation of all groups in the society is that only states that are large enough, 
meaning that they have a large polity and population, can afford representation. Alternatively, 
small states that have de-centralized units cannot afford representation. Robert Dahl (1989) 
suggests that democracy, regardless of their size, cannot evade representation. Young (2002) 
supports and extends Dahl’s argument by saying that “even in relatively small units of political 
decision making political […] equality may best be served by institutions of formal 
representation”134 Yet, the institutions of some democracies do discourage citizens from 
participating in political processes and ultimately decision-making. This taking away of rights 
typically occurs in relation to national minority groups. The chapter that follows will engage the 
argument of special representation of marginalized groups with the wider literature, while the 
second part will focus on explaining the approach to national minority right to political 
participation. Hence, this chapter discusses the sources of minority political power, from 
                                                          
132 Young, I.M., 2002. Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford University Press. p. 124.  
 
133 Barber, B., 1984. Strong Democracy. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 145-146.  
 
134 Young, I.M., 2002. Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford University Press. p. 125.  
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representation to the right to political participation and explains how they are viewed and 
contextualized in various democratic systems. 
 
PART I  
Minority Representation  
 
 An essential mode for the promotion of efficient representation of members of under-
represented groups135 is through political and associational institutions. However, representation 
of marginalized groups does not mean an immediate commitment to political equality (Phillips, 
1993). A remedy for this that is often proposed in the wider theory of political participation, 
especially related to minority groups, and that is the concept of “descriptive” or “mirror” 
representation. As such, the represented are all members of the marginalized group (s) as related 
to the proportion that it has in the general public136. Pitkin (1971) argues that ‘mirror’ 
representation equals representation which only serves as a “standing for” rather than asking 
about being represented. Such arguments are appealing, as the practice of ‘mirror’ representation 
can represent an inclusive forum for political participation of groups that are under-represented. 
Again, this is especially relevant for national minority groups and the issue of political 
participation. Several studies (Mansbridge, 1980, Williams, 1998) confirmed that in places 
where there is history of exclusion of groups from the political processes, members of such 
groups are likely to be disengaged in politics, largely because they have become apathetic or 
simply because they refuse to try to engage with the majority.137 Secondly, due to marginalized 
groups’ social positioning as “minority”, they often tend to have different understanding of social 
and political problems, which also implies that they have different solutions for them. As 
Williams (1998) and Bickford (1999) propose, such groups perceive each other differently; have 
different opinions about the society, its history and current contexts. Hence, in this case 
                                                          
135 Under-represented groups include women, working-class people, ethnic and racial minorities, disadvantaged 
castes, etc. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, I will consider only national minorities as under-
represented groups in the context discussed. Source: Young, I.M., 2002. Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford 
University Press. p. 141. 
 
136 Pitkin, A., 1971. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
 
137 Williams, M., 1998. Voice, Trust and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failure of Liberal Representation. 
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representation can only ease such imbalances. Accordingly, the next parts of this chapter will 
outline theories of how different democratic systems contribute and accommodate national 
minority political participation. 
 
Sources of Minority Political Power: Representation in the Government  
 
 Minority participation, at least in democratic states, is termed to represent the highest and 
most advanced form of minority representation. Considering this, it can be stated that most 
European countries or better those with a longstanding legacy of democratic rule, have, in one 
way or the other, successfully managed to include their national minority groups into the 
political processes on all government levels. Of course, the focus here is on countries with a 
strong record of successful mechanisms of inter-ethnic cooperation, a long history of minority 
inclusion and an effective state apparatus which allows for different groups’ political 
participation but more so, political influence. Nevertheless, the right to political participation of 
national minorities does not derive purely from minority rights, but quite the contrary - it 
primarily stems from the political concept of power sharing.138 And although the executive 
power sharing is relatively non present in international legal documents on minority rights, it has 
become an important segment of states’ political efforts to include their minority groups into the 
governing political bodies. The general non-recognition of the term “power-sharing” within the 
general international law context can, at least in part, be due to the fact that the very terminology 
of “power-sharing” is both viewed and understood differently across varying political contexts 
and realities. Hence, power-sharing in post-conflict states, such as BiH, is viewed as a modus for 
engagement and cooperation between two former belligerents and is, thus, not understood as a 
minority-related instrument, but rather a tool for the creation and sustainability of a post-conflict 
government which aims at consolidating the historical enemies. On the other hand, in most stable 
democracies, power-sharing is based on broad coalitions,139 but also other mechanisms, such as 
group-specific motivations and loud presence of minorities in the media, but also short-term 
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coalitions between majorities and minorities. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, I 
will orient towards the definition of power-sharing as used in works by Brendan O’Leary which 
states that executive power-sharing is understood “as the inclusion of all major ethnic groups in 
the executive.”140 Not least, when using the term executive power-sharing in the context of 
minority inclusion it must be noted that such rights derive both directly from international human 
rights standards, but also indirectly from other mechanisms of minority inclusion in the areas of 
cultural recognition, use of language, education, etc. And while the former represent an already 
formed and relatively rigid form of inclusion norms, the latter are created and argued for by 
minorities themselves, provided that they already constitute a significant group on any given 
governmental level. Yet, other more significant differences between these two sources of 
minority inclusion in the power-sharing realm remain.  
 Firstly, let us consider the international human rights standards that span into minority 
rights sphere. Most, if not all of these instruments are scarce of detail when it comes to defining 
the political representation of minority groups.141 Although they do prohibit minority exclusion 
from the government, there is a lack of precise delineation between mere rejection of inclusion 
and a right to be represented. In other words, governments may interpret these norms according 
to their political tradition, type of democratic rule and the existing established system of power-
sharing, but also in the context of time and space, which refers to short-term circumstances that 
may arise between majority and minority groups. Hence, the legal regulation (or its absence 
thereof) of minority presence in the government is subject to interpretation. This can make such 
provision highly allusive and misleading for minorities that seek representation. Another 
contested dispute presented by international human rights standards on minority inclusion is the 
dilemma of when and how minorities should be included in the government. One example is the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) and the Commentary 
of its Advisory Committee on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life 
which states that there should be a possibility for “posts assigned for minority representatives in 
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141 I will use the term “minority” here, as these instruments do not pertain only to national minorities, but also other 
marginalized groups.  
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the executive on all levels.”142 The Commentary, however, falls short of defining how such 
representation should occur, through which mechanisms and according to what standards, thus 
leaving much space for controversy and different interpretations. What the Commentary does 
acknowledge is the danger of using veto rights, which can also be employed as tools in power-
sharing systems. As Bieber points “the scepticism of the Advisory Committee is borne primarily 
out of the experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina, rather than any theoretical and comparative 
study of these mechanisms.”143 It is, than, clear that the Advisory Committee is ill equipped in a 
sense of offering mid-way recommendations for multi-ethnic states governing, but maybe 
rightfully so, considering different political histories and traditions, as well as types of 
democracy that vary the interpretation of international norms. In addition to the Advisory 
Committee, one more international norm within the field of minority rights protection needs to 
be consulted – the Lund Recommendations, which state that:  
 
States should ensure that opportunities exist for minorities to have an effective voice at 
the level of the central government, including through special arrangements as 
necessary. These may include, depending upon circumstances:…formal and informal 
understandings for allocating to members of national minorities cabinet positions…144 
There is a clear reference to power-sharing in this recommendation, but since Lund 
Recommendations do not provide binding standards, this interpretation can only be used in the 
sense of best practice. Hence, the international human rights norms on the issue of minority 
inclusion in the government are weak and defenceless. They offer a good starting point and a 
valid framework for states’ behaviour, but fall short of binding provisions which could ensure 
better efforts by multi-ethnic democracies to include their marginalized groups. Thus, the 
interpretation of these notes rests in the hands of domestic sources of political and legal power.  
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Public Affairs, 27 February 2008, ACFC/31DOC (2008), para. 128.  
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 Finally, minority representation in the executive also derives from minorities themselves. 
What this means is that if minorities do influence the decision-making processes in the domain 
of minority language usage, education in their mother tongue, access to minority media channels 
and cultural recognition, than this means that their government require their active participation 
in the decision-making on minority questions.145 But yet again, there is room for analysis. The 
new dilemma in this context is represented by the impasse between mere symbolical 
representation and influential power-sharing, while the room for interpretation still remains in 
the hands of domestic sources of legitimacy, or better the long-established spaces of political 
tradition and constitutional provisions. Hence, there are some underlying questions here – to 
what degree is minority representation effective and do minority representatives really 
effectively represent their minority group or are they puppets of their (often majority) political 
parties? In order to offer an answer to the former query, O’Leary discerns between “a complete, 
concurrent and weak consociational executive”146, whereby the first includes all relevant parties, 
the second parties which represent the majority of the community and the last where only the 
plurality of the minority community is present. The second matter regards the influence of 
minority members within the government, an issue which highly depends on the form of 
minority representation within a given state. But in order to offer a deeper meaning to the former 
issue, mainly in the context of BiH where this problem is widely present, I will briefly discuss 
the theoretical viewpoints of minority representation and constitutional executive power-sharing.  
 
Minority Representation and Constitutional Executive Power-Sharing 
 
 Compared to power-sharing, minority representation can be termed to represent a 
subordinate and consequently weaker form of minority inclusion in the executive. The basis for 
this lie in the fact that minority representation is temporary because of a clear lack of political 
                                                          
145 This type of participation is accomplished through different mechanisms, from consultative roles to cultural 
autonomy and self-determination. Of course, autonomy and self-determination form the widest basis for executive-
power sharing, but since national minorities in BiH do not aspire for such rights, these mechanisms will not be 
discussed in the wider theoretical context of this dissertation. Not least, the attention will be drifted to different 
sources of minority inclusion which are relevant to the country in question and its national minority groups, 
including state and sub-state constitutions, and federal arrangements in their more specific forms.   
146 O’Really, B., Debating consociational politics: Normative and explanatory arguments, In: Noel, S. (ed.), From 
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and legal norms which would make it a constitutionally embedded regulation. Hence, it is up to 
majorities to decide whether and how to include minorities in the executive; this makes it clear 
that they (the majorities) are not obliged to do so. Yet, majorities can benefit from minority 
inclusion in the government, despite the obvious lack binding international norms. The reasons 
for this are manifold and include preferential coalitioning, easy-to-satisfy minority demands vs. 
hard-line majority party demands, conditionality (e.g. EU), an advanced diversity policy and 
government’s commitment to multiculturalism, symbolism, but also control.  
 Firstly, majorities include minorities in the executive for, as Bieber (2010) points, 
“arithmetic reasons”, which means that majority party can secure for the minority party to enter 
the executive, thus allowing the majority to obtain the obligatory parliamentary majority to 
govern.147 This is especially true of governments where majority parties are in such sharp 
opposition that coalitioning becomes impossible, and where minority inclusion in the executive 
through a majority party is much less costly than the inclusion of other smaller parties which 
already enjoy majority support. Related to this is the fact that minority parties/representatives are 
almost entirely concerned with minority rights, so that it becomes much easier to satisfy these 
demands than to make much harder concessions to opposing majority parties. On the other hand, 
minority parties are sometimes included in the executive to balance the majority parties of both 
extreme right and extreme left, as they tend to be much more moderate than their majority 
counterparts. Hence, minority parties can offer an alternative to governments where extreme 
right/left wing parties gain most seats.  
 Not least, soft power tools as exercised by, for example, the European Union, can serve 
as a stimuli for domestic sources of legitimacy in getting the much needed external support 
benefit from including minority parties into the executive realm. As pointed out by Bieber, 
several countries which sought EU-accession (e.g. Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania) have opted 
for minority party inclusion in the government only to satisfy their ambition to join the European 
supranational actor. Lastly, some countries (e.g. Serbia) opt for minority party inclusion in the 
government due to their multiculturalist orientation and diversity policies. In these countries, 
more than in other, the justification for minority inclusion does not find its basis in conditionality 
or concessional benefits, but rather in power demonstrations and control. International standards 
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do not represent the foundation for their inclusive-behaviour as these countries and their ruling 
parties can (and have done so in the past) withdraw their support for minorities at any given time. 
Bieber and McRae argue “that such forms of minority inclusion resemble the model of ‘control’ 
– a model of majority control over the minority – such a conceptualization carries strong 
negative connotations.”148 However, apart from the issue of control, such arrangements make 
much sense in countries where minority groups are relatively small, unless we are considering 
cases where formal and legally enshrined power-sharing is necessary for historic reasons (e.g. 
Kosovo).  
 Aside from minority representation which is obviously weak and subject to interpretation 
and majority motives and preferences, executive power-sharing “can be described as a firm and 
durable commitment towards the inclusion of different groups within government. Such a 
commitment might be expressed either by a political agreement, which has evolved over time 
into a tradition, or a legal requirement.”149 In a large majority of Western European states with a 
history of democratic heritage, such power-sharing arrangements evolve out of tradition. At this 
point, I will turn the attention to some of the major sources of minority powers both legally 
enshrined and those prescribed by the postulates of political organization (mainly federalism and 
its sub-forms). The focus will be not on all minorities, but on national minorities and the sources 
of their right to political participation.  
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PART II 
Accommodating National Minorities’ Rights to Political Participation in 
Different Democratic Political Systems 
 
It was a dream of nineteenth-century nationalists to unite the people of the state around a 
common story of one language, history and habitual life practiced among ordinary men in order 
to create nation-states that would serve as representations of ethnically homogenous groups 
(Gertz 1973, Isaacs 1975, Rokkan 1975, Smith 1986). A century later, states established 
numerous political mechanisms to accommodate the growing ethno-national diversities within 
their borders, and hence instituted legal instruments which would protect national minorities, as 
well as sets of policies relating to these groups and the areas they inhabited150. Cohen and 
Warwick (1983), Collins and Waller (1992), Enloe (1973) and Nielsen (1985) all argue that 
modern institutions of mass political importance (notably communication and education) played 
a vital role in emphasising common these identities. The hope of states which embarked upon 
this past of unity was to erode the national differences upon which the members of the 
population were basing their identity151. But to establish an ethnically diverse state that would 
adopt a common identity, it was crucial for the people to be recognized as members of one 
nation. Even more so was critical that the citizens adopt the common identity and participate as 
members of a single political system, regardless of their ethnic, linguistic or religious origins. 
Such provisions, thus, became mostly regulated by state constitutions, but it is not a rarity that 
these integrative political mechanisms fail as different ethno-nationalist groups fight to maintain 
their sovereignty152. In democratic states, where citizen participation is considered an essential 
characteristic of democratic development such issues are again, regulated by state constitutions, 
but also other state-instituted arrangements. Hence, to fully understand how such political 
mechanisms function, but more importantly how they relate to national minority rights to 
                                                          
150 These policies related especially to economic development. Source: Sekulić et al., 1994. Who were the 
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151 Davis, H., 1978. Toward a Marxist Theory of Nationalism. New York: Monthly Review.  
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political participation, the following sections offer a systematic overview of most relevant and 
common political mechanisms used to accommodate national minority rights to participation in 
the political processes.  
 
National Minorities in State Constitutions: A Conceptual Clarification 
 
 When considering state constitution as a source of minority power, it is necessary to 
make a quick definitional differentiation pertaining to national minority rights. Within state 
constitutions, national minority rights may refer to one of three different types: minority rights 
that are exercised individually, minority rights that are exercised collectively, or individual (non-
collective rights). Minority rights that are exercised individually are rights that have been 
conferred to an individual precisely because he or she belongs to a specific group or 
community.153 In contrast, minority rights that are exercised collectively depend on the existence 
of a sufficient number of people within a minority community such that the group, as a whole, 
can receive particular treatment.154 Finally, individual (non-collective rights) refer to those rights 
that may be particularly important to national minorities (such as non-discrimination) but that are 
granted to all, including the members of the majority.155 A large part of the academic literature 
refers to the first and second types of rights listed above, as will I hereafter156. But where do 
these constitutionally embedded rights stem from and what are their origins is a question which 
needs to be considered next within the broader context of constitutionally enshrined rights for 
national minorities.  
The question of general minority rights first entered the international dialectic indirectly 
through the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. The development of the concept Westphalian 
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sovereignty, which sermonized the supreme authority of the sate and through the concept of state 
sovereignty also set the basis for national self-determination, contained within it the premise that 
states could be recognized as independent entities with power over their people as long as they 
did not violate the rights of minorities.157 Following World War I and the establishment of the 
League of Nations, the question of minority rights, though acknowledged as an important issue, 
was conveniently swept aside as conflict arose over the precise meaning of self-determination: at 
that time the focus was on equal rights for citizens, not nations. Thereafter, the multi-national 
states that emerged after the Great War in Central and Eastern Europe differed greatly from the 
liberal and Republican states of the West.158 This can be, in part, attributed to the reality that 
many of the Western states were held together through a civic principle, whereby citizenship in 
the polity was taken as the foundation for national cohesion or patriotism.159 On the other hand, 
many of the states in CEE were held together by a national principle, which “defines the nation 
in terms of ‘blood and soil’ conceptions of ethnicity”160, embedded in primordial theories of 
nations. Still, following World War II, the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights went 
even further to dissociate rights with any sort of collective identity161.  
The collapse of communism revealed the underdevelopment of the historical progression 
of West European minority norms in several key aspects. First, was the question of self-
determination of nations and minority autonomy; second, the defence of individual rights over 
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159 Rhodes, M., 1995. “National Identity and Minority Rights in the Constitutions of the Czech Republic and 
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161 In order to limit the use of the term of “collective identity” to autochthon national minority groups, but also due 
to the fact that “collective identity” is out of the scope of this dissertation, I refer to the definition of it as put forward 
by Polleta and Jasper (2001) who define collective identity “as an individual’s cognitive, moral, and emotional 
connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution. It is a perception of a shared status or 
relation, which may be imagined rather than experienced directly, and it is distinct from personal identities, although 
it may form part of a personal identity. Collective identities are expressed in cultural materials—names, narratives, 
symbols, verbal styles, rituals, clothing, and so on—but not all cultural materials express collective identities.” 
Source: Polletta, F., and Jasper, J.M., 2001. “Collective Identity and Social Movements”. In: Annual Review of 
Sociology. Vol. 27. Columbia University. p. 285.  
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collective rights and third, the relation between kin states and co-ethnics.162  Accordingly, three 
different competing visions on constitutional minority policy emerged in Eastern Europe. The 
first vision, which can be considered “strong democracy”, emphasized majoritarianism, denying 
“the state had any role in promoting or preserving minority culture, including funding schools 
and accommodating nonstate languages, unless the majority specifically authorized it.”163 The 
second and less prevalent, “broad liberalism”, allowed citizens in the private sphere to pursue the 
goals of their cultural community and provided access to the state in minority languages, while 
the third, “liberal pluralism”, was geared toward the recognition of multiple national 
communities.164 It was not until 1995 and the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities, a multilateral treaty of the Council of Europe, that the vision in which 
governments are required “to provide ‘appropriate’ levels of minority-language education, 
media, and other cultural goods, but they are not required to make them available to specific 
persons, nor can they limit the enjoyment of these goods by any persons”165 was articulated. 
However, a 1996 re-examination of the convention clarified that there is no recognized right of 
special status for minorities and that international law cannot impose any territorial solution for 
national minorities. 
 Hence, and as noted previously, the opinion of democratic states still differs as to whether 
there is a need for special minority rights within their state constitutions. Some states such as 
France and Greece support national minority rights by avoiding any language that would grant 
citizens who are members of national minorities any special rights beyond the human rights that 
are universally accepted, ignoring linguistic and cultural differences.166 For others, such as 
Hungary and Germany, the unity of state and nation is less important (though for different 
reasons), and the protection of special minority rights appears a state goal in official politics, 
“…so that the preservation of the country’s ethnic and cultural diversity may even appear a 
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constitutional duty.”167 In Eastern Europe, the national (as opposed to civic) orientations of the 
constitutions can likewise manifest in different policies toward minorities. For example, the 
Albanian, Estonian, and Lithuanian constitutions rest on sovereignty principles deriving from the 
nation, which seems to undermine or even deny national minorities. However, many post-
communist constitutions based in national principles include different minority protection 
mechanisms, spanning from guaranteeing the right to receive education in their own language 
and some access to the state in minority languages, to the right to freely determine and develop 
their national identity. Still yet, some states choose to mix national and civic ideas, such as the 
Polish Constitution, which opens with, “‘We, The Polish Nation – all citizens of Poland.’”168 
This mixture, of course, might prove confusing for national minorities in how they choose to 
identify themselves.  
 A case study comparison between the Czech Republic and Slovakia by Rhodes reveals 
that a constitutional emphasis on the civic principle instead of the national principle has proven 
to better resolve conflict pertaining to minorities. The Czech Republic outlines the rights of 
national minorities, stating that “‘citizens who constitute national or ethnic minorities are 
guaranteed all-round development’ as well as the right to ‘education in their language’, to ‘use 
their language in official contact’, and to ‘participate in the settlement of matters concerning 
national and economic minorities.’”169 But the document exclusively refers to the inhabitants of 
the country as citizens, not as a nation or a people. In contrast, though the Slovakian constitution 
also outlines rights for national minorities, it adopts the national principle: “We the Slovak 
nation...together with members of national minorities and other ethnic groups living on the 
territory of the Slovak Republic, that is, we the citizens of the Slovak Republic, adopt through 
our representative this Constitution.”170 This seemingly minute difference in vernacular has 
proven to exacerbate domestic challenges within the state, particularly by antagonizing the large 
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Hungarian minority.171 All of the above examples clearly demonstrate that the merits of a 
constitution based on the civic principle versus the national principle remain inconclusive and 
necessary of evaluation on a case-by-case basis that accounts for the particular history and 
culture of each respective state.  
 Hence, the question of territorial autonomy for minority groups still poses a conundrum 
in the state constitution-making process of today. Discussing the necessary requirements for 
minorities to make an Iraqi constitution viable, Mutua argues that in addition to equal protection 
and anti-discrimination requirements, a Bill of Rights must guarantee: 
“minority groups, such as the Assyrians, Christians, and Armenians, the right to use their 
own language, the right to practice their own religion, and the right to enjoy their 
culture…not hinder or prohibit, the efforts of minority groups to establish institutions in 
which their languages are the primary media for instruction.”172  
This stance is in line with the international precedent established in 1995. Yet, although Mutua 
(2006) acknowledges that autonomy regimes may prove the best solution for minority groups to 
defend, advance, and enjoy their basic rights as a collective or group entity, he notes that 
“…neither the international law regime on minorities nor the human rights corpus directly and 
explicitly authorize autonomy regimes.”173 He elaborates, “note should be taken of the fact that 
the Declaration on Minorities neither uses the terms ‘peoples,’ nor ‘self-determination,’ nor 
‘autonomy’ ”.174 This question of territory has thus become key in the present-day discussion of 
minorities in state constitutions. This is especially true of federal systems where power is divided 
among its constituting territories by a state constitution.  
 Nevertheless, in most federal systems, state constitutions remain a weak source of 
constitutional arrangements for sub-state units, or better federal units that constitute a state. 
Rather, most state constitutions prescribe procedures for their own changes and leave space for 
                                                          
171 Ibid, p. 347.  
 
172 Mutua, M. 2006. “The Iraq Paradox: Minority and Group Rights in a Viable Constitution.” Buff. L. Rev. 54. pp.  
943-4. 
173 Ibid., p. 944. 
  
174 Ibid., p. 937.  
 
83 
 
sub-national constitutions, which, in most countries, stay largely invisible. Despite this and 
considering the fact that sub-federal units also represent legal political entities, then it becomes 
logical for them to have their own constitutions. However, the degree of freedom which a state 
constitution grants to its subnational units largely depends on the “completeness” of the state 
constitution itself. Hence, the more incomplete it is, the more power lies in subnational 
constitutions. This is especially true in multi-ethnic states where it is not uncommon for federal 
units to be divided along ethnic lines. Thus, minority rights are very often regulated by sub-state 
constitutions, which is why this topic merits its own section.  
 
National Minorities in Sub-State Constitutions 
 
In recent years, notably so in post-communist countries of CEE and later on in the states 
of the Balkans, the renaissance of political awareness about group and regional identity has 
resulted in states searching for new inclusion mechanisms for the previously unorganized and 
marginalized groups, mostly national minorities. And since a creation of a new country is never 
an option and since no state, except for Ethiopia, allows for subnational units to secede, 
subnational constitutions remain the most widely accepted instrument. In fact, in all federal 
states subnational constitutions govern the rights of different groups, including national 
minorities. Not least, granting constitutional space to subnational units makes it easier for all 
groups to gain recognition of their rights at the subnational level. Hence, unlike state 
constitutions, sub-state constitutions have the potential to safeguard both the rights of 
geographically concentrated minorities and the rights of internal nations within multinational 
federations.175  
Sub-state constitutions protect political rights, “particularly the rights (within parameters 
established by the federation) to affirm one’s own identity, to set one’s own social and political 
goals, and to devise those institutional arrangements best suited to the achievement of those 
goals.”176 Specifically, they can protect the right of groups to maintain their distinctive identities 
made manifest through religion, language, or ethnicity, as “local conditions and values may lead 
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particular constituent unites to use their subnational constitutions to go beyond the federal 
minimum.”177 In addition, sub-state constitutions can also provide a roadmap for how 
government policies toward minorities will be carried out on a state level. Finally, these 
documents may serve as “instruments of conflict management during periods of political 
instability”,178 for the process of constitution making provides opportunities for political 
involvement and socialization (though sometimes it runs the risk of reinforcing a separate 
identity from that of the larger federation).179 
Despite the reality that sub-states in some federations such as the United States of 
America (USA), Switzerland, and Australia possess their own constitutions, this practice is far 
more an exception than a norm. Indeed, many widely studied federal states such as Canada, 
Belgium, Nigeria, and India contain charters or legislation pertaining to their sub-states, but they 
do not have separate sub-state constitutions. Often, this absence of a sub-state constitution marks 
a deliberate attempt by the federal government to ensure that constituent units do not occupy too 
much constitutional space or cause conflict. For example, in Nigeria and India, the contents of 
would-be subnational constitutions are prescribed within the federal constitution, obviating the 
need for separate sub-national constitutions. Another mechanism employed to minimize conflict 
while allowing for sub-state constitutions is the creation of mechanisms for federal review of the 
choices made by constitution-makers; in other words, the federal government gains some control 
over the content of sub-national constitutions at the time when they are created. 
On the other hand, there are instances when sub-state constitutions are created, certain 
measures aid in maximizing their impact for the constituents. First, it is important for sub-state 
governments to communicate the norms of the sub-state constitution to the constituents. In all 
cases, this means duplication and dissemination of constitutional texts in sufficient copies, 
translation of the texts into local languages and teaching of the contents of these texts. In this 
way, constituents can exert their minority rights by putting federal power in check, and more 
generally, they can aid in making these state constitutional texts more visible in the federal 
discourse. A second measure to be employed is “norm implementation”, in which sub-state 
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constitutional principles are put into practice, even when political actors may suffer temporary 
political losses as a consequence. This recognition gives “strength and vibrancy” to the 
constitutional system. 
Building on from this, it is clear that the consequences of sub-state constitutions cannot 
definitively be classified as positive or negative for the functioning of the federal system, despite 
the voice given to minorities. Sub-state constitutions may foster unity between the federation as a 
whole and its respective states, providing a format by which citizens can re-affirm their 
commitment to the political principles propagated by the federal system on a local level, in a 
more specific and detailed manner. Thus, sub-state constitutions “have the most potential to 
legitimate these citizens’ instinctive commitments and thereby reduce citizen estrangement from 
the union.”180 However, sub-state constitutions may result in divisive effects: “In part, this is 
because some citizens in constituent states are bound to be dissatisfied with the compromises 
forged in the constitution-making process; these individuals are likely to be more frustrated than 
if the underlying issues had continued to be held in abeyance.”181 Furthermore, sub-state 
constitutions may encourage discrimination of populations that may not be considered minorities 
in the federation but become minorities in the state due to the concentrated, homogenous 
presence of a particular ethnic group. This has been the case with Ethiopian sub-state 
constitutions, whereby the government has ignored the emergence of new minority groups that 
are calling for “ethnic sovereignty”, a notion that emerged after Ethiopia became a federal state.  
But to approach subnational constitutions requires a legal assessment of the amount of 
subnational constitutional space and competences that are prescribed to sub-state units by the 
national constitution. While some countries, such as Switzerland and the United States allow 
their subnational entities much subnational constitutional freedom, countries like South Africa 
restrict these spaces to its national subunits. This issue of “policing” national subunits and their 
constitutional spaces is especially relevant in multinational federations. These entities, thus, 
represent our next unit of analysis within a wider context of sources of minority political rights.  
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Multinational Federations: Establishing a Definition 
 
Before providing a definition of a multinational federation, it is useful to review the 
components of a mere federation. A concise definition of federalism reads that it is: “ ‘a form of 
territorial organization in which unity and regional diversity are accommodated within a single 
political system by distributing power among general and regional governments in a manner 
constitutionally safeguarding the existence and authority of each.’ ”182 Beyond the primary 
component of central-regional division of power, federalism often assumes a set of secondary 
characteristics: “…a written constitution, bicameralism, equal or disproportionately strong 
representation of the smaller component units in the federal chamber, decentralized government, 
and the right of the component units to be involved in the process of amending the federal 
constitution but to change their own constitutions unilaterally.”183 The academic literature lists 
multiple types of federalism including territorial federalism, regional federalism, multinational 
federalism, and ethnic federalism. Unfortunately, there does not appear to be universal consensus 
on the precise differential characteristics among them.  
 Differentiating between the different types of federalism depends, to an extent, on the 
civic versus national principle. Political philosopher Will Kymlicka defines multinational 
federalism as “creating federal or quasi-federal subunit in which the minority group forms a local 
majority, and so can exercise meaningful forms of self-government…the group’s language is 
typically recognized as an official state language, at least within their federal subunit, and 
perhaps throughout the country as a whole.”184 In principle at least, multinational federalism can 
be thought of as much fairer than other systems in accommodating the desires and concerns of 
minorities. The key distinction between regional and multinational federalism is whether ethnic 
identity or universal citizenship is the basis for the federal unit.185 In regional federalism, 
“…different ethnic groups share a common citizenship in a civic homeland where two levels of 
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government share power.”186 In contrast, in multinational federalist states, ethno-national groups 
seek self-governing by ethnicity. Let us consider the American and French territorial models of 
federalism, since they represent the two main liberal traditions. Both systems rest on the civic 
principle (citizen model), but are not concerned with ethnicity. In fact, the American and the 
French model do not recognize other ethnicities in the population, or better they do not find them 
relevant.187 For them, the only relevant and recognized unit is the nation, a principle according to 
which all citizens are equal individuals who belong to the nation. Moreover, the American model 
goes as far as not accounting for the cultural element; cultural belonging is irrelevant and all 
groups must assimilate culturally into an all-inclusive American culture. However, the United 
States does recognize individual cultures, but does not deem them relevant in the political 
processes and granting of special participation rights. Alternatively, France assumes cultural 
homogeneity of all its citizens, while different cultural groups other than the nation or within the 
nation are not recognized by the constitution and are, thus, irrelevant.  
 Despite its inclusivity of different groups, the multiregional federal model is both 
challenged and praised. On one hand, some contend that multiregional federalism contains 
inherent flaws that undermine its legitimacy as an effective system of governance. For example, 
multinational federalism has been classified as unstable and problematic, for it can promote 
violence and is likely to bring an end to the state itself. A common corollary to this line of 
thought, therefore, is the belief that the act of giving minorities portions of majority power 
undermines the ability of a democracy to function. Another criticism is the occurrence of “ethnic 
engineering”, in which an ethnic group within a member state that is a minority in the federation 
but a majority within the sub-state uses its autonomous position to oppress other ethnic 
minorities.188 This issue becomes even more conflict-inducing when the local minority 
constitutes a majority at the level of the central state.189 Codagnone and Vassily (2000) identify 
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this as pressing issue in Russia, where the manner in which multinational federalism has 
developed “…does not ensure the ‘polyethnic’ rights of non-‘titular’ nationalities” and that often 
as a consequence, “…some basic general federal principles are not respected in practice.”190 This 
undesirable outcome is hence a shared echo in the literature that concerns both multi-national 
federations and also sub-state constitutions.  
 Further criticisms, again, point to the characteristics of multinational federalism that 
undermine democracy. For example, stable democracy often depends first, on cooperation 
between segmental elites and second, on the possibility that “groups and individuals have a 
number of cross-cutting, politically relevant affiliations,” both of which are harder to come by in 
systems of ethnic federalism.191 In addition, ethno-centric political cultural values that arise in an 
ethnic federation can be “…parochial even when very large groups share them, and are not 
conducive to the establishment of civil society.”192 The correlation between ethnic federalism 
and the absence of liberal democratic political culture is clearly exemplified in the case of 
Ethiopia. Indeed, multinational state unity continues to take priority over “civil society, political 
trust, power sharing, genuine participation in a multiparty democracy and the rule of law.”193 
However, multinational federalism continues to be adopted as a model of governance because of 
certain benefits it poses.  
 Multinational federalism proves an attractive model in many post-conflict societies. 
Clancy and Nagle assert that many multi-ethnic federations have been littered with conflict, such 
as Czechoslovakia and Nigeria, while those more relatively successful examples have still 
suffered from secessionist crises, such as India and Canada.194 Still, they emphasize that the 
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model of multinational federation in itself is not the sole causal factor for these conflicts, nor that 
“federalism inevitably gives rise to civil war and/or secession.”195 In fact, while multinational 
federalism may be more complicated and costly than a unitary system, it may provide “a better 
framework to handle a society already damaged by conflicts.”196  To return to the case example 
of Ethiopia, though the country hardly stands as an exemplary democracy, the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia has endured for almost two decades despite its history of civil 
war, ethnic violence, and revolution. The new federal model has sustained political stability 
without international intervention or serious challenges of secession.197 
 
Anomalies and Broader Conclusions 
 
 The contextual debates over multinational federalism and its provisions only demonstrate 
that all states are ill-equipped in addressing special-participation and representation rights of self-
conscious minority groups. Hence, I will turn the attention to two case anomalies of 
multinational federalism. The first is the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose most 
striking feature is its weak central authority compared to the strength of its two constituent units. 
This example is salient because typically, federal-state relations are reversed “…with concerns 
usually expressed about the powers of an overweening central government and its encroachment 
upon the competences of the constituent state governments.”198 This abnormal distribution of 
power requires the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the Constitutional Court set up 
by the international community to strengthen the federal government and reign in the claims and 
activities of the Entities.199 A second atypical historical example is the case of Estonia, the best-
known example of a system wherein ethnic federalism was based in non-territorial autonomy. 
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Typically, multiregional federalism gives right to minorities who constitute a majority in a 
particular region. Conversely, the Cultural Autonomy Law of 1925 empowered any ethnic group 
numbering at least 3,000 to establish for itself a separate legal entity, regardless of geographic 
concentration.200  Though this system was short-lived in the Estonian case, it still remains a 
viable option for states that have a particular problem with territorially dispersed minorities.201 
 The federal ideal appears to have taken on recent popularity globally in the form of 
multinational federations. The recent examples of Iraq (2005), developments in Nepal (2007), 
and Pakistan (2008) reveal the attraction of the conceptual and organizing principles of 
federalism.202 Their comparative success or failure aside, other examples include Somalia, 
Sudan, Eritrea, Afghanistan, and Cyprus. Without a doubt, this model cannot be expected to 
resolve all contentious minority claims. In addition, the legitimacy of the ethno-federation 
ultimately depends on “the act of foundation and its voluntary character.”203 Still, although 
multinational federalism may prove more appropriate for some states than others, it continues to 
be adopted in multiple forms, particularly in post-conflict states.  
 
Asymmetric Regional Federalism – A Conceptual Clarification  
 
 Contrary to multinational federal models, asymmetric regional federalism is a difficult 
case for inclusion theory. In order to fully understand it, let us first consider how federal systems 
turn into cases of asymmetric regional federations. There are two manners by which a federal 
system may become asymmetrical and both are characterised by inequality. In this case, 
inequality may be embedded in constitutional powers of the federated units or inequality in the 
extent to which the regions share power within the federal government.204 As such, we can 
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define four types of federations, one symmetric and three asymmetric. In a symmetric federation, 
regions have both equal self-government within their domains and share powers equally within 
the federal government. In one type of asymmetrical federalism, regions differ in their powers of 
self-government, but share power equally with the federal government. In another type of 
asymmetrical federalism, regions have equal self-government within their domains but share 
power unequally within the federal government. In the third type, regions differ in their powers 
of self-government and also share power unequally with the federal government. Motivations for 
asymmetrical regional federalism may be economic, political, cultural, historical or religious in 
nature. As such, we can mention the Indian Constitution which recognizes only Kashmir as a 
subnational unit with its own subnational constitution. On the other hand, South Tyrol in Italy, 
has emerged into a quasi-autonomy for historical reasons, and as such represent an asymmetrical 
federalist case in the heart of Europe. Alternatively, Russia is an especially difficult case of 
regional asymmetrical federation. Russia is divided into six different subnational units – 
republics, oblasts, krais, autonomous oblasts, autonomous okrugs and federal cities.205  Russia’s 
Federation Constitution recognizes its 89 components as equal,206 with each of its units having 
different statuses and powers. The factors that divide these units according to their status and the 
degree of power are represented in the hierarchy of these subnational units. As such, a republic 
possesses a legal right to formulate its own subnational constitution, whereas an oblast can only 
adopt a charter (ustov). However, these charters resemble a real constitution in many ways, so 
they can also be treated as subnational constitutions. On the other hand, the President of the 
Russian Federation can enter into special treaties with each subunit, especially in times of 
elections, a trait which can cause alterations in subnational constitutions to the point where they 
may even be granted constitutional status. Such asymmetries, not only in the case of Russia, but 
other regional asymmetrical federal units, clearly depict the problems that arise in such systems. 
One of the most contended issues is what classifies as a subnational constitution? Lastly, it is 
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worth mentioning that de facto asymmetry based on transparent principles – in contrast to de jure 
asymmetry as prescribed in a constitution – is also pursued by federations.207  
 Nonetheless, the asymmetrical arrangement of a federal system can play an important 
part in the recognition of a national minority group and by consequence, in preventing conflict. 
Yet, He argues that federalism must adopt differential treatment and asymmetric policy so that 
the constituent units of a federation do not possess identical powers.208  This line of reasoning 
derives from the belief that because of their social and political history, some national minorities 
should have special rights. Furthermore, mere equal powers “may compel those who are part of a 
national minority to seek a change to the status quo in a way that makes their powers more 
appropriate to their status,”209 such as secession. In contrast, when federations are asymmetric, 
the increased institutional resources granted to historically slighted groups render them less 
likely to engage in conflict with the centre. However, there is a fine balance to be struck: 
“…asymmetric federalism cannot in any fashion imply erosion of the inter-territorial solidarity 
of the member states, which would then maintain or reinforce existing inequalities.”210 It is only 
through the cooperative dimension of federalism that cultural and political asymmetry can 
become principles of a multinational democratic state as a viable alternative to the reasoning of 
nationalism, nationalization of states and secession.211 
 Unfortunately still, asymmetrical regional federalism appears more promising in theory 
than in practice. While national minority groups may potentially be mollified by an asymmetrical 
structure, regions that do not benefit from the asymmetrical arrangements may become aggrieved 
and seek secession themselves.212 We are thus presented with the paradox in which asymmetric 
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federalism creates the same problem it seeks to circumvent. Furthermore, many existing federal 
systems that have attempted to adopt an asymmetrical model suffer from structural problems. For 
example, Maiz asserts, “Canada, India, and Spain, to mention only three, have yet to achieve a 
satisfactory constitutional articulation which is acceptable to all parties in the cases of Quebec, 
Kashmir, Punjab, the Basque Country or Catalonia, despite the doses of constitutional 
asymmetry built into these cases.”213 Especially in the case of India, many speculate whether 
asymmetrical federalism has tangibly aided minority groups, as was its stated purpose.  
 
Consociational Systems – A Conceptual Clarification 
 
To conclude on this theoretical chapter, let us finally examine consociational systems. 
Consociationalism has many facets, for its components have been redefined and debated by 
scholars over time. A fairly succinct definition reads: “…consociational polities are non-
territorial federations in which polities divided into trans-generational religious, cultural, ethnic, 
or ideological groupings are constituted as federations of “camps”, “sectors”, “pillars” and 
jointly governed by coalitions of the leaders of each.”214 More specifically, consociationalism 
consists of four key power-sharing principles: a grand coalition government representing all of 
the major segments of a divided society; proportionality in representation, public employment, 
and expenditure; community autonomy on issues deemed to be vital; and constitutional vetoes 
for minorities. It can be utilized in federations, cantons, or across an entire state and in contrast to 
the more formal multinational federation, consociationalism can be viewed simply as a bundle of 
procedures and techniques employed in a state without a history of federalism.215 
 Lijphart offers a definition of consociationalism that elaborates on the purpose it should 
strive to serve. As opposed to interpreting consociationalism as a series of “serendipitously 
complementary policies,” he identifies as the “essential characteristic of consociational 
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democracy, not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate efforts by 
elites to stabilize the system.”216 Instead of envisioning a grand coalition, he thus adopts the term 
“elite cartel” in his formal definition: “Consociational democracy means government by elite 
cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented culture into a stable democracy.”217 In 
Lijphart’s vision, the elite cartel’s characteristics include the ability to accommodate the 
divergent interests and demands of the subcultures, the ability to transcend cleavages and to join 
in a common effort with the elites of rival subcultures, a commitment to the maintenance of the 
system and to the improvement of its cohesion and stability, and an understanding of the perils of 
political fragmentation. Of course, it is important to note that Lijphart’s conception of 
consociationalism has evolved over time, as he prescribes specific institutional arrangements in 
some of his earlier works. In summary, still, we can say that consociationalism, at its core, 
contains components of power sharing by an elite group of representatives whose aim is to 
overcome existing fragmentation in a society in order to achieve a stable democracy.  
 Alternatively, consociationalism may be adopted as method of conflict management, 
particularly in ethnically diverse societies. Stanovčić identifies the theoretical potential of 
consociational systems:  
While consociation may not satisfy nationalist extremists in matters of ethnic identity, it 
can certainly guarantee a high degree of human rights, a share in democratic 
government, and national wealth and cultural autonomy. But consociation requires 
mutual trust and the rule of acceptable laws equally applicable to all groups, conditions 
that are not always present in reality.218 
As consociationalism seeks to manage conflict through the recognition and protection of salient 
minority identities, its success depends on many factors such as “the actions and interaction of 
exogenous actors.”219 There is a possibility that consociationalism may only entrench these 
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identities and obviate their transformation. Still, in cases where federalism has not proven an 
entirely adequate method for conflict management, consociational practices may prove an 
appropriate supplement.220 Yet, the critiques of consociationalism are many.  
An empirical study seeking to analyze many of Lijphart’s institutional recommendations 
in practice provides little support for his earlier theories. For the purposes of this work, I will 
provide only a quick review of some of Lijphart’s specific institutional recommendations that 
were analyzed in his study: electoral system, regime type, and decentralization of authority. First, 
in terms of an electoral system, Lijphart recommends closed-list proportional representation (PR) 
with large district magnitudes, discouraging any system with majoritarian effects. Second, he 
advocates a parliamentary executive instead of a presidential or a semi-presidential one, as there 
is greater potential for executive power sharing in a parliamentary system. Finally, he views 
federalism positively, for it is a mean “to give broad autonomy to individual groups and reduce 
the number and scope of issues that must be resolved at the central government level.”221 This 
autonomy may include non-territorial autonomy, such as the funding of different religious 
groups to teach primary education. 
Through the form of a literature review, the study cites many scholars who counter 
Lijphart’s predictions. Some argue that PR systems can facilitate the presence of extremist 
parties that seek to overthrow the regime or take rigid ideological stances far from the median 
voter. PR sometimes also increases the incentives for parties to pursue “centrifugal campaign 
strategies”, courting voters whose views are extreme as opposed to moderate. And still yet, PR 
(together with power sharing requirements) can paralyze the government when it is confronted 
by difficult issues because of the need to include many parties in the governing coalition In 
regard to regime type, presidentialism does not, by itself, create problems for democracy: 
presidentialism is just as viable as parliamentarism within the right institutional combination. In 
fact, the president may be the only elected official with a truly national constituency in a new 
democracy and may thus have stronger incentives to promote broad-based public goods. Finally, 
“…adopting federal arrangements…might actually increase secessionist tendencies, by 
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reinforcing territorially based ethnic identities.”222 Especially when ethnic groups are territorially 
dispersed, the federal prescription “may end up sparking or accelerating a Balkan style 
conflict…with groups making competing claims over the same land and seeking to redraw 
borders to include clusters of co-ethnics, through violent means if necessary.”223 
By looking at 106 country-regimes between 1972 and 2003, the study refutes many of 
Lijphart’s predictions concerning the reduction of political violence by way of consociational 
systems. The findings can be summarized as follows:  
1. PR is generally associated with higher levels of violence, in contrast to what most other 
studies have found;  
2. Presidentialism is associated with lower levels of political violence, again in contrast to 
previous studies; 
3. The results on federalism are inconclusive and suggest that federalism in isolation has 
inconsistent effects on political violence; 
4. The combination of consociationalist institutions is associated with higher levels of 
political violence.224 
The reason why this particular study was chosen for this dissertation lies in the fact that it marks 
a current, empirically grounded refutation of much existing consociational theory. However, this 
study deals specifically with Lijphart’s conception of consociationalism, which is by no means 
the only existing theory (though it does provide a basis for many scholars).  
Alternatively, an article by Salamey also warns of the potential negative effects of 
consociational systems, demonstrated by the case examples of Lebanon and Iraq. In these 
countries, consociational democracy “has yielded corporate forms of power sharing that have 
been referred to as ‘corporate consociationalism.”225 Salamey explains that the sectarian elite has 
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become “indispensable oligopolistic patrons to their sectarian cliental constituencies”, referred to 
as “ ‘political feudalism’ ” in Lebanon.226 The result is a “self perpetuating capture of the state 
by political sectarian elite that both lacks national accountability and undermines government 
commitment to the public good.”227  Furthermore, he describes that in both Iraq and Lebanon, 
consociationalism predetermines power positions among ethnic and sectarian national groups. 
He adds that in other ethnically and sectarian divided societies like Northern Ireland or Sudan, 
consociationalism has given rise to power sharing distributions and mandates that have been 
“fixed by unwritten national accords, pacts, or customs, making amendments difficult, 
sometimes impossible, and often risk-laden.”228 Thus, while consociational systems appear 
attractive in theory, they have often yielded negative consequences in practice.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The chapter above considered two main concepts related to the general argument of political 
participation of national minority groups in the context of the theory of democratization. The 
first part critically assessed minority representation as intertwined with political participation 
arguing that a state requires the presence of both to be termed highly democratic. This was done 
in order to lay out the basic characteristics of minority representation, but also to understand the 
controversies that surround the concept, which, as clearly seen, is not self-imposed with the 
arrival of democracy. Rather, minority representation is seen as a mean of accommodating 
groups that have historically been excluded from the political processes (Mansbridge, 1980, 
Williams, 1998). The discussion which followed concentrated more broadly on the theoretical 
explanations relating to accommodation of national minority rights to political participation in 
different democratic systems, including state and substate constitutions, asymmetric regional 
federalism and lastly consociational systems. Furthermore, this chapter embarked on offering 
answers to the underlying questions which underpin national minority representation and 
participation – that of effectiveness of such representation and whether effective representation, 
(if it occurs) is exhibited by members of those groups. A key to this argument was the discussion 
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on minority constitutional executive power sharing, which was termed a durable and firm 
commitment on part of the majority to include different groups in the government (Bieber, 
2010). However, a problem arises when countries a lack of a predominant majority. This is 
precisely the case in BiH which relies on representation by legal requirement, which means that 
group representation is embedded in state’s constitution. However, the underlying problem in the 
case of BiH is that not all groups are included, but only territorial majorities which, according to 
size and numbers in a particular territory within a state, as discussed in Chapter 1, can be called 
minorities. This right does not span to national minorities which constitute a smaller proportion 
of the society. Hence, in BiH, only three constituent peoples have secured places in all state-level 
institutions, but the rest of the population which does not belong to these groups (including 
seventeen national minorities) does not have access to government structures, at least not on the 
state-level. Thus, considering the many complexities of the power-sharing mechanism discussed 
in this chapter, I now turn the attention to power-sharing complexities as the concept relates to 
the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hence, the subsequent chapter analyzes this issue in 
much greater detail as it proves extremely relevant to the main topic of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 4: POLITICAL POSITIONING OF 
NATIONAL MINORITIES IN POST-DAYTON BIH: 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS VS. DOMESTIC 
PRACTICES
 
Introduction  
This chapter illustrates the ways in which the fault-lines in BiH’s application of the power-
sharing democracy have come to existence and how they shape democratic development of the 
country notably in light of the right to political participation of its national minorities. The ethno-
territorial cleavages that are legally enshrined in the Dayton constitution have brought about a 
number of divisions along ethnic, territorial, political and social lines, but considering that this 
dissertation focuses on political participation of national minorities within a broader field of 
democratic theory and minority politics, I discuss the Dayton Peace Accords at the source of 
discrimination which pertains to actively exercising the right to political participation by national 
minority groups and analyze it within the wider context of the existing legal frameworks which 
presently govern such rights. The principal purpose of this chapter is contextualize the current 
approach to the issue of political participation of national minorities in BiH, but also to posit the 
existing participatory mechanisms and examine whether they are scarcely used by members of 
national minority groups in BiH. This chapter also portrays the complexities and inadequacies of 
the current approach to political participation of national minorities through the prism of 
politicization and lack of channelling, which, it is argued, cause a situation of weak political 
involvement as it relates to a) understanding the very essence of political participation and its 
definition, b) the background against which political participation is understood and c) the link 
that these groups make between this right and their minority status. I therefore relate each of 
these issues to the main arguments outlined in Chapter I, but also use them to set the background 
for better understanding of quantitative data presented in Chapter VII. As such, this chapter also 
makes use of the results of focus groups and interviews, which compliment these issues.  
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The Dayton Peace Accords: The Birth of Constitutional Discrimination  
 
From 1945 to 1992, BiH was a part of Yugoslavia, a multinational state with a federal 
constitution. Throughout history, BiH was referred to as a “country of minorities”. This was 
mainly due to its demographic structure, which, according to the data from the census held in 
1991 was the following: Muslims comprised 43.7%, Serbs 31.45%, Croats 17.3%, while 5.6% of 
the population considered themselves “Yugoslavs”.229 Yugoslavs were mostly (although not 
exclusively) members of other nations and nationalities (according to the terminology used in 
SFRY’s Constitution)230, but entitled to equality under the Constitution. Following the events 
that occurred from 1991 until 1992 in Slovenia and Croatia respectively, the independence of 
BiH, and subsequently its international recognition resulted, as indicated previously, in the 
bloodiest and longest conflict in former Yugoslavia.231 The mixed ethnic picture only 
exacerbated the situation, which was finally settled in December of 1995 when the Dayton Peace 
Accords were signed. The Agreement not only ended the conflict, but also laid the institutional 
basis for the political and economic revival of the country. Despite the geographical divisions 
into two sub-state units,232 BiH remained a multi-ethnic state with three dominant ethnic groups 
in place just as before the war, and seventeen national minority groups. Currently, things are far 
from the pre-war state-of-art, while the sources of the current debate lie precisely in the Dayton 
Constitution and the power-sharing mechanism that it legally enshrined.  
Ironically, the last year celebrated the twentieth anniversary of Dayton Peace Accords 
and consequently the Dayton Constitution. It also celebrated twenty years of peace, pseudo-
democratic institutions, feeble economy and the omnipresent ethnic divisions. But, could any of 
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232 Federation of BiH - FBiH (51% of the territory) and Republic of Srpska - RS (49%). 
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these factors, except, of course, peace, be truly commemorated if one is to consider that we are 
considering a potential EU member state? Is there really a reason to celebrate those twenty years 
of Dayton-created peace, since the former failed to create a fully functional BiH? The answers to 
these questions are probably overly intricate and subjective, moreover because the peace accords 
have received a variety of remarks. The pro-Daytonists argue that much has indeed been 
achieved, but confess that there remains a significant amount of reforms to be yet introduced. On 
the other hand, the con-Dayton groups are rather critical towards the agreement and argue that it 
created a quasi-state, one imbedded on the principles of (ethnic) majority prevalence. 
And indeed, when looking at Dayton Constitution, one cannot but notice that it 
overemphasizes ethnicity. Firstly, the constitutional system is based on the principle of ethnic 
constituency or the principle of “constituent peoples”, which implies that each “constituent 
group” has equal rights to governing the state. Thus, the Constitution does not deal with the term 
“citizen”, like the liberal traditions of France or the United States described in the previous 
chapter, but instead divides the citizens of BiH into three “constituent groups” – Bosniaks,233 
Serbs and Croats. The Constitution also mentions a non-constituent group of people, plainly 
called “Others”. It is exactly in this paradox that the peril lies - while Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats 
are dominant and (homogenous) ethnic groups in BiH, “Others” represent a discriminated and 
excluded heterogeneous constitutional category, including BiH citizens who belong to one of the 
seventeen national minorities, but also citizens who refuse to strictly identify with one of the 
ethnic groups.234 Nowhere is this constitutional inconsistency more obvious than in the case of 
political participation of national minorities, where such constitutionally embedded legal 
mechanisms of exclusion have taken many forms on all levels, from state to municipal level 
politics. To elaborate further, it is essential to note that such an ethnically exclusionist 
constitutional arrangement “…prevents, inter alia, persons belonging to minorities from being 
elected to the three-member Bosnian Presidency and delegated to the upper chamber of the 
                                                          
233 Not to be confused with the term “Bosnian”, which could be used (if legally applied) for all people living in BiH. 
Bosnian is a citizen of BiH. Although a large percentage of Bosniaks are Muslims, one should not fall victim to 
mere generalization as there are many other explanations why people in BiH choose to identify themselves with this 
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234 Since this study deals with minority rights to political participation, the reminder of the thesis will assume the 
usage of the term “Others” solely in relation to national minorities. 
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Bosnian Parliament.”235 And while this case stands as a clear-cut example of discrimination, the 
fact that we are examining the issue of participation in the political life of a single state brings us 
to yet another discriminatory practice which relates to the right of national minorities to 
participate in all spheres of political and public affairs, as prescribed in recent international legal 
instruments. Thus, in the context of political participation of national minorities in BiH one must 
also examine the legal side of the issue. 
 
A Short Analysis of the Dayton Constitution within the International Legal Framework 
 
As seen in Chapter 4, the positioning of special rights to political participation of national 
minorities in the context of international law is a relatively new practice which appeared after the 
end of communism when self-aware minority groups started demanding more rights. The origins 
of this issue can also be connected to the evolution of the very term “political participation” since 
this kind of citizen behaviour started to go beyond classical forms of activism, mainly voting, 
political party membership and representation. On the other hand, the concept of group equality 
evolved into the concept of individual equality. Hence, legally entailed equality was 
complimented by equality in practice. What this implied were equal participation rights in all its 
forms. Ghai points that in the past there was a tendency to view minorities as part of the 
majority, while the big focus was on the creation of a single nation. Today, however, it is clear 
that a paradigm shift has occurred and that the foci have moved to searching for an independent 
socio-political role for minorities.236  Hence, the principal aim has moved from mere protection 
to fostering minority identity through political inclusion. This, in turn, increases minority 
political presence and motivates them to become more politically visible. At the same time, 
political participation of minority groups in the public sphere, but notably so in the executive, 
holds both an honouring and a symbolic value,237 which, in turn, strengthens minority 
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participation, increases the level of minority representatives in the government and affirms 
minority identities.  
However, when considering and examining the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in light of protection of national minority rights to political participation, the peace-setting nature 
and purpose of Dayton Peace Accords, and ultimately the constitutional provisions that surface 
from it, it can be concluded that Dayton Constitution cannot be examined in isolation from 
relevant international legal documents. More precisely, the Dayton Constitution incorporates 
several provisions from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which is supreme 
over national laws.238 The Preamble of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, which encompasses BiH’s constitution, is inspired by the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Language 
Minorities, which particularly emphasizes their right to participation in the decision-making 
process on all government levels. Moreover, the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities, which came to power in 1995, legally binds all Council of Europe member-
states239 to apply it in practice. In light of this provision, BiH has a constitutional obligation 
(Article II, pt. 7, in relations to point 15 of the Annex and Constitution of BiH) to respect the 
FCNM.240 This would not be problematic, and the discriminatory practices in BiH would 
probably not be on such a large scale, were it not for a very subjective provision of the FCNM 
itself. Article 3 of the Convention states that every person belonging to a national minority can 
choose to be (or not) treated as a minority, which opens a path for case-to-case interpretation of 
this provision. Thus, in the case of BiH, this condition is clearly misinterpreted, which leads us to 
a conclusion that the only way in which a member of a national minority group in BiH can 
acquire his/her right to political participation (particularly on the state level), is to declare 
him/herself as a member of one of the three constituent groups, which is contrary to the basic 
human right to the freedom of expression of ethnic/national belonging. Furthermore, this practice 
is also opposed to Article 3 of the FCNM which guarantees that national minorities will not be 
disadvantaged on the basis of ethnic or national determination.  
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Considering the above, in 2003 the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH drafted a definition 
of national minority, which states that national minorities are nationals of BiH, belong to BiH’s 
population, but do not belong to any of the three constitutive peoples; instead, they include those 
groups with a shared or similar ethnic background, a shared or similar tradition, customs, beliefs, 
language, culture and religion, history and other characteristics (Article 3, pt. I).241 Part II of 
Article 3, additionally lists seventeen national minorities which live in BiH (or who lived in BiH 
in 1991, at the moment of the last census with available data). However, what this means in 
practice is that national minorities are still considered as “Others”, and thus their right to political 
participation, as explained above, is greatly undermined. Therefore, despite these efforts, the 
discriminatory practices of the current BiH Constitution remain and prove lethal for its socio-
political advancement.  
In addition to State Constitution of BiH, the subnational constitutions of FBiH and RS 
have similarly responded to the question of political participation of national minorities. The 
Constitution of RS refers to the “protection of rights of ethnic groups and other minorities”,242 
while the Constitution of FBiH refers to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging 
to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. Furthermore, the Constitution of 
FBiH binds every municipality to “take all actions in aim of assuring the protection of rights and 
freedoms…” of minority groups.243 Hence, local authorities are also bound to respect the 
international standards in this domain. In this respect, some cantons244 in FBiH, including Tuzla 
and Sarajevo Canton, have existing Laws on the protection of rights of persons belonging to 
national minorities.  
 
How BiH Became an International Outlaw? “Sejdić-Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina” Case 
 
As noted above, the last decade saw the introduction of several new international 
minority rights instruments, all created with the aim of recognizing and reaffirming the legal 
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support for identity and status issues of national minorities within state constitutional and 
political systems. A particularly essential right which surfaced in these new documents is the 
explicit reference to the right of minorities to political participation, more precisely the right to 
decide in public “matters affecting them.”245 Thus, the focus is on collective political 
participation.246 Furthermore, the FCNM interprets this right as rather “strong” and “started 
implementing it in unqualified terms, translating the minority cultural identity directly into the 
political plane.”247 Many other international legal provisions, such as the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its Article 25, deal with issues of equal rights to 
participation in the political life of the country. To examine each of these documents in detail 
would be a thesis by itself, and thus before moving to the specific issue in BiH, let us just 
mention that on the European level, the focus is on broad political participation, and not solely 
on “matters affecting them” (minorities) as it is the case with FCNM or ICCPR. This means that 
national minorities have the right to political participation according to the general direction in 
which their country is moving (usually through co-decision making).  
Moving away from the legal norms and examining political participation from the point 
of view of democratic development, one can make a general conclusion that in states with 
overemphasized ethnic mobility and ethnic nationalism minorities run the risk of being excluded 
from the political system. Being a state where ethnicity overpowers nationality and where ethnic 
nationalism looms large, BiH is certainly a country where the above legal documents play only a 
minor role. This is not to say that BiH has no laws that deal with minority protection whatsoever. 
Quite the contrary, the 2003 BiH Law on Minorities stipulates that persons belonging to 
minorities “have the right to be represented in state institutions and public service at all levels in 
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246 It is important to note that the use of phrase “political participation” is rather ambiguous in this sense, as none of 
these documents consider the broader aspects of the term. In the language of political science, effective political 
participation is a much more comprehensive term, and as such refers to, among other things, participation (usually 
through membership) in non-state and semi-state bodies (chambers of commerce, labor and trade unions, boards of 
public broadcasting, etc.), political party membership and rights to form national minority parties, right to vote and 
right to be voted for, right to be elected and participation in various forms of consultations. Political participation 
also includes participation in the executive and judicial branches of the government, as well as in public 
administration. See Chapter 1 for classical discussions on political participation (Verba and Nie, 1972).  
 
247 Hodžić, E. 2011. Political Participation of National Minorities in Local Governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
State of the Art, Prospects and Ways Forward. Analitika, Sarajevo. p. 6. 
 
106 
 
accordance with their share in population based on the last census.”248 Furthermore, the 2001 
Election Law (enacted in 2004) also deals with the issue of political participation of national 
minorities on local levels. More precisely, the law established the “three percent threshold 
principle”, which guarantees that, according to 1991 population census, at least one seat is to be 
reserved for members of national minorities in those municipalities in which minorities 
constitute up to three percent of the population. The law also confirms that at least two seats are 
to be allocated to national minority representatives in municipalities in which they comprise 
more than three percent of the population. Additionally, in 2008 an amendment to the Election 
Law introduced a different and more general provision that at first seems less favourable to 
minorities. According to the amended law, at least one seat is to be reserved for national minority 
members where they make up more than three percent of the population. However, this solution 
does not make the situation worse, but simply establishes a threshold beyond which the 
representation of minorities cannot be ignored.  
Since the practice of minority representation on local levels is a relatively new trend in 
BiH, which began only in 2008, the legal guarantees for national minority group members in 
municipalities where they represent more than 3% of the population according to 1991 census, 
was not respected. This is a clear breach of 2008 Election Law amendment.  Thus, if put simply, 
the laws on political participation of national minorities on local level in BiH do exist, and are 
fairly inclusive, but the problem is that they are not implemented. The non-implementation of 
these laws has several dimensions. Firstly, and as mentioned above, the 2001 Election Law came 
into force three years later, but much after the deadline for the registration of candidates for the 
2004 local elections. Therefore, the three percent threshold relating to political participation of 
national minorities could not be implemented, and resulted in “non-participation”. Secondly, the 
2008 Amendments to the Election Law were not respected in all municipalities249 – a clear 
breach of legal obligations prescribed in the Election Law.  
On the other hand, if examining the applicability of the Election Law to general (state 
level) elections, the discriminatory principles of the Dayton Constitution surface to the top. In 
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short, what this means is that the tripartite presidency of BiH250 consists only of three constituent 
groups. Article 8.1. of the Election Law, which specifies the election rules for the Presidency of 
BiH, does not even refer to national minorities (“Others”).  Furthermore, when it comes to 
elections to the House of Peoples of BiH Parliament, subheading B, Article 9.12 states that: “The 
House of Peoples of BiH Parliamentary Assembly has 15 representatives, of which two-thirds 
are from FBiH (five Croats and five Bosniaks) and one-third from RS (five Serbs).”251 Again, 
this article does not refer to “Others”, thus excluding national minorities from participating in 
elections for higher offices. But, the Election Law of BiH is not the only source of discrimination 
of national minority groups that live in BiH. Under BiH's constitution only ethnic Bosniaks, 
Serbs and Croats can be elected members of the Presidency of BiH or of the Parliament (Articles 
IV and V of BiH Constitution).252 Lijphart terms this type of ethnic-led political arrangements as 
pre-determination, which “like self-determination...refers to an internal process, but in contrast to 
self-determination, it means that the groups that are to share power are identified in advance.”253 
Thus, one can only conclude that the state of BiH severely impedes the right to political 
participation of its national minorities. 
This status-quo remained for years. The attempts of national minority members to 
participate in the political life of BiH were scarce and unheard of until December 2009, almost 
exactly fourteen years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, when Jakob Finci (a Jew) 
and Dervo Sejdić (a Roma) claimed that BiH Constitution was discriminatory on the base of 
race, religion and association with a national minority.254 Both plaintiffs made reference to 
Protocol 12 of the ECHR, which BiH signed on April 1, 2005. Initially, these were two separate 
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In: Kymlicka, W., 1995. The Rights of Minority Cultures. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
254 Dervo Sejdić was unable to stand as a candidate for the presidency, while Jakob Finci was not allowed to present 
a candidacy for the House of Peoples of the parliamentary assembly. 
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cases, which were then merged into one by the European Court of Human Rights. It is interesting 
to note that neither Sejdić nor Finci claimed their rights before the signing of ECHR on the part 
of BiH, as they both believed that no legal basis for their complaints existed prior to this 
period.255 The second (mutual) motive behind their complaint was the failure of the so called 
“April Package”256 of constitutional reforms from 2006, which did not pass due to the fact that 
only two pro votes for were missing.  
Thus, in December 2009 the Grand Chamber of the European Court for Human Rights 
ruled that BiH was guilty of violating Protocol 12 and Article 14 of the ECHR due to ethnic 
discrimination ingrained in its constitution. Following this ruling, BiH’s decision –makers 
showed some initial efforts to implement the decision. The pressure was growing on part of the 
CoE, which called for immediate implementation of the Court’s decision, so that national 
minorities can stand for high office positions in the general elections that were to take place in 
October 2010. The efforts behind CoE’s pressures resulted in the adoption of an action plan and 
a formation of a working group (within BiH’s Council of Ministers), but the plan was short lived. 
Numerous working group meetings did not result in any constitutional amendments by October 
2010, despite severe international pressure and concrete proposals made by various actors. A 
major hindrance were the ruling ethnic parties, which, throughout the process, interchangeably 
obstructed any substantial proposals for the implementation of Court’s decision.  
Six years later, and the political stalemate still persists. A lengthy chronology of events 
related to this case only demonstrates that the procedural labyrinth in BiH is too bureaucratic and 
non-transparent. Furthermore, the fact that BiH has been on the European list of “outlaws” for 
too long, does not change the situation when it comes to political willingness to resolve this 
issue. Secondly, and as strange as it may seem, the likeliness that any form of sticks will be 
applied against BiH for not implementing the Court’s decision is zero to none. What is certain is 
that government’s inactivity regarding this issue will result in BiH’s slower advancement 
towards its EU membership, a topic which will not be discussed under the auspices of this 
dissertation.  
 
                                                          
255 Hodžić, E. and Stojanović, N. (2011). Novi – stari ustavni inžinjering? Izazovi i implikacije presude evropskog 
suda za ljudska prava u predmetu Sejdić i Finci protiv BiH. Analitika, Sarajevo.  p. 26. 
 
256 The April Package included a whole set of new constitutional reforms. It was expected that the package would be 
adopted in April 2006. 
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The Current Approach to the Issue of Political Participation of National Minorities in BiH  
 
In theory, the search for rights of political participation of minorities signifies a paradigm 
shift, where there is a move from a discourse of protection to that of empowerment of minorities. 
Thus, when examining the constitutional provisions of BiH when it comes to this issue, one can 
conclude that this paradigm shift has not yet occurred. The ruling of the ECHR in the case of 
Sejdić-Finci vs. BiH was the first judgment in the history of this Court that questioned the 
constitutionality of an ECHR signatory state. Despite the initial steps that were taken on part of 
BiH towards the implementation of Court’s ruling, and the fact that the Election Law does 
envision (at least on a local level) some degree of participation for national minorities, they still 
do not have a meaningful option to politically participate on the state level. This means that 
minority issues in BiH (including their right to political participation) are still treated as part of 
the “approach to vulnerable groups” and mainly in the context of social inclusion. Hodžić (2011) 
rightfully argues that: 
 
“The political participation of minorities is still understood by many relevant actors as 
related to the ethics of care and protection, financial needs and budgetary 
considerations, and not as a matter of co-decision making in sectors of particular 
relevance to minorities and in broader aspects of political life. In such a perspective, 
political participation of minorities is seen mostly as an ad hoc problem-solving 
mechanism rather than continuous dialogue that would enable persons belonging to 
minorities to voice their concerns and positions in decision-making and at the same time 
also inform the general directions of development of a society.257” 
 
Thus, when minorities are consulted, the consultation process is ad hoc and confined to several 
issues, but mainly financial allocations to different minority organizations and associations.  
                                                          
257 Hodžić, E. (2011). Political Participation of National Minorities in Local Governance in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: State of the Art, Prospects and Ways Forward. Analitika, Sarajevo, 2011. p. 48. 
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 Despite of this, both state and local governments in BiH possess consultative 
mechanisms258 for inclusion of national minorities in the political processes. The Council of 
national minorities of BiH is a special consultative body of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH 
(PA BiH) formed in April 2008. Considering its consultative nature,259 it issues opinions, 
recommendations and suggestions on all matters pertaining to national minority rights, statues 
and interests to the Parliamentary Assembly. The Council also has the power to delegate experts 
to constitutional and Joint Committee on Human Rights, Child Rights, Youth, Immigration, 
Refugees, Asylum and Ethics of the PA BiH in instances when these bodies discuss matters 
related to national minorities. Lastly, the Council consists of one representative from all 
seventeen recognized national minority groups in BiH which are elected by a decision issued by 
the Joint Committee on human rights, child rights, youth, immigration, refugees, asylum and 
ethics of the PA BiH, which, in turn, must consult associations of national minorities or other 
relevant NGOs. However, it can be concluded that the role of this body is marginal, considering 
its purely consultative role. On the other hand, this is the only state-level body through which 
national minorities can be represented in the executive, which is discouraging to members of 
different minority groups. This is evident not only in low number of candidates for this body, but 
also the fact that since 2008 the members of the Council have remained mostly the same. 
Additionally, in 2002, a Committee for Roma was formed in the Council of Ministers of BiH. 
The work of both bodies is regulated by relevant laws on the protection of national minorities on 
state, entity and cantonal levels, as well as other relevant documents.  
 Alternatively, the Law on the protection of national minorities of FBiH also establishes 
similar consultative bodies on the entity level. The FBiH law prescribes the criteria for 
membership in entity level council, whereby a national minority association is allowed to appoint 
one Council member per one thousand minority organization member. The maximum number of 
representatives in FBiH Minority Council is five, with the exception of Roma who can appoint 
seven members.260 When it comes to RS, fifteen Minority Council members are not chosen 
                                                          
258 The mechanism of national minority representation on state-level in BiH corresponds to consultation mechanism 
activity. This mechanism exists in a variety of forms and BiH practices the minority consultative councils whose 
members come from all national minority groups and minority representative organizations (associations). These 
organizations articulate and make visible minority interests in different areas, and present them to the government. 
 
259 Ibid, p. 33.  
 
260 FBiH Law on minorities, Article 17.  
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directly by the associations, but by the National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska. The 
candidates are elected from a list prepared by the Council of National Minorities of the Republic 
of Srpska, an NGO organization which coordinates all minority associations from RS. Albeit 
different, both entity levels, thus, severely politicize national minority membership in the 
consultative bodies, which gravely impedes and limits minority influence. Furthermore, the role 
of both entity councils is poorly defined and their primary function is consultative, which means 
that they can act only through their founding bodies.  
 Conversely, the mechanisms for minority inclusions on local levels are relatively more 
encouraging. Both entity Laws on local self-governance prescribe different inclusion tools for 
minority groups, including referendums, citizen assembly, citizen initiatives, citizen panels, local 
community meetings,261 etc. Furthermore, communities, which are mandatory legally defined 
units in FBiH and voluntary and not legal units in RS, have the possibility of defining 
participatory mechanisms in more detail through their own statues.262 The wide range of 
participatory mechanisms on local levels in both entities clearly does not limit citizen 
participation. However, local statues are deprived of detail when it comes to specific guidelines 
concerning national minority special rights to participation, so the general nature of these 
provisions clearly lacks specific focus on these groups. What is more, general matters of interest 
to national minorities are seldom discussed through the existing participatory channels, which 
further discourage them to participate in issues that are not of concern to their groups. It can thus 
be concluded that, aside from state and entity level participation, national minority participation 
originates on the local level, and is far more inclusive considering the availability of tools that 
are presented to such groups. Yet, there are several problems, all of which will be discussed in 
the reminder of this chapter. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
261 In Bosnian “mjesna zajednica”. This concept is an inherited feature from former Yugoslavia, where it represented 
a traditional citizen consultative-participatory mechanism.  
 
262 Hodžić, E. (2011). Political Participation of National Minorities in Local Governance in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: State of the Art, Prospects and Ways Forward. Analitika, Sarajevo, 2011. p. 48-55. 
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“I didn’t know” - From Over-Politization to Phlegmatic Use of Existing Participatory 
Mechanisms  
 
 Although it is possible observe the general trends and patterns of national minority 
political participation in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, the peculiarities, complexities 
and inadequacies of the existing participatory mechanisms demonstrate two basic characteristics: 
over-politicization and lack of appropriate channelling or better absence of an inclusion 
framework which would offer specific guidelines in terms of how to use them. This results in a 
scenario in which, despite these tools, political participation of national minorities in BiH is 
almost inexistent. Unlike in modern European states where minority association membership 
signifies a great deal of formal political participation, this trend cannot be observed among BiH’s 
minority groups, where national minority association membership translates into celebration of 
national and religious feasts and holidays. This view was summarized up by one respondent:  
 
“The associations are here to help preserve our tradition, celebrate our holidays, but 
more than anything they uphold our religious tradition and religion in general. Maybe 
even language, but that is a bit harder. Even before the war we gathered to celebrate our 
holidays. We must stick together in order to keep the tradition and transfer it to our 
young.” (Jewish female, 76 years old) 
 
When asked about her opinion whether she sees her association as a channel for political 
participation she added:  
 
“What political participation? No way! It’s all about tradition; I don’t care about being 
included in the government. Even if I were younger I wouldn’t. I vote, but why would I 
care about the rest? It’s all politics anyway; they just keep switching positions, going in a 
circle. No!”  
 
Although this answer was the most radical, other respondents from Jewish organizations from 
across Bosnian cities agreed.  
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“Political participation is important, of course. Voting is our civic duty, while I see other 
forms that you mention as dependent on individual will, meaning that you either do it or 
choose to stay inactive. But I don’t, in any way, see this association as a channel through 
which we can push for our right to political participation. In my opinion, only individuals 
who care and know how to do it can do it. The best way to influence something, at least 
for the ordinary citizen, is to vote and engage in public debates” (Jewish male, 35 years 
old). 
Another explains, 
 
“I think that national minority associations can serve as a basis for political 
participation, a place where nobody prohibits us do discuss our minority interests and 
rights and how we can further them in the context of current constitutional 
discrimination. However, associations are not adequate in terms of acting in our name...I 
mean, associations are not political agents, so we must have somebody to either 
represent us, an influential individual who knows politics and who is well respected, 
otherwise a bunch of Jews from Sarajevo cannot do it. This is not typical for us, we don’t 
engage in protest, we never had a history of being a violent group and this sticks with us. 
Yes, I would also say that associations are the safeguards of our tradition. But for 
‘regular’ people, the best way is to go out and vote. A lot of people in BiH don’t vote 
because they think they will not change anything. If everybody voted, change would be 
visible. For minorities, this is the best way to participate.” (Jewish male, 57 years old).  
 
A 29 year old Jewish female, an active member of Naša Stranka, summarizes why her 
community, or the majority of its members, do not see the association as a channel to further the 
right to political participation:  
 
“I am politically active, I am also a political scientist, I understand politics. Associations, 
such as national minority communities (udruženja) can well serve as channels for more 
political engagement, especially in times of turbulence, when people’s demands are 
great. In my opinion, all national minorities in BiH, not just Jews, which I know well, do 
not use this channel appropriately. This is because there is not enough impetus from the 
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outside to further these rights and not enough knowledge among us about what it actually 
means to participate. Nobody is asking ‘you’ to be a member of a political party, but get 
out there, vote, change, write letters, keep informed, ask questions. Things will not 
happen for us on their own.” 
  
One of the answers that differed the most from this pattern was presented by Jewish male, 41 
years of age, who states:  
 
“I can see how my association can serve as a starting point for an individual, who wants 
to be politically active, but above all, this is a citizen association and it can never turn 
into a political group.”  
 
An elderly Jewish male, age 68, adds:  
 
“The Jewish community, just its very name carries a certain value, at least here in 
Sarajevo. We are a symbol of benevolence, co-existence, support…during the war we 
didn’t care who was who, but gave help to those in need because we received it. It was 
mostly from Israel. Back in the day nobody cared if the medicine they got was from 
Israel. Today, it’s a big deal. So I guess, even if we wanted to mobilize politically for the 
sake of furthering our rights, we would be accused of pro-Israeli ideas…I am speaking of 
today, of course. But yes, I guess the association, if it knew how and if its leaders and 
members knew enough, would be able to change something politically for us Jews.”  
 
All, but two of the thirty focus group participants from Jewish associations (93%) agree, 
however, that the primary goal of these organizations is to “preserve the tradition” and “keep the 
community together”.  
Not very different were the answers of the Polish minority interviewed in Banja Luka.  
 
“I am aware of my Polish background and all I really care about is that I keep my 
tradition, that my children are one day aware of their heritage, that they can at least 
communicate in Polish. I am not really convinced of the power of minority associations 
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when it comes to change, especially political or economic change…I really am not. What 
I think is best...voting, engaging in local politics, local associations, discussions, read 
and inform ourselves, so that we can be smarter political decisions”  
states a Polish female, 32 years of age.  
 
“To change minority rights under Dayton? We are all tired of this story, it simply cannot 
happen. I cannot run for a president, so what should I fight for? It will not happen during 
my lifetime. Everything in this country is over-politicized, everything”,  
 
says a Polish female, 56 years of age. All twenty eight Polish participants in the focus groups 
stated that they care about “the preservation of Polish culture and language” and that political 
mobilization is “simply not the business of such groups”.  
What these findings lead us to conclude is that very often, minorities do not participate 
because they are simply unaware of different participation channels, not by their own choice, but 
by the inability of minority associations’ leadership to inform them of the existing platforms and 
participatory mechanisms.  
 
“Minority associations preserve tradition and this is their primary purpose. But, we keep 
forgetting history and how we mobilized as groups, not only as Poles, or Jews, or Roma, 
or Germans, but as a whole, under the auspices of our associations. It is a great way to 
engage in politics, to make our voices heard. I do not want to sound like I am mobilizing 
national minorities in a violent way, but there are so many ways in which minority voices 
can be heard and so many channels through we could exercise minority rights. All of this 
can be done through an association. Look at Roma, they do it, so it is doable...and it’s 
certainly not prohibited. We have more power in our hands than we think we have. 
However, we are not adequately informed among ourselves. Our active political 
engagement must start, in this order – education through reading and listening, trusting 
the alternative, engaging in what is out there and sticking to our minority identity as we 
do this. This is the only way to make minorities politically visible.” (Polish male, 47 years 
old).  
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This lack of political mobilization under the auspices of associations spills over to the individual 
levels and illustrates communities which are incapable of political change just because they 
simply do not know how and where to participate. The motivations for this behaviour will be 
discussed in Chapter 7, but the general apathy that was noted during focus groups stems from the 
fact that associations themselves fail to inform their members of adequate participatory channels. 
An insignificant percentage of respondents (5%) agree that associations might represent a 
catalyst for change, but that other factors such as associations’ non-governmental status add to 
powerlessness to act as significant political players. Furthermore, both Jewish and Polish 
national minority organizations were too focused on the cultural aspect of associations’ work, 
without any awareness of the importance and existence of participatory tools which could 
enhance the status of their groups, at least on local level.  
This last argument is further supported by the fact that local level bodies which are 
responsible for consultations with minority groups are rarely comprised of national minority 
members who are not political party members.263 The view of a 32 year old male of Polish origin 
from Gradiška summarizes this view: 
 
“I am politically active only because I believe that change is possible if an individual 
engages and wants to advance its groups rights. Empowerment comes through 
individuals and marginalized groups, at least in today’s BiH, do not really stand a 
chance except if some of their members are not strongly engaged in politics. Sometimes, 
however, even members of national minorities who are active on the local level forget 
where they are coming from. There are very few us and if two of us forget that we stand 
for out groups, than we cannot expect much change” 
 
Another politically active member of the Jewish community from Banja Luka compliments this 
opinion: 
“The issue of national minority political participation and engagement in higher acts of 
politics is certainly politicized. Just the mere fact that I have to abandon my own identity, 
cross this important boundary, and say that I am a Serb in order to even reach a point 
                                                          
263 Hodžić, E. (2011). Political Participation of National Minorities in Local Governance in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: State of the Art, Prospects and Ways Forward. Analitika, Sarajevo, 2011. p. 40.  
 
117 
 
where I participate in politics in order to change something for my groups, is politics. 
This is discriminating Bosnian politics, a fault-line of our ‘pluralist’ system and 
something that will forever drag democratic development in this country behind” (Jewish 
male, 36 years old).  
 
Hence, the belief of Jewish and Polish respondents is that the issue of national minority political 
participation is overly-politicized and largely dependent on individual motivations to which 
transcend group issues, a matter which will be discussed in much greater detail in Chapter 7.  
Alternatively, in examining minority group knowledge about participatory mechanisms 
on local level and the role of their associations in this process, I was also interested in revealing 
whether mjesna zajednica is considered as a forum where minority participation can start. The 
2011 findings presented by Hodžić264 observe that in local communities in which national 
minorities have significant territorial concentrations, mjesna zajednica is seen as an instrument 
of communication with the local government. He also confirms that these mechanisms were 
occasionally used.265 However, the findings of the focus groups organized for the purposes of 
this dissertation, both Jews and Poles from across the country did not view mjesna zajednica as a 
useful participation mechanism. Nevertheless, the reasons which these two groups cited were 
different. A 62 year old Jew from Sarajevo gives the opposite opinion: 
 
“I understand local politics; I have spent my whole life working for mjesna zajednica. I 
know what it entails and how people can participate. But, when it comes to power that 
national minorities can hope to gain through it, we are out of luck. How can a group of 
15-20 members of different national minority groups in Dobrinja266, for example, hope to 
achieve something when we are so small in number? What to push for? A Jewish Sunday 
school or a synagogue because Dobrinja is the biggest neighbourhood in BiH? 
                                                          
264 The study conducted by Hodžić in 2011 is the only official work covering political participation of national 
minorities in BiH. No other national or international academic works on this topic exist and this is why I can only 
rely on this piece of information. This study, however, did not produce quantitative data and makes very limited use 
of qualitative findings (interviews).  
 
265 Ibid, p. 42.  
 
266 A large neighborhood in the suburban part of Sarajevo.   
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Ridiculous! No public policy can be made on behalf of a single national minority group 
on this level. No, mjesna zajednica is not the place to do it and it does not offer useful 
participation tools for any member of a national minority group to exercise it effectively.  
 
Ten other respondents from Jewish communities across BiH also mention the issue of number. 
One explains: 
 
“There is a widespread practice not to consult minorities in any of local issues. Those 
who do not belong to national minority groups see us as being all the same, they do not 
make a difference between a Jew or an Albanian, maybe yes, a Roma, but we certainly do 
not exhibit physical differences in appearance. To non-minorities we might as well be a 
part of the majority. In my view, we are too small in number as individual groups to have 
our individual concerns voiced through ‘mjesna zajednica’. This channel is 
discriminatory for us, if you ask me.” (Jewish male, 33 years old) 
 
A 35 year old politically active female from Zenica adds that: 
 
“Numbers are problematic for all members of national minorities. They are consulted or 
they use consultative mechanisms to advance their rights or empower their communities, 
but only if they live in ‘mjesna zajednica’ that has a large minority population. I know of 
this situation in Sarajevo and Zenica where Roma have used these mechanisms, and in 
and around Prijedor where Ukrainians have used this mechanism. But overall, let’s say 
that this is not a standard practice.” 
 
Hence, Jews believed that mjesna zajednica is not a successful mechanism because of: 
 
a) General discrimination towards national minorities and the fact that “people believe 
that minorities should not be consulted because they are small in number”267; 
 
                                                          
267 Quotation from a Jewish male participant from Sarajevo, aged 31, during the focus group.  
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b) National minority groups are often viewed as one whole, instead of as separate groups 
with unique cultural, religious, historical and linguistic traditions. 
 
Alternatively, Poles share a similar opinion and argue that mjesna zajednica is not a good 
participatory tool mainly because it discriminates against the minorities in terms of taking the 
size of the particular minority group and addressing their needs adequately. As one Polish female 
participant, aged 44, from Gradiška states 
  
“Some ‘mjesne zajednice’ have many citizens who belong to national minorities. For 
example here we have many Poles and Ukrainians, but although they participate in the 
activities on the local level they are not viewed as groups that might have certain and 
different demands. Of course, ‘mjesna zajednica’ addresses the needs of the masses, but I 
do not see it as a channel through which we could voice minority-related matters and 
request policies that relate exclusively to minority rights” 
 
A male participant, aged 19, from the same town, offers a broader view of this opinion: 
 
“I think this is not entirely true for all groups, but mostly for groups that are smaller like us, 
Poles, or Ukrainians, Germans, Jews. If we were a larger minority maybe we would be able 
to see ‘mjesna zajednica’ as a place where we could argue, push, propose...this is what 
Roma do, but Roma are our largest minority and unfortunately not too active in this town. 
But for us, smaller communities ‘mjesna zajednica’ is a poor mechanism through which we 
can gain anything. It is not discriminatory entirely, but in a way, when you think about it, it 
is...”  
 
The problem of local community, or ‘mjesna zajednica’ as a channel through which participation 
of national minority groups could occur is further complicated by the fact that in smaller towns 
with several different minority groups, issues that are put on the agenda largely relate to the well-
being of the whole community and never target single minority groups. A 52 year old Polish 
male from Banja Luka, who has been an active member of his ‘mjesna zajednica’ since 1992 
states:  
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“As a Pole, obviously a member of a national minority group, I never saw ‘mjesna 
zajednica’ as a channel through which I could voice my concerns or concerns of my 
Polish community, friends, family...even if I wanted to, I wouldn’t know how, because 
‘mjesna zajednica’ never targeted issues that are of interest to us. When “Sejdić-Finci” 
issue occurred, we tried pushing for more political influence, tried to see whether a few 
young Poles who are interested in politics could really achieve anything by being more 
active in pressing the country to do something about state minority representation. This 
will to participate turned out to be futile, as ‘mjesna zajednica’ said it could not really 
influence state-level politics...” 
 
A 21 year old Polish male, also from Banja Luka interrupts to add:  
 
“Our political involvement, we believe, can only start on the local level, but you see from 
his story that there is no interest, the way through which we can achieve this is unclear. 
The system is unfair, not inclusive and relies too much on numbers. Then we end up 
asking the largest minority living in a certain town or village, how much money will be 
invested in a traditional Polish festival. Makes no sense...” 
 
Hence, in the opinion of Poles, ‘mjesna zajednica’ is not a mechanism through which political 
participation of national minority groups in BiH can occur. They point-out several major reasons 
for this:  
 
1. ‘Mjesna zajednica’ does not adequately portray the size of the national minority. Hence, 
all minority groups are discriminated, except Roma, since their numbers are significant in 
BiH.  
2. Channels through which participation occurs or should occur are “unclear” and “target 
local community questions of little interest to Poles”268 
                                                          
268 A significant number of Polish respondents (71%) referred here to building of religious objects.  
 
268 Quoted words emerged the most during focus group discussions. 
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3. National minority groups are often viewed as one whole and not as separate 
ethnic/cultural/linguistic groups. This creates a situation in which numerically larger 
groups are consulted on most issues, simply because they are easier to reach to.  
 
Hence, several issues are problematic when it comes to participation on local community level. 
Aside from the general feeling of discrimination, which is a very subjective trait, of much 
importance is the overwhelming belief among Jews (all 30 participants or 100% agreed to this) 
that “all national minority groups are seen as one”. This leads to a situation in which national 
minority groups are often faced with issues that are objectively not of interest to their particular 
group and hence limit participation interest. As a 23 year old Polish female explains:  
 
“Living in a larger city as a member of national minority and seeing ‘mjesna zajednica’ 
as a participatory mechanism is like seeing a humanitarian organisation as a source of 
income. Going for meetings in which members of the community discuss Serb, Croat, 
Bosniak representation on the local level and knowing that you, as a member of a 
national minority who has no intention of changing his/her identity for the sake of 
representation, can’t participate in any way creates a feeling of exclusion. People ask 
questions ‘why should I go when I these issues don’t concern me?’ are an everyday issue, 
so of course, we do not see these local channels as participatory channels. It might be 
that we are uninformed, but again, people generally turn away from places where they 
feel excluded and find alternative channels, like political parties.” 
 
Alternatively, consultations with all minority groups occur all at the same time, without 
particular focus on interested groups. Hence, local community levels run into danger of 
excluding imperative groups and consulting those less interested one (maybe only because they 
form a larger group at a given local level or particular mjesna zajednica) This, in turn, results in 
the feelings of “unfairness” and belief that local community minority participatory mechanisms 
are “inadequate”, “politicized” and “overly general” to appropriately channel minority demands 
and further them to a higher level. Not least, the issue of seeing all national minorities as a single 
community creates a situation in which local community governments, but also higher 
governmental bodies, create “minority questions” which are discussed during consultations with 
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national minority groups and their representatives. Funding a minority association or cultural 
club is essential for all minority groups, but not all minorities need to be consulted if a specific 
focus is on budgeting, for example, a Roma club. As many respondents noted, there is a general 
tendency to consult minority groups on issues that concern Roma, as their social status is more 
disadvantaged compared to both national minority groups and BiH’s constituent peoples. 
Another inadequacy of the system is tightly connected to minority groups’ belief that their 
associations are places for cultural gatherings, whereby much of consultations occur on the 
issues of cultural programs and funding of minority cultural projects. Issues that concern political 
participation channels and ways to politically participate are rarely discussed by minorities with 
governments and vice versa. Hence, the root of this systematic scantiness lies in the existing two-
way communication gap. As a consequence, national minorities claim to be uninformed about 
participation mechanisms, blaming the structure that is too politicized, complex and 
decentralized. Alternatively, governments fail to organize this information and assure its 
dissemination among relevant groups, thus creating a system that can rightfully be termed a 
“Swiss-cheese model”, formed and intact, yet full of gaps that are difficult to fill. For this reason, 
let us learn about more successful models which will serve in picturing a more inclusive political 
reality for national minority groups in BiH. 
 
Conclusion  
 
The purpose of this chapter was to contextualize political participation of national minorities in 
BiH, notably in light of democratization and through a discussion of political fault-lines 
embedded in Dayton Constitution. I have argued that following the wartime events that occurred 
in BiH from 1992 until 1995, the mixed ethnic picture in BiH as inherited from former 
Yugoslavia exacerbated peace settlement efforts and ultimately ended with the 
institutionalization of Dayton Peace Accords which also entails BiH’s post-war Constitution that 
is still in place. However, due to the multi-ethnic picture, the argument made in this chapter is 
that Dayton Constitution overemphasizes ethnicity. Hence, the constitutional system based on 
ethnic constituency and the principle of “constituent peoples” in lieu of the term “citizen” 
represents the principal fault-line of the power-sharing mechanism instituted in Dayton and a 
legally enshrined basis for discriminations of groups that are considered “Others” under the 
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present constitutional framework. Furthermore, the argument made in this chapter is that this 
constitutional inconsistency is the primary culprit for the exclusion of national minorities from 
state-level bodies, but also a reason for their dissatisfaction with the present socio-economic 
order in the country, an issue which will be discussed in more detail in chapters 7 and 8. The 
discussion extends to include a comparison of Dayton Constitution against relevant international 
legal documents which cover national minority rights to political participation. The aim of the 
legal discussion was to posit the international legal frameworks in the context of BiH’s 
constitutional contents and understand the interpretations used by BiH in addressing the principal 
topic of political participation of national minority groups. The concluding argument as it relates 
to this part of the chapter was that members of national minorities in BiH can be represented in 
state-level government only if they declare themselves as members of one of the three 
constitutionally recognized constituent groups. Hence, this discriminatory practice, the argument 
is, degrades these groups’ motivation to participate in high political acts. Related to this is the 
proposition that this chapter makes and that regards the fact that political participation of national 
minority groups is misunderstood by local political actors, who extend it to minority rights 
related mainly to cultural rights. Some of the qualitative findings presented in this chapter 
illustrate that issues which concern political participation channels and ways to politically 
participate are rarely discussed by minorities with governments and vice versa. Hence, the final 
argument is that this systematic insufficiency stems from both – the governing political actors 
and the national minority groups themselves – which ultimately determine former’s 
dissatisfaction and results in lower levels of political participation. But before embarking on 
assessing the reasons for different political behaviour of the examined groups, I now turn the 
attention to the historical narrative with the aim of creating the basis for understanding the 
current trends and transformations in Jewish and Polish political participation of BiH. Although 
little is known of the history of political participation of these national minorities in BiH, in the 
following chapter I argue that both Jews and Poles were relatively politically active groups and 
that their political engagement was primarily influenced by the historical period effects, from 
their arrival to BiH onwards.  
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CHAPTER 5: JEWS AND POLES IN BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA – A (HI) STORY OF POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION 
 
Introduction 
 
The chapter below presents a historical analysis of political participation patterns of Jews 
and Poles, the two primary case study groups in this dissertation. The purpose of this chapter is 
to relate historical paths of political participation of the two groups to the patterns of political 
activism that we observe among them today, but also examine how and to what degree did the 
historical ‘period effects’ (Norris, 2003) influence their political engagement. The chapter is 
divided into two parts, covering historical political participation of Jews and Poles respectively. 
The first part of the chapter assess early development of Bosnian Jews which is more concerned 
with their socio-economic, rather than political development, making it difficult to examine the 
patterns of their formal political participation prior to the arrival of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
in 1878. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to argue that Jewish communities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina refrained from any type of political engagement during this period. First Jewish 
organizations were formed as early as 1565, thus clearly indicating a need for public and 
community engagement. Later, this paved the way for more political inclusion on different 
levels. Thus, the first part of this chapter comprehensively investigates the historical patterns of 
political participation of Bosnian Jewish communities, as one of the most essential groups which 
significantly shaped the political history of the country, notably in the period from 1878 and the 
arrival of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until 1941, when a significant portion of Bosnian Jews 
perished in the horrors of the Holocaust. Moreover, it illustrates the fact that Jews of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina never conducted their own independent politics, nor formed Jewish political parties, 
and that their political role and participation were primarily exercised through their own political 
organizations, all of which were indispensable for the development of the political life in the 
country. The analysis is presented through an investigation of two different periods in Bosnian 
history – the Austro-Hungarian annexation and the independence of Yugoslavia from 1918 until 
1939 – during which the Jewish community of BiH flourished and enlarged, but also practiced 
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the most diverse forms of political participation,269 a pattern that was less observable during the 
communist rule, when all its political activities centred mainly around the Communist Party.  
Conversely, the second part of the chapter looks at the early socio-political development 
of Poles who inhabited Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Austro-Hungarian rule. Unlike Jews, 
the Polish community which settled in BiH was more concerned with their socio-economic, 
rather than political development. Despite the fact that they built entire villages and established 
personal businesses in Bosnia, the Polish community never became fully integrated into the 
Bosnian society, even after the fall of the Austro-Hungarian rule. What is more, generations of 
Poles who were born in Bosnia remained relatively closed within their communities. The second 
part of the chapter thus investigates the socio-political life of the Polish community, as an 
essential group which shaped the history of the country, notably in the period from 1895 and the 
arrival of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until 1946, when a significant portion of Poles returned 
to their homeland. Subject to external colonization, those Poles who inhabited the Bosnian lands 
never fully assimilated neither socially, nor politically into the Bosnian society of that time, but 
despite this influenced an era of country’s history.  
Lastly, I wish to note that the rationale for this chapter lies in the use of the 
transformative paradigmatic approach explained in Chapter 2, and the corresponding ontological 
assumption that I take, whereby social reality is historically bound and that it has a surface, but 
also deeper structures (Neuman, 1997), the latter which can only be understood through 
understanding of historical orientations. The main purpose of this chapter is, thus, to understand 
the historical patterns and triggers that govern contemporary political participation motives of the 
two studied groups, as it is only through history that we can fully learn the motivations and 
behaviour of the observed communities. The chapter serves the purpose of connecting historical 
motivations to current ones as it is only through such an observation that one can learn what 
political empowerment really means to these groups and in which way it is understood.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
269 As we will see, most Jewish politically oriented organizations and activities originated in these two periods. 
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PART I  
Political Participation of Bosnian Jewish Communities: A Historical 
Perspective (1878-1941) 
Jews of Bosnia and Herzegovina – The Early Days 
 
As long and intricate as it is, the history of Jews who settled across the Balkan Peninsula 
cannot be examined as an isolated pattern of historical circumstances, but rather as a series of 
mutually dependent events which moulded one of the most significant national minority groups 
that have inhabited these areas since the Roman times. The reasons for this are manifold, but 
most go back to the fact that the Balkan Peninsula was long ruled by some of the most powerful 
empires in the European history, each one leaving a significant mark not only on the customs and 
socio-political development of different ethnic minority groups which inhabited this part of the 
world, but also shaping their long-term statuses within the local communities. The same is true 
of Jewish communities which settled in Bosnia and Herzegovina prior to the arrival of the 
Ottomans, but also those that arrived to this central Balkan region during the rule of the latter 
Empire, when huge waves of Jewish population fled the 1492 inquisition of non-Catholic groups 
from the Iberian Peninsula.  
When first Jewish communities arrived to the Balkans at the dawn of the 15th century 
they soon discovered a few aboriginal Jews.270 whose descent is, by historical accounts, tied to 
the Roman era, when they formed their first settlements very close to the borders of today’s 
BiH.271 Hence, the remnants of Jewish tombs and synagogues from 3rd and 4th centuries were 
discovered not only in Macedonia, Dalmatia and Montenegro, but also in Osijek272, only fifty 
kilometres away from Bosnian north-eastern border. However, most Jewish groups at that time 
settled in today’s Macedonia, where they remained during the Byzantine rule. Due to the 
                                                          
270 The descent of these groups is, by historical accounts, tied to the Roman era, when they formed their first 
settlements very close to the borders of today’s BiH. Source: Malcolm, N., 2011. Bosna: Kratka povijest. Sarajevo: 
Biblioteka Memorija. p. 206. 
 
271 Malcolm, N., 2011. Bosna: Kratka povijest. Sarajevo: Biblioteka Memorija. p. 206. 
 
272 Today in Croatia.  
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significance of a long trade route that crossed these lands on its final destination in the Greek city 
of Salonika, old and new members of the Jewish community from across Europe settled in this 
area during the Roman rule. However, the biggest influx of Jews to the Balkan Peninsula came in 
the 15th century, when under a threat of a death sentence known as “auto de fè”, instituted by 
Thomas Torquemada, the grand inquisitor of the Spanish king Ferdinand and queen Isabella, 
thousands of Jews fled Spain in March of 1492.273 Forced to leave Spain, these Jews settled 
across the European continent. And while some of them found their refuge in France, Belgium 
and The Netherlands, most of them arrived to the Mediterranean countries of the Ottoman 
Empire, including those of the Balkans. Many of these groups initially settled along main trade 
routes of the time, mainly in Salonika, but later moved on to Skopje, which, thanks to Jewish 
fruitful trade activities, soon became an important regional trade centre. Hence, those Jews who 
ultimately settled in Bosnia and Herzegovina arrived primarily from Salonika, Bitolj, Istanbul 
and Sofia. Some also penetrated from the North, more precisely from Italian cities of Padua and 
Venice, but also Zadar, Zagreb and Dubrovnik.274 They called themselves “Sephards” or the 
Sephardic Jews, a name which denoted their Spanish origin, but also their religious and cultural 
customs.275 
Although Bosnia was not situated directly on the trade route to Salonika, an important 
segment of that road went from Dubrovnik to Foča in Eastern Bosnia and on to Novi Pazar and 
Skopje. Hence, Jewish traders from Skopje and Dubrovnik had frequent dealings with Bosnian 
intermediaries.276 However, most historians on this topic (Malcolm, 2011; Pinto, 1987; Levy, 
                                                          
273 Jews fled Spain under a threat of a death sentence known as ‘auto de fè’, instituted by Thomas Torquemada, the 
grand inquisitor of King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella. Source: Pinto, A., 1987. Jevreji Sarajeva i Bosne i 
Hercegovine. Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša. p. 11. 
 
274 Levy, M., 1996. Sefardi u Bosni. Prilog historiji Jevreja na balkanskom poluotoku. Bosanska biblioteka. p. 11. 
 
275 A Sephard is a Jew descended from Jews who lived in the Iberian Peninsula before their expulsion in the late 15th 
century. For religious purposes, "Sephardim" denotes most Jews of West Asian and North African origin who 
commonly use a Sephardic style of liturgy. The name comes from Sephard, a Biblical location. Sephardic Jews 
speak Ladino, a mix of Spanish and Hebrew. In Bosnia, Ladino also adopted many local words. Ladino is still 
spoken by four members of the Jewish community in BiH. Source: Efendić, N., 2010. “Pogled na sefardsku romansu 
u Bosni i Hercegovini”. In: Narodna umjetnost 47/2. Sarajevo.  
 
 
276 Malcolm, N., 2011. Bosna: Kratka povijest. Sarajevo: Biblioteka Memorija. p. 207. 
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1996) claim that , in fact, it was the development of Sarajevo277 as an important trade centre that 
led Jews to inhabit Bosnian territories. Moreover, it is essential to mention that bezistan278 
“Bursa” was probably crucial in attracting Jews to settle in Sarajevo, since this important trade 
facility was mainly in the hands of Anadolian Jews.279 In the next two centuries, the Jewish 
community from Sarajevo developed close ties with Skopje and Salonika, specializing in cloth 
trade, a branch that stayed controlled by Bosnian Jews until the Holocaust of the Second World 
War.280 
Nevertheless, when examining the patterns of political participation of Bosnian Jewish 
communities in BiH, I considered several situational aspects, all of which are important in a 
more general context of this thematic, but which are not indispensable for this dissertation and its 
main focus on current levels of political participation.  
 
• In state-level politics, Bosnian Jews never established or led any political parties; 
• In state-level politics, Bosnian Jews were members of different political parties. 
Their choice of political engagement was primarily driven by their individual (not 
group) beliefs and personal ideology; 
• The political engagement of Bosnian Jews was always complemented by their 
engagement in the economic life, in which they played an indispensable role. This 
was notably so in urban areas, where they analyzed different economic trends and 
offered solutions for the entire community.  
 
But, in order to thoroughly examine and understand this interesting network of relations, we 
must first adequately look further away into history, and offer an insight into the first forms of 
political participation of Jews that settled in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Ottoman rule.  
                                                          
277 There is no precise data on the actual arrival of Jews to Sarajevo, but three court records from 1565 mention 
Jewish traders who settled in Sarajevo. Source: Levy, M., 1996. Sefardi u Bosni. Prilog historiji Jevreja na 
balkanskom poluotoku. Bosanska biblioteka. p. 11. 
 
278 Bezistan (also known as bedestan or bedesten) is a covered market built in a shape of a mosque. Such places were 
built during the Ottoman rule throughout the occupied territories. Bezistan represented the centre of commercial life 
in every city or town. Source: Vujaklja, M., 1954. Leksikon stranih reči i izraza. Beograd: Prosveta.  
 
279 Shaw, S. J., 1991. The Jews of the Ottoman Emipre and the Turkish Republic. London. p. 53. 
 
280 Pelletier, R., 1934.  Sarajevo et sa région: chez les Yugoslavs de la Save à l’Adriatique. Paris. pp. 48-49. 
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The Life and Politics of Jewish Communities during the Ottoman Empire: The Origins of 
Jewish Political Engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 
Upon their arrival to Bosnia, the Jews of Sarajevo281 lived in Muslim “mahalas” (a 
quarter),282 but in 1577, after they aided the Ottomans in defeating the Habsburgs, they were 
given a mahala of their own. However, a 17th century account by a Jewish writer from Salonika 
indicates that this quarter was not granted because of Jewish assistance to the Turks, but upon 
their own request to Ottoman authorities. Whatever the reason, theThe richer Jews moved into 
grouped houses in the central area of the city, close to the central market. Poorer families, on the 
other hand, moved into a special building constructed upon the orders of the city governor in 
1580-1581. This house was known as Siavuš-Pašine Daire (or the bequest of Siavuš- Paša).283 
The building itself comprised of forty-six rooms, with a common courtyard, hence each family 
occupied one or two small rooms, depending on the number of people. The Jewish called this 
building Il Cortijo (the “courtyard” in Ladino), while Muslims called it “Velika avlija” (the great 
courtyard) or čivuthana (the house of Jews).  
 As the number of Jews grew, so did their need to organize into first associations. 
Although there is little account on the activities of the Jewish community in Sarajevo, it is 
known that inIn 1565 they formed their first community (Jevrejska opština or JO), which soon 
became a central institution for all Sarajevo-based Jews. This organization represented Jews in 
different dealings with the Ottoman government, but also served as the central stage for Jewish 
social and religious life. Hence, JO community represented a platform for early forms of political 
engagement of Sarajevo-based Jews, serving as a strong bond between their growing 
populations. It should be noted, however, that this institution was not completely political.284 and 
                                                          
281 Jews first settled in and around Sarajevo. However, smaller Jewish communities moved in and around the city of 
Travnik in Central Bosnia, a developed trade center during the 18th century. The arrival of Jews to other larger 
Bosnian towns, including Mostar, Tuzla and Bihać, occurred much later in history. 
 
282 Malcolm (2011) points out that the word “quarter” is a somewhat misleading translation of “mahala”, as these 
were just small subdivisions of a larger town, consisting of not more than forty houses. Also, the word “mahala” 
does not equal the word “ghetto” that was used for Jewish closed quarters in Christian Europe. In “mahalas” there 
was a complete freedom of movement, without gates or curfews. Source: Malcolm, N., 2011. Bosna: Kratka 
povijest. Sarajevo: Biblioteka Memorija. p. 209. 
 
283 Ibid, p. 209. 
 
284 Tauber, E., 2013. Ilustrovani leksikon Judaizma: Istorija, religija i običaji. Sarajevo: Historijski arhiv. 
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it did not, in any case, serve as a predecessor for a Jewish political party or any other political 
dealings that might have gone against the Ottoman (or in the future any other) regime. Another 
fact that points to the nature of this organization is that Jevrejska opština in Sarajevo had its own 
statute, which regulated the rights and duties of all its members and leaders. Thus, we one cannot 
ignore the fact that Jews started organizing into semi-political units very early. It was not until 
the final years of the Ottoman rule, however, that Jews had their first representatives in the 
Ottoman parliament in Istanbul. This was primarily due to the fact that the legal position of Jews 
was very similar to that of Christians, as both were subject to a set of legal codes known as 
kanun-i raya285 and required special permissions to build synagogues or churches. 286 Yet, Jews 
had their own places of worship, and were able to build them by making suitable payments to the 
Ottomans. Thus, it can be concluded that Jewish relatively low political participation during 
most of the Ottoman rule was due to the fact that they lacked legal equality with Muslims. Still, 
no significant change occurred in Jewish community’s political involvement until the end of the 
19th century. However, the Ottomans were much more open towards non-Muslim groups, 
allowing Jews to use their own courts to judge civil suits within their community. But despite 
these general allowances, Jews still had to pay haraç (a form of a poll-tax paid by non-Muslim 
populations; originally a land-tax), and were subject to different dress rules, including a 
stipulation introduced in 1574 by Sultan Murat IV, which decreed that Jews were not to wear 
turbans, silk clothes, or anything green. This practice later changed, and allowed rabbis to wear 
turbans, as long as they were yellow.287 In general, however, it can be said that Jews of the 
Ottoman Empire, more specifically those living in Bosnia, were much less discriminated against 
than Jews living in Christian Europe.  
 In the first decade of the 19th century the Jewish population of Bosnia grew steadily. Not 
only did theyThey lived in Sarajevo (approximately 2000),288 but now also moved to settled in 
                                                          
285 Traditional code of laws applied to “raya”, the non-Ottoman people (including Muslims). By 19th century the 
term “raya” denoted non-Muslim populations. Source: Malcolm, N., 2011. Bosna: Kratka povijest. Sarajevo: 
Biblioteka Memorija. pp. 319-320. 
 
286 Traditional code of laws applied to “raya”, the non-Ottoman people (including Muslims). By 19th century the 
term “raya” denoted non-Muslim populations. Source: Malcolm, N., 2011. Bosna: Kratka povijest. Sarajevo: 
Biblioteka Memorija. pp. 319-320. 
 
287 Ibid, p. 210. 
288 Ibid, p. 213. 
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Travnik and Mostar, where they established notable trade businesses.289 At the end of the 19th 
century, came the slow collapse of the Ottoman Empire. It was at this time, more precisely in 
1877, that first Jewish representatives gained posts in the vilayet council,290 but also in the 
parliament in Istanbul. However, it was not until the reforming Sultans of the 1830s until 1850s 
(when the Ottomans were losing their grip over the Balkans) that new civil laws granting equal 
rights to all religious communities were issued. Initially, these laws existed in theory rather than 
in practice, but were nevertheless there when the Austro-Hungarians occupied Bosnia in 1878.291 
It was at this time that the biggest change to the status-quo of the Bosnian Jewish community 
came, including their right to political participation. During this period, the levels of political 
engagement among Bosnian Jews increased, thus making it much more worthy of our attention 
than the preceding Ottoman era.  These early forms of political participation serve as an example 
of the historical accounts which state that Ottoman governors often relied upon Jewish 
physicians and merchants as their own personal and diplomatic advisors.  
Two prominent Jews were elected to the parliament – Javer eff. Baruh and Isak eff. Salom, both 
of whom spoke Turkish language. For some time, Baruh also served as a counsel general, and as 
a director of the vilayet printing house. After his death, his son Sumbul eff. Salamon Isaković 
was proclaimed his successor, and later served as the city councillor in Sarajevo for many years. 
Salom, on the other hand, had a notable military career, and served in the order of Tahir-Paša.292 
During the reign of Abdul Hamid, all three of them were notable Sultan’s and Vezir’s 
advisors.293 Hence, it can be said that Jews enjoyed relative trust among the Ottoman rulers. 
These early forms of political participation serve as an example of the historical accounts which 
state that Ottoman governors often relied upon Jewish physicians and merchants as their own 
personal and diplomatic advisors.  
 It is not very clear whether this trust and early granting of political rights to Jewish 
communities came from the fact that Jews were peaceful people, who supported their rulers, 
unlike Christian masses (notably the Orthodox), who resented the Ottomans. However, it was not 
                                                          
289 Ibid, p. 320-321. 
 
290 Vilayet is the province in the Ottoman Empire; vilayet council thus denotes a provincial council. 
291 Nezirović, M., 1992. Jevrejsko-španjolska književnost u Bosni i Hercegovini. Sarajevo: Svjetlost. pp. 35-36. 
 
292 Pinto, A., 1987. Jevreji Sarajeva i Bosne i Hercegovine. Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša. p. 155. 
293 Ibid, p. 155. 
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until the reforming Sultans of the 1830s until 1850s (when the Ottomans were losing their grip 
over the Balkans) that new civil laws granting equal rights to all religious communities were 
issued. Initially, these laws existed in theory rather than in practice, but were nevertheless there 
when the Austro-Hungarians occupied Bosnia in 1878. It was at this time that the biggest change 
to the status-quo of the Bosnian Jewish community came, including their right to political 
participation. During this period, the levels of political engagement among Bosnian Jews 
increased, thus making it much more worthy of our attention than the preceding Ottoman era.   
 
Political Life of Bosnian Jews during the Austro-Hungarian Rule: 1878-1914  
 
It was by the decision of the Berlin Congress held in 1878 that the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
gained the right to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. With the arrival of the new Christian, and 
more so “western” occupying forces, the fate of Bosnian Jews altered. This change was most 
obvious in their political, but also social life, as this period saw an increase in Jewish population 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, primarily due to the arrival of Ashkenazi Jews294 from Hungary, 
Galicia, Poland and the Czech lands. Hence, the Austro-Hungarians faced a challenge of dealing 
with very diverse populations which inhabited the Bosnian territories. These demographic 
switches forced the new government to introduce several changes which influenced the existing 
socio-political and economic reforms order of the autochthonous populace. These reforms 
inevitablywhich also influenced the Jewish population of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
Just four years after their arrival, in 1882, the Austro-Hungarians set-up a “Sephardic 
Israelite Religious Community”, modelled after the Austrian Cultusgemeinde (religious 
community).295 This body elected its own governing unit, while its main task was to keep a 
register of all Sephardic Jews in the city. Furthermore, the community had a right to levy taxes 
on all Jews, up to the amount equivalent to twenty percent of direct state taxes. On the other 
hand, the Ashkenazi Jews from Central Europe were organized into a separate religious 
                                                          
294 Ashkenazi Jews are Jews of France, Germany, and Eastern Europe and their descendants. The adjective 
"Ashkenazi" and corresponding nouns, Ashkenazi (singular) and Ashkenazim (plural) are derived from the Hebrew 
word "Ashkenaz," which is used to refer to Germany. They speak Yiddish, a mix of German and Hebrew languages. 
Source: Solomin, R.R.M. Sephardic, Ashkenazic, Mizrahi Jews - Jewish Ethnic Diversity. Available at: 
http://www.myjewishlearning.com/beliefs/Theology/Who_is_a_Jew/Types_of_Jews/Ethnic_Diversity.shtml 
 
295 Malcolm, N., 2011. Bosna: Kratka povijest. Sarajevo: Biblioteka Memorija. p. 215. 
 
133 
 
community, and were looked down upon by Sephards.296 Hence, these two communities led 
separate lives.  But However, the new government did not pay much attention to the divisions 
that occurred upon the arrival of the Ashkenazi., although they were aware of the underlying 
differences between these two groups. Despite this, however, both Jewish communities were 
often registered together (all three censuses, official reports and school statistics),297 and it was 
not until the 1910 census that the government ordered separate data on these two groups. 
Notwithstanding occasional trade and business connections, the divisions between the Sephardic 
and the Ashkenazi Jews remained until the last few years of the Austro-Hungarian rule in 
Bosnia. They led separate religious and everyday lives, and even formed different associations. 
Yet, these divisions proved to be the core reason for the late political Zionist movement and the 
spread of Jewish national progress that occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 
1900s.298  
The abrupt changes that occurred in the country had an enormous impact on all of its 
communities, but the negative consequences of the new regime were now slowly beginning to 
fade thanks to the formation of progressive social factors, a trait that was notably observable 
among Jews. This was primarily because the Sephardic, and later on the Ashkenazi Jews lived in 
urban areas.299 Thus, Bosnian Jewish communities, realizing the benefits of equal rights that they 
now gained along other groups, opened the door to a more liberal communal development. This 
meant more cooperation with the local population (notably Muslims and Christians), a factor 
which in later years significantly influenced the development of the entire country, both socially 
and politically.300, where civil tradition and practical knowledge about basic life needs lay at the 
core of their socio-political participation. Aware of the significance of the newly introduced 
changes, both Jewish communities became well aware of the consequences that these 
circumstances could have on an individual, but also the community as a whole, especially if they 
                                                          
296 Gordiejew, P. B., 1999. Voices of Yugoslav Jewry. Albany: State University of New York Press. p. 27. 
 
297 Kruševac, T., 1966. Društvene promene kod bosanskih Jevreja za austrijskog vremena. In: Spomenica - 400 
godina od dolaska Jevreja u BiH. Sarajevo. p. 72. 
 
298 For more information on Jewish history in the 19th century Balkans see Szabo, A., 1998. “Židovi i proces 
modernizacije građanskog društva u Hrvatskoj između 1873. i 1914. godine”. In: Ognjen Kraus (ed.), Dva stoljeća 
povijesti i kulture Židova u Zagrebu i Hrvatsko. Zagreb: Židovska općina Zagreb. 
 
299 Gordiejew, P. B., 1999. Voices of Yugoslav Jewry. Albany: State University of New York Press. p. 28. 
 
300 Ibid, pp. 28-29. 
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refrained from cooperating with other ethnic groups, as it was previously the case. Thus, Bosnian 
Jewish communities, realizing the benefits of equal rights that they now gained along other 
groups, opened the door to a more liberal communal development. This meant more cooperation 
with the local population (notably Muslims and Christians), a factor which in later years 
significantly influenced the development of the entire country, both socially and politically.  
Nevertheless, it was not until 1910 that the Austro-Hungarians announced the formation 
of the first parliament and imposed a new constitution. In June of the same year, the so called 
Bosnian Diet (Sabor) was established. The parliament included 92, 25 of whom were virilists,301 
who were elected directly by the tsar or chosen according to their status in the social 
hierarchy.302 In June of the same year, the so called Bosnian Diet (Sabor) was established. 
However, this body was short lived, as after the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand 
in June of 1914, it never convened again. The entire election system was undemocratic. Out of 
92 members, 25 of them were virilists,303 who were elected directly by the tsar or chosen 
according to their status in the social hierarchy.304 Virilists were chosen either by the government 
(Zemaljska vlada) or by professional chambers (including legal and medical chambers, but also 
trade and industrial organizations). Just as it was the case with other groups, Jews were allowed 
to be elected as virilists, as well as members of the Assembly. Jews had two members – one from 
the clergy and one from the working class. However, Jewish members never had a chance to 
achieve anything that would protect the Jewish interest, as they had little opportunity to 
cooperate with other parties in the Assembly. Hence, Jews never took an active role in party 
debates. Other (non-virilist) members were chosen by a closed circle of people, either directly or 
orally in the kurija.305  
Besides political and social changes, the Austro-Hungarian reign in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina also introduced significant economic reforms. What this meant for long-established 
Jewish businesses was increased economic development and closer cooperation with other 
                                                          
301 The word “Virilist” derives from Latin. In the Austro-Hungarian history, the word virilist denotes a member of 
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groups resulted in the creation of social class differentiation within the Jewish community. What 
this meant for long-established Jewish businesses is a different matter, but the fact is that 
increased economic development and closer cooperation with other groups resulted in the 
creation of social class differentiation within the Jewish community. The basic class differences 
that now started appearing created a situation in which poorer Jewish families became closer to 
poor non-Jewish families, rather than with richer Jews. This was the first time that Bosnian Jews 
were divided on the basis of their financial well-being. However, this differentiation could not 
easily break the strong Jewish communal ties as a whole, both among the Sephardic and 
Ashkenazi groups. What happened, in turn, was that these two Jewish communities became more 
politically active, increased the sense of national awareness and contributed to closer ties 
between the two Jewish groups.306 What happened, in turn, was that these two Jewish 
communities became more politically active, and started transforming from a religious into a 
national community.307 Moreover, the changes that occurred in the society as a whole increased 
the sense of national awareness and contributed to closer ties between two Jewish groups. Now, 
the formerly apolitical, highly religious Jewish community that dwelled in the Ottoman Empire 
became politically involved for the first time in its history on Bosnian soil. This involvement was 
two-dimensional, occurring through the formation of different associations308 and the previously 
mentioned national Jewish movement.  
 
La Benevolencija – The Birth of Cultural and Political Actions among Bosnian Jews (1892) 
 
 La Benevolencija was probably one of the first Jewish associations to be formed under 
the Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its whose formation signified Jewish 
inclusion into the social and political life of the country,country. Initially, La Benevolencija 
acted as a local, Sarajevo-based organization, and until 1908 accepted only Jewish communities 
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307 “National community” is an expression relating to "people's community", which refers to uniting people across 
social classes in order to achieve unity.  
 
308 These associations were not necessarily political in character, but some of their activities had political goals. An 
example of this is Lira, a cultural (singers’) society, which from the very beginning was very much involved in the 
Jewish national movement. 
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from Sarajevo.309  The activities of La Benevolencija supported young men through their 
university education in cities such as Vienna, Graz and Prague. They later returned to their 
homeland where they worked as notable professionals, mainly doctors, lawyers and professors. It 
is than to no surprise that it was precisely within this social class that the new direction of 
political engagement was created – more liberal masses among the Jewish population in Bosnia 
were created, influencing the very development of this community and setting the basis for 
future Jewish national movement. 
 On the other hand, La Benevolencija undertook different activities, all of which indirectly 
raised the level of political awareness among young Jews, and contributed to their political 
engagement in later years. Besides its primarily educational goals, La Benevolencija also focused 
on political education of Jews.310 Yet, the true transformation and influence of this association 
occurred much later, and reached its peak in the interwar period between 1918-1939, at the same 
time when other, more so political, Jewish organizations emerged. 
 
but also symbolized the newly rising awareness about the principles of liberal citizenship311, a 
notion that was previously unknown among Bosnian highly religious Jewish community in the 
Ottoman Empire. La Benevolencija was formed on January 12, 1892 in Sarajevo, some four 
years after the initial arrival of the Austro-Hungarians. The first report on the formation of the 
society was signed on this date and complimented by a circle of highly acclaimed members of 
the Jewish community at that time. Since the very beginning of its formation, La Benevolencija 
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sought to gain popularity even outside the Jewish realm, hence inviting other notable people 
from Sarajevo. This move represented a Jewish wish to become a well-integrated, respected and, 
above all a contributing group in the Bosnian society.  
 Initially, in order to adequately respond to changing socio-political circumstances, La 
Benevolencija acted as a local, Sarajevo-based organization, which until 1908 accepted only 
Jewish communities from Sarajevo.  However, the new activities focused on integrating other 
groups from Sarajevo, hence a public proclamation was issued stating that “All those who wish 
and want to assure a good future, learn a skill or go to school, but do not have the financial 
means to do so, can apply to La Benevolencija. She will aid everybody in creating and assuring 
their existence.”312 The activities of this association were primarily humanitarian, concentrating 
on education and funding of young men (girls rarely went to school) who wished to advance in 
their careers and education. From the very beginning of its work, La Benevolencija supported 
young men through their university education in cities such as Vienna, Graz and Prague. Only a 
few years passed until these activities paid off, as many of these individuals returned to their 
homeland where they worked as notable professionals, mainly doctors, lawyers and professors. It 
is than to no surprise that it was precisely within this social class that the new direction of 
political engagement was created – more liberal masses among the Jewish population in Bosnia 
were created, influencing the very development of this community and setting the basis for 
future Jewish national movement. 
 On the other hand, La Benevolencija undertook different activities, all of which indirectly 
raised the level of political awareness among young Jews, and contributed to their political 
engagement in later years. Besides its primarily educational goals, La Benevolencija also focused 
on the following activities: 
 
- Publications of textbooks and books on Jewish history, literature and philosophy; 
- Founding a printing company which issued translations of the most famous Jewish 
authors in the fields of sciences, philosophy and arts. These works now became highly 
available among the general public, and not only Jews; 
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- Political education of Jews.313 
 
Yet, during the Austro-Hungarian reign in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the work of La 
Benevolencija was only at its dawn. The true transformation and influence of this association 
occurred much later, and reached its peak in the interwar period between 1918-1939, at the same 
time when other, more so political, Jewish organizations emerged. 
 
 
Political Activism among Bosnian Jews during the Austro-Hungarian Rule: The Jewish 
National Movement and the Rise of Zionism  
 
During the Austro-Hungarian reign in BiH, Jewish actions were still apolitical and 
remained so, more or less, until the end of their rule in 1914. The Empire’s officials were pleased 
with Jewish obedience – they stayed out of party politics and political discussions that occurred 
in the Bosnian Assembly, but also city and municipality councils.314 It would be wrong to argue, 
however, that the Austro-Hungarian period was a time of complete political isolation of Bosnian 
Jewish communities. Quite the contrary, the birth of Jewish “national awareness” occurred 
during this period and affected much of the later Jewish political participation, both in terms of 
activism and formation of new political organizations.  
The end of the Ottoman rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina was rejoiced by all non-Muslim 
communities. Nevertheless, unlike Bosnians Serbs and Muslims who forcefully resisted the 
changes introduced by the new occupying forces, Jewish actions were still apolitical and 
remained so, more or less, until the end of the Austro-Hungarian reign in 1914. The latter were 
pleased with Jewish obedience – they stayed out of party politics and political discussions that 
occurred in the Bosnian Assembly, but also city and municipality councils. It would be wrong to 
argue, however, that the Austro-Hungarian period was a time of complete political isolation of 
Bosnian Jewish communities. Quite the contrary, the birth of Jewish “national awareness” 
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314 See Szabo, A., 1998. “Židovi i proces modernizacije građanskog društva u Hrvatskoj između 1873. i 1914. 
godine”. In: Ognjen Kraus (ed.), Dva stoljeća povijesti i kulture Židova u Zagrebu i Hrvatsko. Zagreb: Židovska 
općina Zagreb. 
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occurred during this period and affected much of the later Jewish political participation, both in 
terms of activism and formation of new political organizations.  
 At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, the Jewish communities in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina finally fused with Bosnian people and grew closer to Bosnian lands.315 
It was probably at this time that the overwhelming feeling of “national awareness” swept over 
the Jewish population. However, the dissatisfaction and occasional uprisings against the new 
regime on behalf of other ethnic communities in Bosnia certainly contributed to these new 
feelings among Bosnian Jews. In support of this fact we can cite the words of Vita D. Kajon 
who, in one of his articles, stated that “it was not until the Serb national uprising that their 
(Jewish) ground was indirectly shattered. Then they gained political awareness. A new, younger 
generation educated in Serbo-Croatian schools had an enormous impact on active Jewish 
engagement in domestic politics.”316 Nevertheless, the political expression of Bosnian Jews 
slightly differed from Jewish political engagement in other parts of the Balkans.  
 While Unlike in Croatia and Serbia, Bosnian Jews were closely associated with Bosnia 
and its people.317 After all, they have found their home in Bosnia some five hundred years ago 
and were accepted by the locals, regardless of their different cultural, linguistic and religious 
traditions and habits. Jewish communities aimed at becoming members of Croat or Serb national 
groups, thus giving up their national identity and keeping Judaism only as their faith, both 
Sephards and Ashkenazi Jews of Bosnia and Herzegovina refrained from this process. The 
reasons for this laid in the particular socio-political circumstances that existed in Bosnia during 
this time, and were due more precisely to deeply embedded ethnic and religious antagonisms.  
Bosnian Jews soon realized that giving up their own and accepting a different identity would be 
disastrous for a tightly held Jewish legacy and close ties that they preserved with other groups.  
On the other hand, Bosnian Jews were so closely associated with Bosnia and its people – 
moreover, they have found their home in Bosnia some five hundred years ago and were accepted 
by the locals, regardless of their different cultural, linguistic and religious traditions and habits.  
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In spite of the abovethis, the idea of Jewish national awareness started to spread its roots in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina precisely during this period. It was in August of 1897 that the first 
Zionist Congress was held in Basel, the ideas that emerged during the Congress soon became 
very popular among young Jewish boys, notably those who were educated in the West. The 
spread of Zionist ideas in Balkan countries marked the initial stage of Jewish national 
renaissance.318 However, this new motive for political engagement among Jews was in no way 
violent, but aimed at “resurrecting the love and understanding for Judaism and Jews, learning, 
once again to respect Jewish cultural traditions and heritage, embracing traditional customs and 
parallel with individual development, creating a conscious and a proud Jew.”319 The basic 
concept that lied in the core of the Zionist movement was thus, the reattachment of all Jewish 
communities and unification of Jews. What this meant in the Jewish reality of BiH was a gradual 
unification, or better cooperation, between Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews, who prior to this 
period, as we know, lived entirely separate lives. With the aim of strengthening the cooperation 
among Balkan Jews, a Jewish student association was created in Vienna under the name of “Bar 
Giora – The Academic Society of Jews from Yugoslav Countries”.320 The association was 
initially engaged with publishing reports in Serbo-Croatian and organizing regular meetings for 
Jewish students from Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia. Later on, “Bar Giora” established a close 
cooperation with high school student organizations from different Balkan provinces of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, thus raising the level of political awareness and national identification 
among Jewish youth to an even higher level.  
 At the same time, several Bosnian Jewish associations were formed across the country, 
but most of them still dwelled in Sarajevo. These organizations differed in character; from 
cultural to humanitarian and sports oriented activities, but they all, either directly or indirectly, 
participated in the advancement of modern Jewish national movement. As mentioned previously, 
one of the most engaged in this process was “Lira”, a Jewish singing society, established in 
1901. Despite its predominantly cultural character, its political impact during this period of 
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national awareness was enormous. Kruševac (1966) argues that Lira was probably the first 
Jewish association in Bosnia and Herzegovina that became involved in the Jewish national 
movement. What is more, the historical accounts tell us that “Lira” was the only Bosnian Jewish 
organization that kept a close contact with the World Zionist Organization, regularly receiving 
their brochures. Moreover, “Lira” was prepaid to receive “Die Welt”, the first Zionist newspaper. 
However, since Sephardic Jews did not speak German, “Lira” also spread the content of 
“Ašofar”, a Zionist magazine issued in Judeo-Español by Bulgarian Jews.321 Just a year after its 
establishment in 1902, “Lira” signed its name in the Golden Book of Jewish National Movement, 
thus becoming the first Jewish organization from Bosnia and Herzegovina to do that. In 1903, 
“Lira” organized a visit of J. Kalef, the editor of Bulgarian “Ašofar”, in the Sephardic synagogue 
“managing to attract the old, especially the rabbis, and engage them in the Zionist affair.”322 
 However, it was not until November of 1904 that the first public Zionist activity took 
place in Sarajevo. At that time the association called “B’ne Zion” sent a public print call in 
German to all Jews, emphasizing the “national awakening of all Jews and underlying the 
grandiose freedom movement, which, under the Zionist flag, will create a Jewish land in 
Palestine. At the end, the call urged all Jews to join ‘B’ne Zion’ and contribute to the success of 
the noble, eminently human social movement.”323 The political importance of the appeal was 
enormous. Not only did the political rebirth and awareness among Bosnian Jews flourish, but 
theThe Sephardic and Ashkenazi communities were, for the very first time, united in their fight 
for a common goal. Nevertheless, “B’ne Zion” soon ceased its activities, and a new organization 
was created under the name of “Selbstbildungsverein”324, only to be renamed the “Jewish 
national society”325 in 1908. This association carried its activities until the popularity of the 
movement faded among Bosnian Jews and got lost in the midst of World War I.  
 In the end, it can be concluded that Zionist ideology played an enormous role in the 
process of national awaking of Jewish communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yet, its real 
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importance lies in the fact that in the midst of the Austro-Hungarian imperial reign in Bosnia, the 
once closed and highly religious Jewish community managed to mature politically and achieve 
significant levels of political participation, hence entering a new period of history with a high 
degree of political awareness. The Jews of Bosnia and Herzegovina thus welcomed the new 
Yugoslav state in 1918, but this time as highly aware and equal citizens who have just 
experienced a significant development of their national, but more importantly socio-political 
awakening.326 Abandoning their traditional and almost secluded lifestyles, the Jewish 
communities were now experiencing a complete social and political metamorphosis, as they 
became an important urban and well represented social group. This process will reach its peak in 
the interwar years, more precisely between 1918 and 1939, when Bosnian Jewish communities 
will become even more politically engaged on all levels.  
 
 
The Interwar Period: The Renaissance of Jewish Political Engagement in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (1918-1939) 
 
Significantly weakened during World War I, the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed in 
autumn of 1918. Its once conquered Balkan territories now joined into a single state, commonly 
known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS). Bosnia and Herzegovina became a 
part of this newly created state, and despite the initial anarchy which reined its territories and the 
frequent political manoeuvring between the three principal ethnic groups that occurred across the 
kingdom, the people of Bosnia remained engaged in their own political struggles. The latter were 
due to ethnic clashes and occurred principally among Christians (Serbs and Croats) and Muslims. 
What this meant for the Jewish communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was indeed more 
political engagement, but in no way did they engage in ethnic debates.327 Yet, the level of Jewish 
political participation increased more than ever before in their long history in this part of the 
peninsula. On the other hand, the feeling of Jewish connectedness with other groups was 
omnipresent. Not only did they actively participate in everyday socio-political life, but also 
supported the political ideas of the time which were mainly propagated by the three main groups. 
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To illustrate, one can recall a public proclamation issued by a Jewish lawyer, Dr. Vita Alkalaj, in 
October of 1918, which emphasized “Jewish ardent support of Serb, Croat and Slovene 
aspirations”328  to create a joint state.  
The historical transformations that occurred in South Eastern Europe after World War I 
and the creation of the Kingdom of SHS did not induce a great significant socio-economic and 
cultural changes change for Jews of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Jewish community stayed 
economically vibrant, while the process of cultural, economic and social revival continued to be 
aligned with that of other groups. However, what the Great War did induce were conspicuous 
social disparities, a consequence which severely hit Bosnian Jewish communities.329 The already 
fragmented social structure of Bosnian Jews, notably of those living in Sarajevo, turned into 
sharp contrasts and went far beyond the reach of closed and traditional Jewish communities. The 
increase of different humanitarian organizations was thus not astounding; moreover the 
membership was now open to other groups as well, a fact that once again reiterated the new 
Jewish connectedness to local communities. It was due to this social occurrence that much of 
Jewish political engagement in the later years of the interwar period grew, and ultimately 
resulted in political renaissance of Bosnian Jews.  
 After the end of World War I, the national awaking processes that instigated in the pre-
war era were now over. Yet, to argue that it was only these factors that influenced the creation of 
certain ideological aspirations among Bosnian Jews would be a complete disapproval of several 
other socio-political occasions which gained momentum during this time. This was especially 
true of the Jewish national question. After the end of World War I, the national awaking 
processes that instigated in the pre-war era were now over. What this meant in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was a gradual spill-out from the elite-led theoretical approaches to more citizen 
engagement in the issue. This became not only a topic of ideological debates, but also saw a 
number of enthusiasts and “freedom fighters”, whose members consisted mainly of among 
Jewish youth. The young, in fact, later emerged as the primary carriers of most progressive 
Zionist ideas of the time and managed to carry on with their activities through youth 
organizations such as “Hašomer Hacaira”. Although labelled as fundamentalist, the activities of 
this organization remained popular among those groups who did not identify with socialist 
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political ideologies that suddenly emerged in this period, and which gathered far more Bosnian 
Jews than the past one ever did.330 
This organization was burdened with attributes such as fundamentalist, fanatic, surreal and 
hopeless. Despite of this, its activities remained popular among those groups who did not 
identify with socialist political ideologies that suddenly emerged in this period, and which 
gathered far more Bosnian Jews than the past one ever did.  
 
The Affirmation of Socialism among Jews in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
 The affirmation of socialist ideas in Bosnia and Herzegovina commenced in the first 
decade of the 20th century. The increasing size of the proletariat and the need for an organized 
approach to their everyday struggles resulted in the creation of numerous labour associations, but 
also political parties, cultural and sports societies and press. The socialist movement331 soon 
gained popularity among common citizenry. , It was than to no wonder that Bosnian Jewish 
communities participated in this political movement since its very birth. which, by far, 
outnumbered the rich. It was than to no wonder that Bosnian Jewish communities participated in 
this political movement since its very birth. Moreover, several historical facts point to active 
Jewish political involvement during the era of the socialist movement in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  
 At the time of the formation of the Central Worker’s Assembly of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on August 21, 1905, the name of Mario Levi, a Jewish tailor from Sarajevo, was 
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331 In relation to the main context of this dissertation, I will only define the concept as it relates to Yugoslavia and 
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formed country. A single party was formed in April of 1919 under the name Socialist Labour Party of Yugoslavia. It 
soon gained prominence in many towns and villages, especially in 1920. The movement was based on the 
propagation of different socio-economic ideas based on social ownership and democratic control of the means of 
production. Social ownership extended to include collective ownership and other forms of public collective 
ownership. Source: Harrington, M., 2011. Socialism: Past and Future. Arcade Publishing.  
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among eleven others who signed this important decision.332 Yet, the Jewish role in the 
propagation of socialist ideals did not end with this, but included other activities on all levels. 
The official gazette of the social-democratic party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was 
published under the name “Glas slobode”,333 and more particularly its edition from June 29, 
1909, contained a list of its financial supporters, many of whom were Jews. The Jewish 
involvement in this action demonstrated their particular political zeal and connectedness to the 
eminent propagators of socialism in Bosnia. The fact that much of the money for this cause was 
collected in factories and among common workers, demonstrates that even the poorest Jewish 
families showed strong political interest and orientation during this period. What is more, the 
report of the Central Worker’s Assembly of BiH, which was sent to the 5th Congress held on July 
9, 1911, listed some 6068 members of the worker’s union in BiH, out of which 166 were Jews. 
Percentage wise, this represented a significant portion of Bosnia’s population of approximately 
1, 900.000, 12.000 of which were Jews.334 Furthermore, considering that the workers’ movement 
of the time was under ruthless pressure and control by the regime, but also the fact that, until 
then, the Jewish communities in BiH showed blind allegiance and loyalty to the ruling parties, 
we can with certaintyit can be concluded that the level of political awareness among Bosnian 
Jews now reached its climax.  
 The reasons for this gradual, yet impetuous political involvement of Bosnian Jews were 
manifold. Now only did World War I create socio-economic hardships, but the events that 
triggered popular uprisings occurred so intensely that it became very difficult for anybody to 
simply observe these changes from aside. Common citizens suffered the gravest consequences, 
facing poverty, hunger and disease, but also inflation, political speculations and numerous social 
limitations. All of these factors exacerbated the already fragile socio-economic status of ordinary 
men, and it was thus to no wonder that the Russian revolution of 1917 echoed so loudly in the 
Yugoslav Kingdom. At this time, the conditions under which the Bosnian Jewish communities 
dwelled across the country were in no way different than that of their compatriots. Hence, the 
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social revolution hit them just as powerfully, forcing them to enter the revolution through the 
front door. The movement echoed not just among the poor, but spread across the entire society. 
At this time, the The engagement of several prominent Jewish activists and professionals 
surfaced to the top. Among them was Mojsije Zon who worked in the Central Committee of the 
Socio-Democratic Party of BiH. In May of 1919, alongside well-known authors of that time, 
such as Miroslav Krleža, August Cesarc and Filip Filipović, he published an article entitled 
„Through Social Revolution towards National Liberation”.335 The article was printed in 15.000 
copies, and Zon was chosen as a member of the Central Council of the newly formed Socialist 
Worker’s Party of Yugoslavia in Belgrade.  
 However, the revolutionist movements were soon targeted against by the royal 
government, which, fearing the possible consequences of the national uprising, was becoming 
unstable. In order to protect itself, the government ordered the arrests of the members of these 
organizations.336, and Dr. Zon who was arrested in May, stayed in prison for four months, the 
longest of all revolutionaries.337 Yet, the anti-regime activities continued with an even more 
arduous support from Bosnian Jews. At this time, the once right-leaning supporters of Zionist 
and national-socialist ideas began to switch their ideology and openly critique “Poale cion”,338 
which developed a vibrant political activity, notably on municipal levels. This organization was 
probably the only association with certain characteristics of a political party, since in March of 
1920 it actively participated in the pre-election campaign under the parole that all Jews of the 
Kingdom of SHS, regardless of their social class, should vote for candidates from the Jewish 
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list.339 However, their attempt was unsuccessful. The Jewish members of the Socialist Workers’ 
Party of Yugoslavia called upon all Jews to vote for members of this party, hence demonstrating 
a strong and persistent political will which was hard to shatter by nationalistic and religiously 
strained rhetoric.  
 The end of 1920 marked the end of a turbulent period in Yugoslavia, during which the 
progressive working class and youth succeeded in their attempts to create more democratic and 
humane social conditions. Nevertheless, the regime was not inclined to allow any further actions 
which would destabilize the country, a stance which became even firmer after 59 members of the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Komunistička partija Jugoslavije or KPJ), formerly known as 
the Socialist Worker’s Party, refused to give an oath to the king and recognize the monarchy. 
The period that followed was marked by a series of events across the Kingdom, and can be 
summarized as twenty perturbing years of regime-induced tyranny during which popular 
working masses demobilized. However, withinWithin the Jewish communities several new 
politically oriented organizations were formed under the umbrella of cultural, humanitarian or 
sports programmes, which served as a cover for their underground activities. One of those was 
certainly a Sarajevo-based organization called “Matatja”.  
 
“Matatja” – The Expression of Jewish Youth Workers at the Dawn of World War II 
 
 Formed in Sarajevo in 1923, “Matatja” was a forum for young Jewish workers to address 
their specific needs for a vibrant and intensive social life. Initially, this organization was 
primarily educational in character, offering numerous sports and education workshops. However, 
at the end of the first decade of its existence, “Matatja” numbered almost 650340 members and 
became one of the focal points of Jewish social life in Sarajevo. “Matatja” did not only attract 
Jews, but a number of young workers from other ethnic groups who also joined in. Thus, it was 
not surprising that “Matatja” started serving as an underground arena under which the KPJ 
managed to achieve a strong influence. Hence, “Matatja” became the carrier of the progressive 
thought and political action that occurred in the 1930s.  
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 After a well-known contravention of the partisan (communist) organization in 1936, 
when several members of “Matatja” were arrested (14 of them were also members of KPJ),341 
the general public was confused. Yet, the populous masses continued to support anti-regime 
actions. “Matatja” was at the centre of these events, despite vigilant police control of its 
activities.342 In the fall of 1936, even before its members were accused of anti-regime actions, 
“Matatja” created a whole new activity calendar, more diverse than ever before, including both 
internal and external actions. About 120 young boys and girls participated in these workshops 
and lecture series held in the evenings, focusing on studying social development and Marxism. A 
series of public speeches by notable communist writers and activists of the time were also 
organized, all with the aim of increasing the political awareness and knowledge of the young 
Jewish working force., but also other groups. Notwithstanding its publicly open activities, the 
police members kept a register of names of all participants during these events, while organizers 
were regularly called upon to report to the police. But, the work of “Matatja” continued and 
became even more politically charged. 
 In December of 1938, when there was still no clear political orientation among the 
citizens of Sarajevo, the work of “Matatja” turned, more than ever, towards political goals. It was 
at this time that the organizational culture board reached an independent decision to fully engage 
its most active members in the forthcoming elections. The work of “Matatja’s” members was to 
be executed together with other opposition forces that existed in Sarajevo during this time. Dr. 
Braco Poljokan included around thirty young workers, members of “Matatja” in the joint 
opposition forces. They stayed engaged until the last arrangements in the polling places.343 This 
movement that occurred among Jewish youth had a strong influence on other members of the 
Bosnian Jewish community, as evidenced by the number of votes that they received during the 
elections. Soon after, however, the work of “Matatja” was banned by the regime and it was not 
until a year later that its activities resumed. Following this event, the number of members grew to 
over 1100 people, while the work of “Matatja” became increasingly associated with the activities 
of local communist party organizations and the League of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia 
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(Savez komunističke omladine Jugoslavije or SKOJ), until it finally ceased to exist in April of 
1941.344 
 
Political Activism of Bosnian Jews and Their Final Fate at the Beginning of World War II  
 
On the eve of World War II, the activities of progressive social forces went out of their 
usual scope; they widened and spread beyond youth organizations and other politically oriented 
associations. The masses mobilized quickly, while different political activities ventured even in 
the countryside, hence increasing the number of popular supporters. Regardless of their political 
party membership, the new supporters surpassed the number of members in different socialist 
organizations, mainly because their rhetoric found its basis in the work of KPJ. An overall 
progressive and anti-fascist orientation was now omnipresent across the country.  Thus, this 
period marked a significant boost in youth movements that occurred not only in schools and 
urban centres, but also in villages across Bosnia and Herzegovina. The dispersing popularity of 
these activities did not circumnavigate the Jewish communities, who now joined in even larger 
numbers.  
 The Jews of Bosnia and Herzegovina, now finally determined in their attempts to 
side with the communists and social progressivists of the time, openly participated in anti-regime 
activities that took place across the country.345 Again, The the core of the Jewish force again lay 
in the hands of its progressive youth. The activities undertaken by Jewish youth culminated in 
the period from December 1937 until December 1939., when Jewish students, together with their 
compatriots, wrote three letters critiquing the social situation in the country induced by the 
regime-led politics. Consequently, on December 1, 1937 students from Bosnia and Herzegovina 
published their first letter in which they openly attacked the formation of the Bloc of People’s 
Treaty (signed between the Agricultural, Democratic, Radical and Croatian Peasants’ Parties). 
The second letter came on December 1, 1939 when students from Belgrade and Zagreb signed a 
letter critiquing the new unpopular working policies in the country, and demanding an adequate 
resolution of the Yugoslav national question, including a call for the autonomy of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The third letter, also written in 1939, came from Sarajevo and Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina. The letter was signed by 497 students, 34 of whom were Jews from Sarajevo, 
Tuzla, Brčko, Mostar, Banja Luka, Bihać, Višegrad and Travnik.346 All of these events illustrate 
a clear Jewish determination to spread the ideas of freedom and equal rights for all social classes, 
and a final ideological decision to side with the revolutionist approaches of the progressive 
socialist movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 In those final years of peace, the political renaissance of Bosnian Jews reached its peak. 
Not only did Jews mature politically, but managed to form their own ideological determinations, 
siding with the progressive socialist ideas that so rapidly emerged across Yugoslavia.347 
However, the destiny of many Bosnian Jews changed in the last years before the beginning of 
World War II, when the protected regime of Prince Paul of Yugoslavia, in order to side with 
Germany, started discriminating against them. This political occurrence marked the beginning of 
the “Jewish Question” in Bosnia. On October 5, 1940 two discriminatory decisions were reached 
- the first one prohibited Jews to handle human food, while the second regulated the application 
procedure for Jewish students who enrolled at universities and high schools. Soon after, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was occupied by pro-German "Independent Croatian State" (Nezavisna država 
Hrvatska or NDH), and was divided into two occupation zones. To no surprise did Bosnian Jews 
find found themselves, almost entirely, within the occupation zone of the Nazi Third Reich, 
while only a few hundred were in the region occupied by Fascist Italy. Considering the fact that 
anti-Jewish policies in Italy were much less stringent than in the Third Reich, some two thousand 
Bosnian Jews fled to the Italian occupation zone. However, the majority of them were later 
arrested and executed by the German forces.348 Those who survived remained loyal to Partisans 
(who were communist). Thanks to the Partisan Liberation Movement, some two thousand Jews 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina endured the occupation. Of the pre-war 68.000 Jews who inhabited 
the entire territory of Yugoslavia, only 6853 were registered in March of 1948 when the first 
post-war population census took place.349 All the same, Jewish political activism, along with 
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their cultural and traditional worlds, was swept away in the bloody atrocities of World War II. 
Consequently, those Jews who remained in Tito’s Yugoslavia stayed loyal to and  the communist 
ideology, just as they were some two decades prior to their final extermination from 1941-1945.  
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PART II 
The Socio-Political Life of Polish National Minority in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina from 1895 until 1946 
 
The Arrival  
 
Unlike the Jewish communities which settled across Bosnia and Herzegovina even before 
the Ottoman arrival to this central Balkan region, the arrival of Poles, alongside Germans, 
Austrians, Hungarians and other groups was a politically planned move on behalf of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, which reined most of Central Europe and the Balkans at the dawn of the 20th 
century. Yet, the development of the socio-political life of Poles who arrived to the Bosnian 
lands in the final years of the 19th century cannot be examined as an isolated pattern of historical 
events, but rather as a series of mutually and closely related circumstances that aroused prior and 
subsequent to their arrival to the backyard of the vast Austro-Hungarian realm. The Polish 
advent to Bosnia and Herzegovina did not occur immediately upon the Austro-Hungarian arrival 
in 1878, but more than a decade and a half later, when the socio-political and particularly 
economic conditions allowed Habsburg rulers to premeditate a demographic change in its Balkan 
territories.  
When in 1869 the destiny of Balkan countries was tailored by the highest officials of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, its Minister of foreign affairs, Gyula Andrássy and Benjámin Káallay, 
a leading expert on the history of South Slavs, the authorities were reluctant and wary towards 
the idea of occupying Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the external and internal political 
circumstances forced the Habsburgs to keep Bosnia and Herzegovina under a special governing 
status, and the country was governed jointly by Cisleithania (Austria) and the Lands of the 
Crown of Saint Stephen (Hungary) through a joint Ministry of Finance. This arrangement 
remained until 1908, when Bosnia and Herzegovina was finally annexed, hence becoming a part 
of Austria-Hungary. Naturally, the socio-political and economic circumstances changed radically 
during this period and had a significant impact on local inhabitants, as it was precisely during 
this period that most of BiH’s current seventeen minorities inhabited the area.  
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Consequently, in order to encourage immigration from Central and Eastern Europe into 
the Balkan territories, the Austro-Hungarian government started offering special privileges and 
stimulations to foreigners who wished to inhabit the rural areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
These beneficial measures resulted in the process of “external colonization”,350 which by 1905 
brought some 10.000 Poles to BiH351 whom settled mostly in north-western Bosnia.  
 
The Arrival of Poles to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Early Social Life 
 
As already described, the arrival of Poles to Bosnia and Herzegovina is inevitably 
connected to the Austro-Hungarian project of organized migrations. Not surprisingly, the biggest 
interest in this policy emerged among the poor and lower middle class peasants and servants, but 
also among those Poles who did not own any land in Poland.352 It is interesting to note that there 
were two culturally distinct groups of Poles who settled Bosnia at this time – the first one was a 
Polish-speaking, Catholic community, while the second one consisted of Ukrainian-speaking, 
Orthodox immigrants, known as Ruthenians. However, mMost of these families emigrated from 
Galicia,353 and although they did not share the same religious and linguistic backgrounds354, 
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Bosnians simply referred to both groups as Galicians.355 The biggest influx of Poles to Bosnia 
and Herzegovina occurred in the period from 1890 until 1898, although they continued to settle 
in somewhat smaller numbers up until the onset of World War I.356 As mentioned previously, the 
new settlers found their home in the north-west of the country, and primarily formed their 
communities in the cities (at that time known as kotar) of Prnjavor, Derventa, Banja Luka, 
Bosanska Gradiška, Bosanski Novi and Prijedor.357 A smaller number of Poles, whose entrance 
to Bosnia was blocked due to an epidemic, permanently settled in Slavonia (Croatia). As 
historical evidence tells us, the newly arrived Polish community in Bosnia settled in, but mostly 
around these towns, forming their own villages. Several families moved to villages where there 
was a small percentage of Serbs, and in rare cases Croats, but still, most villages were Polish, 
consisting of “colonists” who formed twelve compact colonies around this area.358  
 Hence, the early social life of Polish communities who inhabited northwest Bosnia was 
closely connected to the land that they received from the Austro-Hungarian 
government,government. or that they bought from Muslims and Serbs who, as previously 
mentioned, escaped the Habsburg rule. The so called “clean” Polish villages359 were formed 
mainly to the northeast of Banja Luka and around Vrbas and Ukrina river valleys. As noted by 
Maria Dombrowska,360 a famous Polish writer who arrived to Bosnia in 1934 in order to write a 
report on the Polish minority in this country and upon the order of the Polish government, “Poles 
settled in some of the most fruitful soils in Yugoslavia…It is true that some Polish villages are 
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358 See works of Vranješ-Šoljan, B., (2006), Zlodi (2005) and Drljača (1976).  
 
359 The term refers to villages that were populated exclusively by Poles. No other ethnic groups (Serbs, Croat, 
Muslims or other national minorities) lived in these villages. This terminology was commonly used throughout the 
historical documents on the Polish communities in BiH, hence my opting for it in this dissertation. See Vranješ-
Šoljan (2006), Drljača (1976), Sombolevski (199-). The term was also used by Maria Dombrowska (1935) in her 
work that I refer to in the main text.  
 
360 Maria Dabrowska (Dombrowska) was a Polish writer and publicist. She wrote dramas, literary critiques and 
stories for children and youth. 
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situated in remote hilly areas (where even God said ‘good night’)”.361 Yet, in the early days of 
Polish settlement in Bosnia, the living conditions were good. Despite hard labour and some 
pioneer work, Tthey were able to afford their own land, a trend which continued even after the 
end of the Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, we can conclude that their 
social status remained, more or less unchanged even after the creation of the Kingdom of SHS, a 
trait which was due to their closely knit communal life and an extremely slow process of 
assimilation.362. However, as new generations emerged and the socio-political conditions in the 
Kingdom altered, the status and activities of this minority group inevitably changed, resulting in 
steady social and political involvement in a country which, by this time, they called their home. 
 Lastly, it is essential to note that on the eve of World War I, but also immediately after it, 
a large number of Bosnian Poles went through the process of so called “secondary immigration”, 
when they mainly moved to the United States in order to “earn money”.363 However, most of 
these families returned to their Bosnian villages after a short period, and as Dombrowska notes 
“they claimed that the sojourn in the United States of America did not bring the benefits that they 
expected”.364 The reasons for this are manifold, but one could claim that it was mostly the world 
economic depression that hit all the countries that contributed to their dissatisfaction and 
ultimately the decision to return to Bosnia. Despite this, the Polish community in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was much better off than their compatriots in Poland. Moreover, Poles were treated 
relatively well by the new royal government of SHS, and as Dombrowska writes she “never 
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heard a sad story about the confiscation of cows, furniture and so on, something that cannot 
escape your ear when you go to any larger village in Poland”.365 Despite their acceptance and 
privileged treatment during the Austro-Hungarian reign, Bosnian Poles never fully realized, at 
least not in this period, the benefits of joint labour and cooperation with local communities. 
However, as new generations emerged and the socio-political conditions in the Kingdom altered, 
the status and activities of this minority group inevitably changed, resulting in a wider 
discontent, but also steady social and political involvement in a country which, by this time, they 
called their home.  
 
Poles in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Interwar Period (1918-1939) 
 
Despite the fact that they were dispersed around Central Europe, Poles who inhabited the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as well as those who dwelled under the German and Russian 
empires, respectively, suffered grave losses during World War I. When in 1918 the Great Wwar 
finally reached its end, the Allied leaders agreed to proclaim Poland a republic. The event 
occurred on 22 November of the same year, mainly with the aim of creating a sanitary corridor 
on the way to Soviet Russia. These events were followed with much attention, while Bosnian 
Poles were elated about the fact that their kin-state was finally independent. Hence, the political 
transformation that occurred in Poland immediately after World War I was wholeheartedly 
approved by Poles living in the Balkan Peninsula. Regardless of such favourable political 
instances for Poland, Polish communities that were scattered across the newly established 
Kingdom showed no interest in opting out of Yugoslavia and returning to their homeland.366 
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Regardless of such favourable political instances for Poland, Polish communities that 
were scattered across the newly established Kingdom showed no interest in opting out of 
Yugoslavia and returning to their homeland. The reasons were, again, of political nature.  While 
Poland faced numerous border issues, notably with its neighbours, in February of 1919 it 
proclaimed a somewhat adventurous war against Soviet Russia. Such political circumstances, 
along with the fact that Galicia, the homeland of Bosnian Poles, still remained an open question, 
only exacerbated the whole picture and offered no secure place for return. Still, despite their 
unwillingness to return, some Poles were eradicated from Bosnia, but principally those fervent 
supporters of the Austro-Hungarian regime in Bosnia. However, the number of Poles in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina increased in the subsequent period despite their forced migration and 
significant losses during World War I.  
Hence, it can be said that the Great War neither alternated their geographical position nor 
undermined political representation of Bosnian Poles. Most of them remained concentrated in 
and around the city of Banja Luka, where 9582 Poles out of total 10.705 still lived.367 However, 
most of them were rural inhabitants who formed Polish colonies, among them two relatively 
large villages of Donji and Gornji Bakinci. The rest lived in the so called “mixed villages”, 
inhabited mainly by Serbs. In the period from 1921 until 1931, when the second population 
census took place, the number of members of the Polish national minority in Yugoslavia 
increased by 3873.368 Yet, dDespite their relatively significant numbers, the Polish national 
minority in Yugoslavia, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, benefited only from a few privileges 
that were granted to it by constitutional national minority laws of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. 
Hence, Poles remained relatively conservative, and concentrated mainly on social and political 
engagements which took place within their own community369.  
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The Political and Social Status of Poles in the Kingdom of SHS 
 
 After the end of the Austro-Hungarian reign in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the 
country’s inclusion into the Kingdom, all of its citizens, including Poles, were granted Yugoslav 
citizenship. According to 1935 data of the General Polish Consulate in Zagreb, 80 percent of 
Poles were citizens of Yugoslavia. The same source indicates that Polish colonists were forced to 
accept Yugoslav citizenship, a process which was made possible through a population census, 
after which Poles automatically became Yugoslavs. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind the 
fact that Polish government of the time was not particularly inclined towards this south - Slavic 
state, and hence considered that such “official” reports might have contained a demanded dose of 
disinclination towards the country in which, despite all of the above, a large Polish minority 
remained. Moreover, this indoctrinated opinion could not be compared to the real-life status of 
Poles in Bosnia and Herzegovina, since according to several historical accounts, Poles opted for 
Yugoslav citizenship out of purely practical reasons.370 The decision to claim Yugoslav 
citizenship significantly contributed to the improvement of their political status within a foreign 
country, but more importantly lessened (but did not completely eliminate) the harsh dictatorial 
dealings that were practiced on foreign citizens during the authoritarian years. What is true, 
however, is that Yugoslav citizenship complicated the activities of different Polish actors in 
Yugoslavia and allowed the royal authoritarian government to easily differentiate between 
colonists (and not just Poles, in this case) and locals.  
 Yet, several other historical factors complicated the socio-political inclusion of Poles and 
negatively influenced their perception by the locals. As closed a set of communities as they 
initially were, even the younger generations of Bosnia-born Poles showed a certain dose of 
reluctance towards local inhabitants, primarily Serbs. One of the major arguments that emerged 
among the Polish communities in the interwar period was that the colonization process was not 
Polish, but rather an Austro-Hungarian project, due to which Poles were negatively viewed by 
the locals and even considered the main culprits for the arrival of foreigners to their homeland. 
On the other hand, Poles showed exceptional grief when it came to the “old times”, and as 
several authors note (Kovalik, Dombrowska) “Poles who came to Bosnia and who lived there for 
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several years always remembered that they were a respected group, privileged by the government 
and able to participate in politics”.371 However, these claims demonstrate very low level of 
political awareness among Poles living in the Kingdom - not only did they fail to realize a drastic 
change in the socio-political circumstances that occurred with the fall of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire and also hit the locals, but missed the chance to acknowledge the fact that they could not, 
under any conditions, be treated equally under the new authoritarian government, and as well as 
they were during the Austro-Hungarian rule. So low was the political participation and 
awareness of Poles, that most of them, even in the 1920s and 1930s, still mournfully remembered 
Austro-Hungary and Franz Joseph, without even recognizing the many liberties and freedoms 
that they were now able to enjoy (and more so than their compatriots in Poland) in 
Yugoslavia.372  
 But the conditions for foreign settlers worsened in 1929, when King Alexander 
suspended the constitution and established a centralized government. King’s authoritarian 
government and its police forces often treated foreigners, including Poles, in ways which were 
borderline crimes373. Even after Alexander’s assassination in Marseille in 1934, Serbs remained 
nervous towards Poles, Hungarians and Italians, seeing them as a potential threat to the regime. It 
was immediately after the King’s assassination that village police was put on call, and as 
honorary Counsel Artur Burda, a denoted Pole who spent his life in Banja Luka, noted “even 
Serbian civilians, living close by foreign villages are armed”.374 Hence, besides official 
investigations, incarcerations, revisions and weapon searching, internal tensions were not 
uncommon and included different assaults, from personal attacks to house searching. The basis 
for such open hatred probably came from the fact that all three foreign communities had closely 
knit ties with their homeland, but many other external political factors that shattered Yugoslavia 
during this time certainly played a role in raising the level of mistrust among common people. 
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The inner tensions among the locals exacerbated during the 1930s, and the differences between 
Poles and locals now surfaced. Not only was this situation complicated by the fact that the Polish 
community still remained almost exclusively isolated from the local population, but also that 
Poles refused to make a difference between common locals and the government, claiming that all 
signs of intolerance came from Yugoslavs and Yugoslavia. Dombrowska states that Polish 
peasants in Bosnia believed that government’s treatment of foreign settlers rested on inherited 
Serbian trait to prosecute people, while common Serbs hated them because they were jealous: “A 
Polish peasant believes that he is the driver of agricultural development among Serbs, shouting 
his opinion wherever he goes.”375 Moreover, Poles claimed that before their arrival “Bosnians 
only knew how to grow corn and take care of the cattle. It was only when Poles came that they 
learned how to grow cereals and use the plough…Serbs were jealous of the expanding Polish 
villages and of the fact that Poles were able to buy land.”376 However, it is clear that these claims 
were very superficial and originated in a clear misunderstanding of local cultures and national 
mentalities in Yugoslavia. Again, the problem lied in the fact that Poles were an isolated 
community which poorly cooperated with the locals. Dombrowska also noted that these were 
probably isolated cases, since she encountered many positive signs of cooperation on both sides. 
Furthermore, Poles were relatively close to German catholic community, mostly because of the 
same religious origin and the fact that they themselves were very religious. Yet, they remained 
relatively politically inactive and uninformed.  
 Not surprisingly, most These new conditions made Poles idealized Poland and as they 
believed that their home country could help them with even the most basic issues, such as the 
right to use the forest land that was granted to them by Austro-Hungarians.377 Dombrowska 
states that “Their distant land looks like paradise, without crisis and problems, which they, on the 
other hand, have to fight wherever they go.”378 This claim demonstrates that Poles did not 
understand the political relations between Poland and Yugoslavia at that time, since many of 
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them believed that the better Poland behaved towards Yugoslavia, the better will Yugoslavia 
treat its Poles. In the eyes of Poles, Poland was a superpower, a fact that, in their opinion, 
Yugoslavia refused to acknowledge. Nevertheless, the Polish community in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina remained a vibrant one, and regardless of the fact that they were becoming 
assimilated and spoke the local language, they still preserved their own tradition. The biggest 
problem for Poles in Bosnia throughout this period was an almost complete absence of Polish 
intelligentsia379, a factor that significantly undermined their political involvement in Yugoslav, 
and consequently all inter-state matters between Poland and their host nation. 
 The raising national awareness of Bosnian Poles and their ever closer connectedness to 
their fatherland abruptly ended on 1 September 1939, when German Nazi forces attacked a 
Polish harbour city of Gdansk. It was at this time, at the dawn of the Second World War, that the 
political awareness of Bosnian Poles increased. This emerging political engagement, although 
induced from the outside and spurred by events in their homeland, later significantly influenced 
the course of their ideological orientation and political behaviour in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
notably during the wartime period from 1941 until 1945.380   
 
The Social and Political Life of Polish Communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 
World War II (1939-1945) 
 
The early days of World War II found Bosnian Poles in the process of recruiting young 
volunteers who were to fight on the Polish front and defend their motherland. Nevertheless, 
following the German attack, the country capitulated after only thirty five days, leaving the 
Polish youth in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The political circumstances in Poland were now rapidly 
alternating, and by mid-September of 1939 the whole country was encircled by adversary forces. 
Only Romania, which shared a small, yet a significant border-crossing with Poland, was neutral 
towards its status, a circumstance which allowed approximately 10.000 Polish soldiers to transfer 
to Western Europe. At that time, around 3000 Polish soldiers wanted to cross the territory of the 
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Kingdom of Yugoslavia, a process which was aided by the Polish national minority from this 
region. A huge amount of essential food and clothing, as well as money was collected by Poles 
from Banja Luka, but also from mixed Polish-Serb villages.381. At this point, an obvious and 
newly emerging cooperation of Polish minorities with local inhabitants, notably Serbs, 
significantly marked the course of Polish inclusion into the political and military operations in 
the period that was to follow.382  
 Towards the end of the 1930s, several factors, all of which were of social and political 
nature, caused some notable changes within the Polish minority in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 
one hand, the altering agricultural conditions and lack of arable land in the areas which they 
inhabited, forced a number of Polish families to sell their property and move to Croatia, more 
precisely to Slavonia. The political forces, however, were much more potent. When in April 
1941, in the so called April War, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia capitulated; the stirring territorial 
changes did not permit for further tight spiritual and personal connectedness of the Polish 
national minority in Bosnia and Herzegovina.383 The Bosnian territory that was initially 
inhabited by Poles now became a part of the Independent Croatian State (NDH), jointly created 
by the Third Reich and the Kingdom of Italy.  
This newly created state primarily encompassed Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also a large 
part of Croatia; hence its territory was inhabited by some 6.5 million people.384 As for national 
minorities, notably Poles, the situation was considerably different. Within the new state, Poles 
were considered a small national minority,385 and were thus referred to as “others”, a group 
which consisted of approximately 50.000 different minority group members of diverse ethnic 
backgrounds.386 On the other hand, the treatment of different minority groups varied. While Jews 
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and Roma received cruel treatment, which was natural considering the creators of NDH, other 
predominantly Catholic minorities enjoyed a somewhat privileged conduct. However, little 
historical evidence exists on the ways in which the Polish national minority was treated; yet, 
considering their religious background, the Croatian authorities hoped to receive their significant 
support.387 The political circumstances in these turbulent times left little space for voluntary 
siding, which resulted in individual and collective calls for cooperation on behalf of NDH’s 
leaders. There was an omnipresent attempt to include Poles in the “ustasha”388 movement or as 
members of the army. The hidden political goal was to force the Polish minority to behave 
tolerantly towards the government and approve of its dealings. Related to this was a political 
attempt on behalf of NDH to draw a significant number of Poles to the “ustasha” movement very 
early on, more precisely in summer of 1941.389 But it was this event that spurred a wave of 
discontent among the Polish minority and influenced the course of their political and ideological 
orientation in the period that followed.  
 
The Polish Discontent and the Birth of Communist Ideology  
 
When in July of 1941, Viktor Gutić, a renowned ustasha activist, and his deputy of Polish 
descent, Felix Niedeielski, visited central Bosnia, the Bosnian Polish community was put on a 
loyalty test. During his sojourn in Prnjavor, Gutić attempted to turn the Polish community 
against Serbs, with whom Poles lived in the mixed villages. What is more, Gutić offered Poles 
all confiscated Serbian property, including their land and houses.390 Nevertheless, this political 
attempt was not approved by Bosnian Poles for two primary reasons. Firstly, despite the initial 
maltreatment by the royal government and occasional civilian clashes in the villages, common 
Poles and Serbs cooperated well, and to a point where they continued to reside in mixed 
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villages.391 On the other hand, being a very religious community, Poles refused the perfidy, 
calling it immoral and anti-Catholic.  
Besides Polish refusal to turn against the domestic populace, the general popular upraise 
against fascists and their supporter forces were relatively weak and rather slow. In this part of 
Central Bosnia, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia counted only a small number of members 
who were loosely organized around the party’s centre core. Besides its fragile organization, KPJ 
also failed to include a large minority population in its activities, also circumnavigating the 
Polish community, which has initially demonstrated loyalty to Serbs, but kept relatively neutral 
when it came to belligerent activities of the local communist forces.392 Polish neutrality was 
especially reinforced by an official of the Polish honorary consulate in Banja Luka, which 
remained open even after Poland capitulated in autumn of 1939.393 On the other hand, the 
organization of a radical Serb group known as “chetniks” and its ideology seriously discouraged 
Poles from siding with any national or religious group. Hence, it can be claimed that these three 
factors severely undermined Polish participation in the war, at least in its early days. 
When in winter of 1941, the 3rd Krajina Battalion394 of the People’s Liberation Front 
cleared Banja Luka and its surroundings from radical Croatian forces, many Polish villages 
(including mixed ones)395 were liberated. However, the communist forces did not use the 
opportunity to massively gather Polish support and include Poles in their lines, except for a few 
of them. But, peace did not keep for long. In spring of 1942, this area was re-occupied by chetnik 
and ustashi forces, and it was at this time that the majority of Polish villages were taken by 
chetniks, who, just like the ustashi in the previous year, tried to gain their ultimate support.396 
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However, the ideology switch did not occur mainly because of religious beliefs and the deeply 
imbedded neutrality of Bosnian Poles, except among the very few who “naively believed that by 
siding with them (chetniks), they would safeguard the Polish national minority from ethnic 
cleansing and massive terror.”397 Despite such unfavourable developing and the air of general 
ideological bewilderment among Bosnian Poles, things took a different turn in December of 
1942, when Yugoslav partisan forces398 liberated the whole of Central Bosnia, including all 
Polish villages. It was at this time that dozens of Poles joined the Partisan forces. The ideological 
battle was finally on the Yugoslav side, a switch that significantly marked the later wartime 
political orientation of Bosnian Poles.399 
The situation became even more favourable in winter of 1943, when on January 16 the 
Yugoslav forces freed the area around the city of Prnjavor, another important Polish 
concentration point. A new Partisan unit was formed in the city, but despite the reinforcement, 
this area, including many Polish villages, was re-occupied by chetniks and the ustashi. The 
situation changed again in July of 1943, when Prnjavor was finally freed. Regardless of these 
frequent changes, the ideological switch among Poles did not occur once the Partisan forces were 
out; quite the contrary to their previous uncertainties, Poles remained loyal to Yugoslav 
communists and were especially active in the liberation of the city of Prnjavor. One of the most 
active collaborators was precisely a Pole, Ignac Kunecki, who, thanks to his frequent informing 
about the enemy positions, played an enormous role in the course of the battle.  
At the same time, the political awareness of Polish youth surfaced. The reason behind this 
active participation was, again, the war, but also the fact that Poles were now highly respected in 
the Partisan lines.400 Massive numbers of young Poles joined the People’s Liberation Front, both 
as active soldiers and as members of different anti-fascist organizations. Surprisingly, Polish 
women were also active, and despite their traditional and highly religious upbringing, they 
massively joined the Partisans and organizations such as the Women’s Anti-Fascist Front, the 
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Union of the Communist Youth of Yugoslavia and the United Union of the Anti-Fascist Youth 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (USAO BiH). Through political participation and activism, many 
Poles now entered the governing bodies of these organizations.401 
Yet, neither the Communist Party of Yugoslavia nor the leading liberation front 
institutions engaged in activities that would allow for a more substantial inclusion of national 
minorities in their lines. This was particularly strengthened by the fact that all proclamations and 
programme documents were directed solely towards the domestic population, notably Serbs, 
Muslims and Croats.402 In fact, very few documents addressed the members of different national 
minorities, and even in cases in which they did the future of minority groups remained uncertain. 
This is why the Communist Party District Committee of Central Bosnia criticized party's weak 
political engagement with national minorities. Hence, in August of 1943, the District Committee 
proclaimed that: 
Galicians, Ruthenians, Czechs and Poles are still passive towards our struggle, which is 
a result of their fear of the occupying forces and chetniks, but also our insufficient work 
with them. We decided to organize conferences with their more visible members and 
through them start penetrating into their villages.403 
 
However, as Sobolevski (199-) rightfully notes, this report shows a clear misunderstanding and 
disinterest in addressing the members of national minorities in the right way, as it completely 
disregards their ethnic names, geographic and cultural origin. As mentioned at the beginning of 
this work, Bosnians referred to Poles as Galicians, but used this name also for the members of 
the Ukrainian national minority (Ruthenians). Nonetheless, the District Committee report from 
November 11, 1943 referred specifically to the Polish national minority, claiming that:  
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The youth of national minority groups is reserved, but well inclined. (Poles have shown 
tendencies to establish their own Polish brigade). At our last meeting we decided that one 
of us will go there, acquaint with the organization, strengthen the brotherhood line, break 
the enemy influences, and mobilize – all through competition.404 
 
Ultimately, and thanks to the involvement on both sides, but mainly dedicated political and 
military workers, the Polish battalion was created in April of 1944. The formation of the 
battalion was preceded by the establishment of the Political Representation of Poles, headed by a 
Polish school teacher, Jan Kumoš. Finally, on May 7, 1944, the Polish battalion was formed in 
the village of Martinci, counting some two hundred members.405 By and large, this political 
move symbolized a final ideological orientation of Bosnian Poles, but more importantly marked 
the beginning of their political participation and inclusion into the military and political 
structures of the People’s Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia (NOP).406 
Naturally, the formation of the Polish battalion influenced the orientation of Poles from 
other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also Croatia. Their ideological path was now clear, a 
point which finalized their long-present political indecision and eliminated an omnipresent fear 
of the occupying forces.407 Hence, Poles from Slavonia, but also those who previously joined the 
German forces or were liberated from concentration camps, soon became part of the growing 
People’s Liberation Front. The effects of the Polish ideological and military switch was notably 
significant for those Poles who were forcefully mobilized by Germans, or who found themselves 
imprisoned in their concentration camps for different reasons. These Poles massively escaped 
from German forces (and even concentration camps) at the end of the war, and joined NOP 
throughout Yugoslavia. Those who remained loyal to Germans were imprisoned by Partisans in 
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the final days of the war. Hence, some 9425 Poles were captured, but all returned to Poland by 
1949.408  
At the end of World War II, it became increasingly clear that the ideological shift that 
occurred among Bosnian Poles was of purely security nature. Not only did Poles gain political 
support from the predominant domestic forces, but this siding was probably one of the safest 
ways to remain closely knit and relatively protected from the fascist and notably German forces, 
which massively killed Poles throughout Central Europe.409 On the other hand, the after-war 
period was the first time in history that saw Bosnian Poles not as foreign, but as Yugoslav 
citizens. In other words, they were not there because of promised goods, such as was the case 
during the Austro-Hungarian reign, nor were they considered second-class citizens in the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Standing as Yugoslavs, Poles were now a recognized national minority 
group. A large number, some 15.000 of them, still inhabited their villages in Central Bosnia, but 
it was not long before they politically organized once more in their final attempt to leave their 
host country and return to their motherland.410  
 
 
The Repatriation of the Polish National Minority in 1946 
 
After the end of World War II, the treatment of Yugoslav national minority groups 
depended on several political factors. Not only did the Communist Party of Yugoslavia have to 
deal with the national question, but politically strategic issues which regarded the future 
orientation of the government, particularly the national structure of the new Yugoslav state, was 
now a preoccupying matter. Yet, the official government position on the status of the Polish 
national minority was pressing in several regards; not only did the communists have to deal with 
a closely knit and relatively exclusionist group, but the enormous role that Poles, notably those 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina, played during the war could not be ignored alongside the fact that 
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Poland was now also a communist state and a friendly ally. Therefore, it can be concluded that, 
unlike other national minority groups that arrived to this area during the Austro-Hungarian rule, 
Poles were among the least problematic minorities411 that the government had to deal with.412 
Despite their peaceful conduct, but also the fact that the communist government provided 
schools, cultural activities and allowed for participation in the government pending party 
membership for all minorities immediately after the end of the war, Poles initiated a series of 
negotiations in order to organize a collective return to Poland. Their plan was realized during the 
course of 1946, just one year after the end of World War II.  
Unsurprisingly, the Polish request for repatriation413 became a state issue, and as such 
was resolved by state’s highest authorities. The official diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia 
and Poland414 were secured even before the end of the war, and on July 1, 1945, Poles organized 
a conference with the purpose of requesting that they were returned to Poland. The communist 
Yugoslav government granted them immediate and ultimate support. Considering the fact that 
the majority of Poles in Yugoslavia lived primarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was not 
surprising that their demand went straight into the hands of Rodoljub Čolaković, the President of 
the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He promised his support and even made the 
Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito aware of Polish intentions. Despite this, Polish 
representatives, led by Jan Komuš and Jan Urban, addressed their request to the embassy of the 
Republic of Poland in Belgrade, where they, naturally, received an immediate approval.415 The 
latter move was an obvious sign of Polish rising national awareness, but also their increased 
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political consciousness, as they were now visibly aware of big power politics and obviously had 
good knowledge of Yugoslav-Polish relations of the time.416 That this is true, was also proven by 
their next move – upon receiving state support from Yugoslavia, which was still their homeland, 
they went to Poland in order to settle the finest matters of their return. After a series of meetings 
with the Polish President and the ministers for foreign and internal affairs, a visit to Lower 
Silesia marked their final destiny, as this part of Poland, more particularly the city of 
Boleslawiec, was chosen as their last settlement point.  
But, things were not as easy as they seemed. The first problems occurred when the 
Yugoslav government refused to amend their acquired assets, including homes and land 
property, as well as cattle that Poles were leaving behind. What is more, Yugoslavia requested 
that Poland pay for all the cattle and other livestock that they took with them to Poland. At this 
point Poles demonstrated that they were not so politically isolated and quiet; their letter to Josip 
Broz specifically made five clear points:  
 
1. we have to pay for the houses and land that was granted to us in Poland, while we are 
leaving our properties in Yugoslavia without any compensation; 2. We are now exporting 
cattle and other domestic animals to Poland, for which Poland would have to pay, while 
those of us who are interested in regaining these animals would have to buy back our 
possessions; 3. We sacrificed a lot during the war, our best sons gave their lives for 
freedom. At the same time we offered great financial support to the People’s Liberation 
Army and mobilized new forces in passive areas; 4. The occupying forces, especially 
chetniks, robbed and burned our homes, and killed many of us. This was because we were 
known for compact participation against the enemy; 5. Even today, Polish settlements in 
Bosnia are exposed to chetnik-led terror, while almost half of the population left their 
homes with little money, and hungry, naked and barefoot found their refuge in cities or 
villages of Slavonia, hoping to be saved.417 
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Reaching the highest state official, the Protocol on the Repatriation of Poles from Yugoslavia 
was signed between the two governments on January 2, 1946. The Protocol regulated the 
repatriation matter, and as an act of highest state priority, it was signed at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Belgrade. , on behalf of Vladimir Velebit, deputy minister of foreign affairs of 
Yugoslavia, and Polish ambassador Jan Karol Wende. The document stated that “some 25.000 
Poles, whose ancestors inhabited the surroundings of Banja Luka and Prnjavor sixty years ago 
during the Austro-Hungarian Empire, will leave this area in the next six months.”418  
The whole repatriation process began in March of 1946. The Bosnian city of Prnjavor, a-
once large centre of Polish national minority, became the heart of repatriation activities. The 
Yugoslav-Polish committee, with its headquarters situated precisely in Prnjavor, made sure that 
the wishes of all Poles were respected, and that they really desired to return to Poland. Hence, by 
the end of 1946 some 15.301 Poles from Yugoslavia returned to Poland. Most of them were from 
Central Bosnia (14.088), while some 4000 Poles remained in Bosnia, notably those who were in 
mixed marriages and who assimilated with the autochthon, primarily Croatian, population.419 
The seven months of repatriation saw a voluntary departure of some 3000 Polish families.420 The 
whole process finally ended with the last convoy departing on December 2, 1946, marking the 
final point in Polish repatriation. This was the first case of an organized collective migration of a 
single national minority from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Yugoslavia) after the end of World War 
II, and an act that left grave demographic consequences on Bosnia and Herzegovina. From a 
demographic point of view, Bosnia acquired an ethnic and cultural loss, while the psychological 
consequences for those who left or remained, marked their future socio-political status in 
Yugoslavia even after its disband in 1991.  
 
Why Six Decades of Polish Socio-Political Exclusion in Bosnia and Herzegovina?  
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A peculiar group to investigate, the Polish national minority in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is one of the most interesting minority populations that have inhabited these areas since the early 
20th century. Considering their particular historical presence in the Balkan Peninsula, one cannot 
but wonder what factors have insinuated Polish socio-political behaviour which ultimately 
finalized with a collective return to their land of origin. Yet, one thing is certain and that is that 
both socially and politically, Poles have remained on the margins of the society, and except on a 
few historically significant occasions, they were the most isolated and compact national minority 
group up to day. 
While the status of Polish “colonizers” during the Austro-Hungarian reign is pretty clear, 
indicating their socio-political status in the higher hierarchy and focusing on the fact that they 
primarily inhabited these areas because of favouring political and economic conditions, but also 
personal interest, their role in the early days of the 20th century, notably after the formation of an 
independent Yugoslav state, is what is worth of further analysis. Hence, when studying the 
socio-political status of the Polish national minority in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the fall of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it is essential to make note of two socio-political factors that have 
undoubtedly influenced the course of their historical development– their closely knit and very 
religious community and Yugoslav treatment of this group, particularly in the interwar and post-
war periods.  
Initially, and as mentioned earlier, the Polish inhabitants were a closely bound and a very 
religious group since their arrival. Hence, the presence and the role of the Catholic Church were 
of an immense importance for these communities. Although Polish Catholic Church was known 
for its disciple activities, organized religious missionary never reached Bosnian Poles. Thus, 
Poles from Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also Yugoslavia as a whole, developed rather 
independently in the religious sense. This does not mean that they aborted traditional Catholic 
habits, and adopted a modified version of Catholicism that would be influenced by domestic 
conditions, but rather the fact that their spiritual development depended on intra-group relations, 
notably their tight religious upbringing, which spread from family to family and generation to 
generation. Consequently, the priest remained the highest authority, and as such represented the 
only factor which could influence Polish socio-political engagement. Yet, the problem was that 
at that time, there were no Polish priests in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this constellation of 
events, it was to no wonder that the Polish national minority turned to Croatian priests, who in 
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turn, largely influenced their political orientation in the interwar period. It was precisely during 
this time, between 1936 and 1938, that Poles became torn in-between the pro-Croatian, but 
Catholic political orientation on one-side, and the rising anti-religious communist ideology. The 
latter fought to organize all groups, including national minorities, into a common force that 
would fight the European fascist forces and radical domestic groups, notably chetniks and 
ustashi. For them, the Polish national minority was a rewarding group among whose members it 
was easy to gain supporters fast – on one hand, many Poles were still torn in-between the 
Catholic tradition and (hence) Croatian influences, while the desire to be recognized was a right 
which they hoped to acquire from communists. Therefore, these prevailing social and political 
factors further contributed to confusion and alienation of Poles, a trend which continued until the 
early 1940s when most of them joined communist lines. 
But, the intractable minority question created serious problems for the KPJ, notably in the 
interwar period.421 As trained Marxists, Yugoslav communists were wary of “national 
questions”, notably if they came from smaller or isolated minority groups, such as Poles. On the 
other hand, as a member of the Soviet-controlled international communist movement, the KPJ 
had to be aware of Soviet plans to deteriorate the Entente Powers and one of the ways to do so 
was to encourage dissident national movements, notably in Eastern Europe. These foreign policy 
issues in the turbulent interwar period resulted in a hesitant political treatment of national 
minorities on behalf of communists, which focused on two most pressing minority issues – equal 
treatment and self-determination.422 The former was particularly interesting for Poles, and 
probably acted as a political crossroad in the process of joining the communist frontline. In the 
long-run, the KPJ alienated the minority groups from itself, a fact which became visible during 
the war. Although Poles participated in the war and fought on the side of Partisans, the fact that 
Polish support for the communists occurred only in order to protect their group (hence, based on 
interest) only highlighted the reality that Poles never reconciled their position in Yugoslavia.  
                                                          
421 This was mainly because communists were still looking for new members and searching for supporters among 
minority groups, hoping to recruit their members by promising many rights. This will change for the worse after 
World War II, when minority rights were rarely practiced, although they did exist on paper. 
 
422 The right to self-determination was not particularly interesting to Poles, because of two reasons: their community 
was rather small in comparison to other national minority groups, such as Albanians, and they had a kin-state to 
which they could return. They aspired for social stability, rather than demanded territory, which, on historical 
premises, was also impossible. 
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The verity is that Poles called for collective repatriation immediately after the end of 
World War II, which only revealed that they were not very attracted to Communist revolutionary 
ideals. What is more, Poles viewed KPJ as a continuation of nationalist Yugoslav movement, 
thus fearing for their well-being even in a friendly, communist state. Hence, the question of 
loyalty persisted among Poles who settled in Yugoslavia in 1895. It was precisely this issue of 
fidelity and trust (or better fear for their well-being), that alienated Poles for six decades. Even 
the slightest traces of their socio-political engagement can be connected to the matter of interest 
and security. The rapidly alternating socio-political circumstances of these times only 
exacerbated Polish concerns. On one hand, they fought assimilation with Yugoslavs 
(particularly, Serbs), while on the other they embraced Croatian religious leaders, alongside 
communism. These concerns remained very characteristic of this minority group, and what is 
more, stayed so until present-day among those Poles who did not repatriate, but continued to 
dwell primarily in Central Bosnia.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I examined the historical patterns of political participation of Jews and Poles from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, from their arrival during the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian reign, 
respectively. I embarked upon this historical analysis in order to lay out the basis for 
understanding the current trends in their political behaviour. A key to my examination of the 
historical ‘period effects’ which, although slowly and gradually, have shaped the political 
behaviour of Jews and Poles in BiH is an understanding of triggers which have played a key role 
in furthering their consciousness about the importance of political participation for their 
communities and consequently their empowerment. Hence, this chapter forms the principal basis 
for answering the question of whether the factors that triggered Jewish and Polish political 
activism throughout history have remained the same or whether they have changed. Furthermore, 
this analysis took account of the underlying historical conditions which shaped these groups’ 
political participation, which is the missing link in literature on political participation of national 
minority groups, both in relations to democratization and its connection to groups’ understanding 
the importance that political engagement has in the process. Consequently, in the next chapter I 
will show whether and how the historical trigger factors for political participation influence 
Jewish and Polish political participation rates in post-Dayton context today and how political 
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participation is understood in terms of influence it has on democratic development of the country 
and empowerment of the small national minority groups. Furthermore, the historical 
observations made in this chapter extend to the next in a way that they underpin the 
understanding of the type of participants that these groups represent today. In other words, the 
present chapter forms the basis for explaining the type of participant variable that was tested 
among older and younger generations of Jews and Poles in Bosnia and Herzegovina today.  
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CHAPTER 6: EXAMINING FORMAL POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION OF JEWS AND POLES IN BOSNIA 
AND HERZEGOVINA: WHAT TYPES OF 
PARTICIPANTS? 
 
 
Introduction 
The primary aim of this chapter is to explore the levels of formal political participation of Jews 
and Poles in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as to answer the question of what type of 
participants they represent. The chapter is presented in such a way as to build up an 
understanding of why some members of these communities are choose to participate actively 
while other engage only in voting practice or abstain from politics all together. As discussed in 
chapter 1, political participation today crosses the lines of mere voting or political party 
membership. To adequately examine the entire phenomenon of political participation, one must 
also acknowledge the existence of such forms of formal political engagement that do not involve 
institutional presence in politics, but include other acts, mostly of expressive and verbal, but also 
cognitive nature. Assessing the latter types of political involvement is notably essential in non-
stable and multi-ethnic societies, in which social and personal integrities play a significant role in 
the level of political participation that an individual exhibits. Hence, we can talk about an array 
of indictors that go beyond standard political involvement in political communication, 
institutional participation and mere electoral contribution. Within this continuum, citizens have 
different requirements. Hence the nature of their influence is also important. This is outlined 
using four different criteria: whether the act communicates a message about an individual’s 
political preference, the potential degree of conflict, the effort put into the activity and the degree 
of cooperation with other people involved in the action423. Accordingly, four different types of 
questions were formulated in order to test whether Jews and Poles, as representative national 
minorities in BiH, engage in politics through political acts of institutional and non-institutional 
channels (party membership, participation in electoral campaigns, political favouring through 
financing), expressive and verbal acts (oral expression, communication with political actors 
                                                          
423 Dalton, R.J., 1988. Citizen Politics in Western Democracies. Public Opinion and Political Parties in the United 
States, Great Britain, Western Germany, and France.                                                                                                        
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opinion forming in small groups), cognitive (consuming political information through media 
channels) and electoral (general voting). Methodologically, the aim of these categorizations was 
to provoke factual individual reports about participants’ real level of political participation and 
unite the collected data to form a general picture about the overall level of political participation 
among Jews and Poles in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Not least, the point is to classify these 
groups’ members according to their level of political participation into active (high level of 
engagement), communicators (middle level of participation) and consumers (low level of 
activism). Lastly, the aim was to gather data on electoral involvement, which was observed 
separately because it contributes the least to higher forms of political participation (institutional 
involvement, expressive/verbal), since in BiH voting is perceived as “civic duty” and not really 
understood in terms of political participation. Thus, the study presented in this chapter was partly 
developed in reference to already established measures of political participation outlined in 
works of N. Nue, S. Verba and L. Milbrath. For the purposes of this work, as specified in 
Chapter 1, some categories outlined in their works were not used since they do not apply to the 
general political post-war context in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
The survey used for the purposes of this study was adapted to a smaller sample than it 
was the case for researches completed by these authors. Sampling procedure was carried out in 
Jewish and Polish communities, asking random participants aged 18-90 to participate in the 
study. The participants were examined using the survey method. As for data analysis, regular 
statistical analysis of results will be presented in percentages from highest to lowest. All results 
were analyzed by SPSS statistical programme. The next step in the process was to introduce the 
selected participants to a questionnaire that consisted of twenty nine questions aimed at 
examining their level of conventional political engagement. Eleven questions asked the 
participants to rate their answers on a scale from 1 to 5. There was one open-end question, 
whereby participants had to write their age. Ten questions were yes/no questions and seven 
offered a choice of answers where the respondents were asked to circle only one option. All 
questions were mandatory. The questions that aimed directly at looking at the level of 
participation included those listed in Table 2 (Chapter 2). The questions shown were also divided 
according to the level of political participation (high, middle, low and only voting). They are 
presented in Table 4.  
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# Type of political participation (activity) Corresponding levels of political 
participation 
1 Political party membership  
 
HIGH 
2 Supporting social/political movement, 
political party, politician beyond voting, such 
as providing financial support  
3 Participating in an electoral campaign  
4 Contacting a political authority for help in 
order to solve a political/economic problem 
 
 
 
MIDDLE 
5 Communicating with members of political 
parties  
6 Comfortable writing a letter to government 
representatives arguing my opinion 
7 Informed about politics through media   
LOW 8 Voting  
  
 
Figure 3 
Types of Political Activities Classified according to Level of Engagement, Complexity and 
Energy Invested 
 
The classification of participation levels into hierarchically organized units (high, middle, low) 
allows for a very detailed analysis of political involvement. The criteria for the hierarchical 
organization of modes of political participation is by no means accidental, but is determined 
according to the amount of time, energy and resources spent for engaging in the activity424. 
Hence, low levels of political participation imply that an individual does not significantly 
contribute, in terms of time, energy and resources, to politics. Of course, this approach is 
relative, but it has been used by numerous political participation scholars425 and as such has 
proven significant in determining the types of participants or the level of politicization within a 
single group, but also country, region or city. I took into account mostly British scholars (Perry, 
Moyser, Days) who differentiate between four to six categories of people according to their 
involvement in politics. As a result, both Jews and Poles were classified into three groups 
(active, middle, low), while their electoral practices, although considered as low engagement, 
were examined separately and presented in separate sections, due to the specific understanding of 
                                                          
424 Kluienko, E., 2007. Political Participation: Theory, Methodology, and Measurement with the Help of the 
Guttman One-Dimension Continuity Scale. In: Golovakha, Yevhen. (ed). Ukrainian Sociological Review 2004-
2005. Kiev: Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. p. 146.  
 
425 See Chapter 2.  
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voting practices and its meaning in the Bosnian society as a whole, including its national 
minority groups. 
The sections that follow will be divided into two parts in order to show separate results 
for Jews and Poles respectively. These parts will systematically and comprehensively present the 
results and correlations which are relevant for this study. As the attempt of this investigation is to 
form a broader and comprehensive picture of these groups’ political participation, analysis of 
quantitative data alone cannot stand alone as it does not allow for a deeper understanding of the 
context. Hence, this chapter makes use of qualitative data acquired during focus groups and 
interviews to compliment the quantitative findings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART I 
Conventional Political Engagement of Jews in Bosnia and Herzegovina - The 
Results  
 
Predictors of Participation Levels  
 
Types of Participants 
 
The measurement of political participation and the corresponding indicators that I used in 
my research questionnaires correspond to questions used in classical political participation 
studies, namely those by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) but also Verba, Nie and Kim (1978 & 
1979). Although slight variations were made, considering the specific groups in a post-conflict 
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state, the general factors which I used for grouping participants into active, middle active and 
passive participants included only conventional modes of political participation, all explained in 
Chapter 2. The empirical analysis on the type of participants that emerged out of this study is 
based on quantitative data. The method of the study was survey sample data. As previously 
explained, one of the aims of the survey was to discover whether the two groups that are studied 
in this work are either highly active, middle active or passive participants. Since the survey was 
not exclusive in terms of questions, meaning that all respondents had to answer each query, 
general observations were made as to what types of activities the participants of the studied 
groups prefer, and into what group they generally fall, considering all types and levels of 
political participation426.  
According to data obtained, respondents were grouped into highly active (21%), middle 
active (92%) and low active (51%). The most popular mode of political engagement among the 
high active participants was political party membership (9%), followed by participation in 
electoral campaigns (8%). The least favoured activity that was considered under highly active 
category was the offer of financial assistance to political movements (4%).  The most interesting 
trends can be observed among the middle active participants or communicators. When it comes 
to middle active participants, several interesting observations can be made. Firstly, the 
communicators among the Jewish population would feel most comfortable in engaging in written 
contact (writing a letter to government officials) with politicians (48%). This mode of political 
participation is followed by communication with political party members (33%), while the least 
favourable form of engagement represents actual direct written contact (writing a letter to 
government officials to solve a personal or group social or economic issue). Interestingly, the 
most favoured political participation act in this group relates to the perception of engaging in an 
activity, but the question, purposefully, examines not the physical act of writing to political 
officials427, but the willingness. Hence, the 48% which would engage in this activity does not 
necessarily imply that the respondents have done so. The most passive participants or consumers, 
                                                          
426 The assumption was that participants who engage in the highest forms of political participation are more inclined 
to engage in lesser forms (e.g. a person who is a member of a political party also learns about politics through media 
channels).  
 
427 Questions “I have contacted a political authority to solve a social” and “I have contacted a political authority to 
solve an economic problem” both address a physical act of engaging oneself in communicating with politicians 
through various means.  
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for which only one predictor was examined (keeping informed about politics through different 
media channels428) represent 51% of the total number of participants. Lastly, 78% of Jews are 
regular voters. In addition to the previous, it can be noted that highly active participants were 
also the ones who have already contacted political authorities to solve a social or an economic 
problem.  
Additionally, a low positive significant correlation (r = 0.20, p < 0.05) exists between 
financially supporting a political movement and contacting authorities to solve a social problem. 
Alternatively, a low positive significant correlation (r = 0.22, p < 0.05), slightly higher than the 
previous, exists between financial support and writing to government official in order to address 
an economic issue. Respondents who have participated in electoral campaigns, thus considered 
highly active, have also engaged in contacting political officials in order to resolve social or 
economic problems. Low positive significant correlations were recorded between participation in 
electoral campaigns and writing to address social issues (r = 0.39, p < 0.01) and economic issues 
(r = 0.38, p < 0.01). When it comes to communicators, two moderate positive significant 
correlations exist between communicating with members of political parties and appealing to 
authorities to solve social problems (r = 0.42, p < 0.01) and resolving economic issues (r = 0.45, 
p < 0.01). Lastly, a high positive significant correlation exists between contacting authorities to 
resolve a social problem and doing the same to address an economic problem (r = 0.81, p< 0.01). 
Hence, it can be said that participants who engage in contact with authorities do not differentiate 
the reasons for communication, but are inclined to address issues that are pressing in a current 
time and circumstances. In conclusion, it can be said that most Jews are “political 
communicators”, meaning that they prefer to engage in expressive and/or verbal means of 
participation. As an active member of the Jewish community from Tuzla (male, 51 years old) 
explains:  
“Jews in Bosnia and Herzegovina view political participation as an important feature of 
democratic governance, but unfortunately not as a tool that they can adequately employ 
to advance their rights. This is clearly due to our constitutional status of “others”. Jews 
in BiH believe that political participation will never bring about their full empowerment, 
but understand that there are less ‘engaging’ types of political activities and this is why 
                                                          
428 Television, newspapers and radio.  
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they still use other, less active, means of political participation. This type of engagement 
has brought about response from governing structures. But, if “Sejdić-Finci” is ever 
implemented, I am sure that many of us would turn towards more active means of 
participation.” 
Another active member of the Jewish Community from Banja Luka (male, 63 years old) adds: 
“Your results tell us that political participation of Jews in BiH is much related to our 
minority status. We are constitutionally discriminated against, which makes people 
angry, so they think along the lines of ‘why would I join a majority party, when it is 
actually those parties and their leaders that are responsible for changes that are not 
coming?’And so, we have a situation in which political participation is an individual act, 
much dependent on the minority status. Historically, we Jews have been engaging in 
politics, we are aware of the democratic value of it, but more related to us is the issue of 
power that we can hope to gain through more active means of political participation. We 
do not ask for much, we do not want our own party, but we do believe that we can help 
this society flourish. We have been and are a part of Bosnian society, although we are 
Jews, but we need a bit more than we have in terms of rights to help the country move 
forward. We are considered to be a ‘quiet’ group, but this, I believe, would change if we 
were to be constitutionally recognized”  
These results presented above and complimented with participant’s responses are not surprising 
for two reasons: 
1. Constitutionally, Jews belong to the category of “others” and as such they are not the 
“constituent” groups who have a full right to political participation. For these reasons 
a large majority of Jewish respondents (91%) does not belong to a political party429, 
as they believe cannot have real political influence even through such means of 
participation. Hence, most of their time and energy is oriented towards 
communication.  
                                                          
429 Since the number of Jews who are members of political parties was so small, I was able to enquire about the 
orientation of these parties. All respondents who are party members belong to center-to-left political parties, which 
are currently considered major opposition parties. All of the respondents who are political party members are from 
Sarajevo.  
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2. Historically, Jews were always strong political communicators and have often 
represented a “mediator” group between the majorities. Alternatively, most issues of 
concern to Jews have remained of social and economic nature, thus the results only 
confirm what the historical narrative concluded about this group in BiH. 
 
Types of Participants by Behaviour - Expressive/Verbal and Cognitive  
 
 Since “communicators” is the category that pertains to the largest number of Jews, and 
since the behaviour of “communicators” is characterized by expressive and verbal traits, I will 
offer a brief analysis of several questions that were asked in order to test the types of behaviour 
that the respondents exhibit, but that do not necessarily fall under the predictors for the level of 
political participation. Hence, the aim of these questions was to get an answer to whether the 
respondents, and if so how, choose to communicate with friends, non-politician strangers and 
politicians. The questions presented to the respondents for these purposes were: 
1. I talk about political issues and discuss them. 
2. I feel comfortable expressing my personal views about social networks to which I belong 
around strangers.  
3. I attempt to persuade people that my political opinions are correct.  
4. I feel comfortable vocalizing my views to politicians. 
The first question denotes a behaviour that requires the least effort in terms of time and energy 
from an individual and as such was presented first in this group of queries. A significant number 
of Jews (63%) said that they either agree (43%) or strongly agree (20%) with this statement 
(M=3.34, SD=1.40). The following statement, which still does not require significant effort in 
terms of time and energy involved, but is ranked higher due to the fact that an individual 
attempts to properly vocalize his/her views around people that he/she does not know, shows that 
38% of Jews engage in this act (M=1.60, SD=0.49). This was a “yes/no” question, so it is 
important to report that 62% answered “no”. Alternatively, 25% of Jews attempt to persuade 
people about the correctness of their views, with 21% agreeing with the statement and only 4% 
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strongly agreeing (M=2.27, SD=1.30). The activity presented in the third question requires much 
more time and energy, as we are considering the act of persuasion. Lastly, the fourth question, 
which requires the most time and energy since an individual must first reach a political figure 
(time) and then express his/her views (energy), is an act of political participation in which 44% 
of Jews engage (M=1.54, SD=0.50). This was also a “yes/no” question, meaning that 56% of 
Jews do not communicate in this way. Here, it can be noted that as the act gets more complicated 
in terms of time and energy invested, the less people are inclined to engage in such behaviour. 
There is a deviation from this trend when it comes to third and fourth question. The answer to 
this might lie in the general perception of Jews in BiH, whereby they feel more comfortable and 
hopeful to achieve a mean by directly contacting politicians, than to direct their energy towards a 
large majority who views them negatively in light of political decisions made by their kin-state. 
 On the other hand, cognitive behaviour, since it pertains to judgment, evaluation and 
knowledge, was tested through examining respondents’ judgment of the political system in BiH 
in the last four years, confidence in the decisions made by politicians, the level of using media to 
learn about politics and the level of general knowledge about current events in BiH’s politics. 
The questions that were presented to the participants were the following430: 
 
 
1. I watch TV, listen to radio or read newspapers to be informed about politics. 
2. Level of information about the current events in Bosnian politics (whether the participant 
is informed, partially informed, uninformed or indifferent) 
3. The political system has functioned well over the last four years. 
4. I have confidence in the decisions made by government officials. 
5. Politicians are attentive to people’s needs.  
The first question, as analyzed previously, was answered positively by 51% of Jewish 
respondents. Related to this is the second question which asked the respondents to choose 
whether they are very informed, partially informed, not very informed or indifferent about 
current political events in the country. 25% of Jews report that they are very informed, while a 
                                                          
430 Not arranged in a specific order.  
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large 50% report that they are partially informed. Only 14% are not informed and 10% are 
indifferent, which demonstrates that Jews are generally well informed through media channels 
about politics in BiH. When it comes to the third question, a staggering 97% of Jews reported 
that the political system in BiH has not functioned well in the last four years, which directly 
explains why 97% of them also report to have no confidence in the decisions made by 
government officials. Hence, it can be concluded that Jews are well informed about the political 
decisions made by government officials to the point where they can make judgments about the 
functioning of the whole political apparatus and the level of trust which they exhibit towards 
elected officials. Lastly, although pure cognitive involvement in politics denotes the lowest level 
of political participation, it is still significant because it forms individual perceptions about 
politics and in case of post-conflict, multi-ethnic countries might help in explaining why 
individuals, especially those belonging to national minority groups, might choose (or not) to 
become involved in higher political participation acts. Alternatively, some interesting results 
emerged for the external efficacy indicator, which was tested through the respondent’s opinion 
towards the statement that “politicians are attentive to people’s needs”. An overwhelming 97% 
of Jewish respondents answered “no” to this statement, hence the theoretical supposition outlined 
in classical studies and mentioned in Chapter 2 which argues that this opinion is typical of 
passive participants, can be said not to hold true for this particular group, as all three types of 
participants answered negatively to this question. Not surprisingly, the three positive answers 
came from participants that were identified as high active (all three engaged in all high active 
acts of political participation). It can be said that the general dissatisfaction with the present-day 
political and economic systems justifies this result. Consequently, these results also uphold the 
current literature which discusses the relationship between political participation rates and 
individual satisfaction with the political and economic system. Hence, the claim that 
dissatisfaction drives political participation (Riesman and Glazer, 1965) is confirmed.  
 
General Predictors for the Category of “Voters” 
 
Age  
As outlined in Chapter 2, age was considered a relevant predictor for examining the level and 
trigger factors for political engagement. This predictor was especially relevant for confirming the 
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existing theoretical suppositions that younger participants are less likely to vote, while older 
participants are more inclined to do so. This predictor is important for the “voters” category of 
participants. The following age groups were present among the Jewish examinees:  
# Age Reponses % 
1 18-30   
 
12% 
2 31-50   
 
31% 
3 51-70   
 
37% 
4 71-90   
 
20% 
 Total  100% 
 
Figure 4 
Age groups of Jewish participants 
 
Out of 12 participants from the youngest age group (18-30), 10 of them or 83% either agreed or 
strongly agreed with the statement “I take part in elections by voting”. Very similar results were 
received by the second age group (31-50), where out of 31 participants 26 or 84% agreed or 
strongly agreed that they vote in elections. Contrary to the initial assumption, the older groups 
were less likely to engage in voting practices. However, the percentage of voters was still high; 
respondents from the third age group (51-70) which also had the highest number of participants 
(37 of them), have 73% of regular voters, while the oldest participants (71-90) which were 
represented by 20 people have an incidence of 70% voters (14 individuals). Generally, it can be 
concluded that middle-aged Jews are inclined to vote more than older generations, while their 
voting behaviour is very close to the youngest group of participants. However, the differences in 
numbers between the most active and least active voters are not very high. They amount to only 
14%. 
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Figure 5 
Percentage of Regular Jewish Voters by Age 
 
Education  
The primary hypothesis when it comes to participants’ education was that the more 
educated the respondent, the more likely he/she is to belong to the active type of participants or 
at least voters. While the level of political participation was evenly spread431 among all Jewish 
participants, the first supposition cannot be confirmed or rejected. However, when it comes to 
the “voters” category, we can observe that Jews who are more educated (have higher education 
degrees) are more inclined to vote than those less educated (secondary school)432. Hence, this 
                                                          
431 This means that according to level of education, all participants, regardless of education, showed some degree of 
political participation. 
 
432 No participants had only elementary education degrees.  
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predictor, just like age, is very relevant for the “voters” group. The following are the results of 
the question “what type of education have you completed?” 
# Education degree Responses % 
1 Elementary school  0% 
2 Secondary school 
 
   
 
43% 
3 Bachelor’s degree   
 
46% 
4 Master’s degree   
 
9% 
5 Doctoral degree   
 
2% 
 Total  100% 
 
Figure 6 
Education level of Jewish participants 
 
Out of 43% of respondents who have completed secondary education, 29 of them (67%) either 
agreed or strongly agreed that they vote. Alternatively, out of 57 of respondents with some type 
of university degree433, 49 of them or 86% vote. All respondents with an advanced degree (MA 
or PhD) in these categories reported that they “strongly agree” with the above statement, an 
incidence of a staggering 100%. Hence, the hypothesis that the higher the education levels of 
participants, the higher their voting instance is confirmed. Differentiating between the levels of 
education of university educated participants this hypothesis is approved even further.  
 
 
Discussion: New Trends and Group Characteristics in Jewish Formal Political Engagement 
in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Analyzing the results above, we can conclude that Jews in BiH do not live in a vacuum, 
but are significantly involved in different forms of political participation without pressure or 
involvement of other actors (e.g. kin-state). Furthermore, conventional political engagement 
implies that the undertaken actions are usually individual. Citizens react to political events and 
                                                          
433 Respondents with BA, MA and PhD degrees were, at the end, grouped into one category, as the number of those 
holding master or doctoral degree was very small.  
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socio-economic circumstances in order to accomplish what they desire; hence, these actions434 
are not permanent, but rather individualized and episodic. Despite this, the trigger factors behind 
such political involvement differ among members of the same group. The results of this study 
reveal three observable trends among Jews that took part in the research. Illustrated through third 
chapter’s historical narrative, it is clear that Jews in BiH have had a long history of formal 
political engagement via different Jewish associations. However, further survey questions 
revealed that the current trends in their political participation are somewhat more complex, as 
their participation generally falls within one of the following three observable categories: a) 
communication represents the main participation mode and is it carried out by individuals who 
are triggered by social and economic problems,  b) Jewish political activism is spurred by the 
ineffectiveness of the government to resolve groups’ problems and c) low levels of political party 
membership and engagement in political party support activities are due to the omnipresent 
disbelief in the political system. Naturally, all three types of participation are products of 
different political reasons, but also involve different generations of participants. Therefore, a 
close look into each type is necessary in order to better understand these participatory behaviours 
and grasp the reasons behind specific types of political behaviour among members of this 
minority group. 
 
Political Participation of Jews in BiH: What are the Trigger Factors? 
 
Jewish formal political participation follows one of the three observable trends, the first one 
being individual action (communication) under the auspices of Jewish associations (Jevrejska 
opština)435. What is characteristic of this type of engagement is the fact that it is practiced by 
members of Jewish communities across the country, but only in cases in which they are directly 
threatened by problems that affect only their group. The results shown above demonstrate that 
Jews communicate with political authorities mostly for reasons of socio-economic nature that 
concern their group. An active member of the Jewish community in Tuzla (male, 62 years old) 
explains this trend: 
                                                          
434 See acts of political participation in Figure 3.  
 
435 All respondents from this group are members of a Jewish association in their hometown.  
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“Jewish community is our house and when we are there we have a feeling of a roof over our 
heads. We take care of our own problems, but many of our members across BiH, not just in 
Tuzla, are older, weak and have little financial sources to support themselves. This is when 
we go out of our home and communicate with governments to ask for support, to turn the 
attention to our status, to make ourselves visible and hence (I hope) more influential. But, 
participation, both active and passive, is individual. I have personal reasons to communicate 
because I am deeply troubled by some current issues. I have communicated with many 
political representatives warning of environmental pollution which affects everybody, not 
just Jews, of course. I know some of our Youth Club members warned against the issue of 
stray dogs. These are issues of social nature that affect all of us. When it comes to Jews, I 
talked to politicians, alongside several members from Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Mostar, to 
resolve ‘Sejdić-Finci’ issue.” 
 
Another participant (female, aged 63, from Sarajevo) further explains this trend:  
 
“Jews are locals. We are locals, we care about the same issues a locals, but sometimes 
also ‘raise our voice’ to attract attention to issues that concern us. When one of our very 
active members and one of our leaders was physically attacked we were loud to voice our 
opinion about this all over media, we were loud to divert attention to potential issue of 
anti-Semitism which is on the rise on the Internet in BiH, but also among young who are 
uninformed and subject to ready-made opinions that is available to them on the streets. 
So yes, we care about local issues, but make sure we use our voice to warn against issues 
that press us as Jews, exclusively.”  
 
Aside from issues of socio-economic nature, 80% of participants of the same group indicated 
that they are not optimistic about the future of the political system, while 78% declared that they 
do not believe in the better future of the economic system. Hence, this group of participants is 
directly driven by factors that concern their own political status and economic situation which 
concerns all citizens. The unfavourable political status of Jews under the constitution can be 
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claimed to be one of the principal, although not the only factor, that influences their opinion. One 
participant explains (male, 84 years old): 
 
“Ethnic-self declaration is an individual right, yet in Bosnia and Herzegovina it is 
something that is prescribed to you by birth. You don’t get to choose, you are told who 
you are and so placed in a ‘herd’, just like all other sheep of the same colour. Jews in 
this country belong to a herd called “others”; we are not constituents and have no 
political participation rights on state-level. This is what makes me angry and even worse 
makes me pessimistic about the future of my grandchildren who are growing up as Jews 
in this country.”  
 
Another member of the Jewish Community in Banja Luka adds (female, 63 years old):  
 
“Jewish political status in BiH – what to tell you? We are discriminated. This is clear-cut 
political discrimination, something that is unheard of in democratic countries. Jews in 
neighbouring countries, apart from Croatia, are citizens of that country and not some 
“categories” as they like to call us. It makes it sound like we all are a burden, a social 
‘category’, somebody you give pennies to. In a way, we are like the lowest Indian caste - 
Jews, but also all “others” are without any rights to be represented and to participate in 
state-level politics. Yet, we are from Bosnia and Herzegovina. If it were not sad, it would 
be funny. This is why this country will never go forward.” 
 
Alternatively, poor economic conditions in relation to constituent groups are also a worry, 
although Jews do enjoy full economic freedoms. Lastly, it should be noted that Jewish 
respondents were mainly comprised of people aged fifty or above (57%) all of whom are active 
members of the Jewish association in their city, but not members of any other political or social 
organization.   
 The second group that is interesting to examine is comprised of individuals between 18 
and 30 years of age who generally fall under the category of participants who engage in the 
highest forms of political participation. Although this group of respondents was the smallest one 
(only 12 participants), 76% of them stated that they have engaged in political acts outside of the 
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Jewish associations, or better other political or social institutions. Hence, it can be concluded that 
this group prefers to be active outside of Jewish associations. The respondents (12 of them) cite 
“general dissatisfaction with the political situation in the country” (100%) and “general 
dissatisfaction with the economic situation in the country” (82%). A quote from an interview 
with a 21 year old Jewish female from Sarajevo clearly explains these trends: 
 
“I do not want to leave the country. When I see that my people do not have any political 
rights, have their hands tied to their backs and are satisfied with what they have, I get 
angry. This is why I have decided to join a political party. My party has already 
succeeded in giving “others” voice on the cantonal level. I hope Tuzla will follow. I am 
just so angered by my parents’ generation who tell me to leave BiH and find a better life. 
We will not have a better life if we do not ask for it. This is a continuous effort and not 
something that will or can and should happen overnight. That would not be normal. Yes, 
I am dissatisfied with the political situation in my country, but if belonging to a political 
party can change this and can help my community, why not join. This is the only way we 
can participate, anyway.”  
 
Overall, this group was not particularly concerned with the status of Jews, nor where they 
interested in contacting political authorities for socio-economic reasons (only 5% of respondents 
from this group engaged in these activities). A young Jewish man from Banja Luka, who just 
turned 18 and joined a political party in order to influence local policies, as he claims, explains: 
 
“I don’t want to hear stories about ‘how good it was in Yugoslavia’ anymore. This is our 
past, and I feel like we must turn to the present in order to change the situation. For me, 
belonging to a political party has several meanings: it gives me a voice that nobody 
would hear otherwise, it gives me power to influence policy processes, it gives me the 
right to complain if I do not succeed. People who sit at home and complain do not have 
such a right, because they don’t even try. As for my Jewish status, I view political 
participation as something individual and although I agree that all “others” should have 
this right collectively, I must say that if political party engagement is the way to influence 
policies and politics as a member of a national minority, than be it.”  
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Hence, in comparison to the first group, this one is considered highly active, with an insignificant 
number of them being also the communicators. The trigger factors for political participation for 
the younger generation, hence, are more concerned with reaction to socio-economic issues 
through direct or indirect involvement in majority parties. The reasons for this could lie in the 
fact that younger generations have higher hopes for the political and economic improvements in 
the country (68%) and that they realize that a change can occur only if the highest forms of 
political participation are exercised. A focus group participant from Tuzla (28 years old) 
summarizes this: 
 
“I hope to be able to participate freely in politics one day. I hope to be able to say that as 
Bosnian, I am representing Bosnians...not Bosniaks, not Serbs, not Croats, but all 
Bosnians. Currently, my only way is to engage through majority parties. Change will 
come slowly; we have already succeeded with “Sejdić-Finci” although this was a long 
process. They will and must find a solution to implement this decision. We, all “others”, 
not just Jews, must press for this and the way to do it is through participating in politics 
in whichever way we can.”  
 
The trends and transformations in conventional political participation of Jews in post-
Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina obviously do not follow a specific pattern, but rather occur as a 
by-product of socio-political and economic inequalities resulting both from discriminating 
constitutional provisions and a large political apparatus which impoverishes the country. Hence, 
we cannot talk about different waves of mobilization which is often the case in countries with a 
longer history of democratic consolidation, but about different characteristics of participation 
among participatory groups. Conventional political engagement is perceptibly quite popular 
among Jews of all ages living in BiH, especially actions that include communication with 
government officials and electoral practices. Still, Bosnian Jews clearly observe politics as an act 
that goes way beyond voting or discussion and realize that there are more direct ways of 
influencing a society in which constitutional mechanisms for minority engagement are virtually 
non-existent.   
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Analyzing Jewish formal political participation in the post-Dayton era reveals certain 
continuations, but also divergences from the pre-Dayton period. Despite the absence of data 
pertaining to political participation before the signing of the Dayton Accords, Bosnian Jews 
played an influential role in the political development of Bosnia and Herzegovina through both 
formal and informal participation (see Chapter 6). Their involvement in political life transcended 
their minority status, thus furthering their own interests as a minority group, and hence today 
Bosnian Jews continue to have a significant political presence in the socio-political life of BiH, 
although not through direct channels. What is important to conclude is that this research has 
proved that we are not considering an isolated minority group whose political engagement is 
provoked only by group-related issues, but rather a group which is closely connected to the 
whole society and which aims to influence the injustices caused by politically unpopular moves. 
Most importantly, and as mentioned earlier, the case study of Jewish political participation in 
BiH confirms the findings of Riesman and Glazer (1965) which states that in unstable and 
repressive societies political oppression and/or dissatisfaction is the driving factor for political 
engagement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II 
Conventional Political Engagement of Poles in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina - The Results  
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Types of Participants 
 
The measurement and indicators of political participation used for determining the 
participation types among Bosnian Jews was equally applied to the Polish minority. The data 
obtained demonstrates several striking differences between these two minority groups, notably in 
terms of the level of political participation. Subsequently, the results demonstrate that 60% of 
Polish respondents are highly active, while only 39% are consumers or low active participants. 
Furthermore, 56% of Poles would contact a politician through a letter, while 44% state that they 
have already communicated with a member of political party. However, only 27% would 
communicate with government officials in order to resolve a social or an economic problem, 
which leaves us to speculate about other reasons for which Poles contact politicians, as the 
numbers above clearly demonstrate a much stronger will to communicate and a pattern of an 
already established communication with politically important figures.  
When it comes to high active participants, the most popular act of political engagement 
was political party membership, and although a figure of 25% is not particularly high, it is much 
higher when compared to a 9% rate recorded among Jews. Participation in an electoral campaign 
comes next to political membership, with a rate of 19%, while the least favoured mode was 
financial support of a political party, with only 16% of Poles engaging in this activity. In relation 
to the first two activities, it can be concluded that not all Poles who are members of political 
parties actively engage in the actual work of the party. In other words, they are not there for 
reasons of increasing their group’s visibility through political participation, but other motives 
prevail. Alternatively, just as among the Jewish population, the most attention-grabbing trends 
appear among the middle active participants. The communicators among the Polish group, just 
like Jewish population, feel most comfortable when contacting politicians through a letter, 
followed by communication with political party members. The rate for both activities is slightly 
higher for Poles than for Jews. Similarly, Poles do not seem to be overly engaged in direct 
contact with politicians (writing a letter to solve a personal or group social or political problem).  
Hence, the same conclusion can be made for this group – 56% of Poles would engage in written 
contact with politicians, but only 27% have already done so, the results which demonstrate that 
there is willingness, but that other factors influence the motives. This, in turn, results in most 
Poles actually not engaging in direct communication with political officials. Interestingly 
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enough, Poles have much lower tendency to only consume politics in comparison to Jews, with 
39% of participants relying on different media channels to be informed about politics. Finally, 
78% of Poles are regular voters, which represents an exactly the same number as the rate 
recorded among Jews.  
Not least, several important correlations were noted for the predictors of political 
participation behaviour outlined above. Consequently, highly active participants were most likely 
to engage in contacting politicians in order to solve a personal or group problem of social or 
economic nature. A moderate positive significant correlation (r=0.58, p < 0.05) exists between 
financial support of political movements and contacting authorities to solve a social problem. 
Similarly, a moderate positive significant correlation (r=0.55, p < 0.05), although insignificantly 
lower than the previous, was recorded between financially supporting political movements and 
writing to political figures to resolve an economic issue. Respondents who engaged in electoral 
campaigns are also likely to have contacted politicians for social or economic reasons. As a 
result, moderate positive significant correlations were recorded between this predictor and 
writing to address social problems ( = 0.55, p < 0.05) and economic issues (r = 0.57, p < 0.05). 
Similar results appeared for the highly active participants who engage in financial support of 
political movements. A moderate positive significant correlation (r=0.52, p < 0.05) was found for 
this predictor and communication with members of political parties (“I have communicated with 
members of political parties”). Alternatively, participants who have engaged in electoral 
campaigns also communicated with members of political parties (r=0.53, p < 0.05). A 
surprisingly high positive significant correlation (r=0.85, p < 0.05) was recorded between 
participating in an electoral campaign and financially supporting a political movement. When it 
comes to moderately active Poles, two high positive significant correlations exist between 
communication with members of political parties and engagement in contact with political 
officials in order to solve a social problem (r=0.67, p < 0.05) and economic issue (r=0.65, p < 
0.05). Considering almost identical results, it can be noted that Poles, just as Jews, do not 
discriminate between social and economic reasons for contact, but communicate with politicians 
almost equally about these sets of problems, depending on the circumstances and the given time 
and space.  
Lastly, it can be noted that most Poles can be categorized as “political communicators” 
who prefer to engage in expressive and/or verbal acts characteristic of political participation. An 
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active member of a Polish association from Gradiška (female, 29 years old) comments on this 
finding:  
 
“I am surprised that our results show that we are communicators. I probably live in a 
community that is more active. I am not surprised, however, by the fact that today we are 
more active than before. We have matured through history. As a group, a tightly knit 
group, I see that more of our members, especially those who are just now reconnecting to 
their Polish roots, see political participation as a way to finally further our status. When 
I say status I mean more political power and more socio-economic equality. This is why I 
am not surprised with the results. It just shows, just as through history, that certain 
historical periods have significantly influenced our awareness of what it means to 
participate. Today, BiH is a democracy, and as citizens of BiH we must find a way to 
influence politics, for which ever reasons.” 
 
Another young female (aged 27) from Prijedor says that: 
 
“Political participation is the basis of every successful democracy. As a group, I think we 
have come to realize that only through active and increased political activism we can 
change things for our group and for the whole society. Historically, we have not 
contributed much, we were, so to say, very ‘in-group’ oriented. We have made significant 
progress in terms of the way we perceive political participation as an act of democratic 
culture and as an act of both group and individual empowerment. Currently, this is what 
matters to us.” 
 
 
A fact that cannot be disregarded and that is mirrored in both quantitative and qualitative data is 
that a significant proportion of Poles who engage in highly active political acts through various 
means. These results are somewhat surprising when considering historical political position of 
Poles, as well as their present categorization as “others” under the Dayton Constitution:  
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1. Although having a marginal constitutional status, 25% of Poles from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are members of political parties. Despite the fact that they do not hold 
important political positions (if any positions at all)436, they still engage in high 
political acts. Since most Poles in BiH live in Republic of Srpska, the assumption is 
that they most probably choose to become members of Serb-dominated parties, as 
central political options are scarcely available in this entity. 
2. Historically, Poles were never strong communicators and have never represented a 
group that had significant political presence. They always sided with different main 
political protagonists, but were never a major political minority group. Hence, the 
results of this research have revealed that the historical narrative in the case of Poles 
is slowly changing and that a higher number of young to middle-aged Poles are 
becoming politically conscious.   
 
 Types of Participants by Behaviour - Expressive/Verbal and Cognitive 
  
 Considering the fact that Poles are categorized as “political communicators” and since 
this behaviour is characterized by expressive and verbal acts, the same set of questions that was 
considered for the Jewish population under this sub-title will be analyzed for Poles. The aim 
remains the same, which signifies that these questions targeted Polish engagement in verbal 
discussions about politics with various actors, from family members and friends, to strangers and 
politicians. The research revealed that 73% of Poles engage in the activity requiring the least 
energy and time consuming activity – general discussion of political issues. More specifically, 
39% of Poles strongly agreed with this statement, while 32% of them agreed with it (M=3.84, 
SD=1.29). The following statement, which still does not require major efforts in terms of time 
and energy, demonstrates that 58% of Poles do not have a problem with expressing their views to 
strangers about social networks to which they belong (M=1.42, SD= .49). Alternatively 42% of 
them answered “no” to this question. The third query which related to attempts to persuade 
people about the correctness of an individual’s political opinion revealed that 35% of Poles try to 
                                                          
436 I have not inquired about this for personal discretion reasons and the fact that this is not relevant for the study in 
question. 
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persuade other people about the correctness of their views, with 19% agreeing strongly and 16% 
agreeing (M=2.60, SD=1.58). The last question “I feel comfortable vocalizing my views to 
politicians”, which requires the most time and energy, is an act of political participation in which 
only 29% of Poles engage (M=1.71, SD= .45). This was also a “yes/no” question, meaning that 
71% of Poles do not feel comfortable with engaging in this activity. Hence, just like in the case 
of Jews, Poles engage less in more complicated and time/energy consuming modes of political 
participation.  
 In concluding this section, I will also concentrate on Poles’ cognitive political behaviour, 
which pertains to judgment of BiH’s political system in the last four years, as well as confidence 
in political decisions and usage of media not only for information, but learning about politics and 
current events on domestic political scene. The first question, which related to usage of three 
different media channels to be informed about politics, revealed that 39% of Poles engage in this 
activity, which is significantly lower than Jewish respondents. The second question, which is 
directly related to the first tried to reveal the level of awareness about current events in Bosnian 
politics. 28% of Poles report that they are very informed; while a large 42% report that they are 
partially informed. 22% of Polish respondents were indifferent and only 8% were indifferent 
towards domestic political events. These results greatly coincide with the fact that 60% of Poles 
are highly active in politics, meaning that it is not surprising to see that most Poles are at least 
partially informed about national politics. When it comes to the third question, an overwhelming 
91% of Poles report that they do not believe that the political system has functioned well over the 
last four years. Alternatively, 83% of them say that they do not have confidence in the decisions 
made by government officials. Again, question three explains the results presented in question 
four. Lastly, these results yet again prove that individual perceptions about politics can help 
explain individual and group involvement in different political participation activities. Even 
higher results (93%) emerged for the external efficacy indicator, tested through the respondent’s 
opinion towards the statement that “politicians are attentive to people’s needs”. Hence, just as it 
was the case with Jewish respondents, it can be said that the general dissatisfaction with present-
day political and economic systems justifies this result. Lastly and related to the last statement, 
the theoretical assumption that passive participants are more inclined to think that politicians 
account for people’s needs is rejected also in the case of Poles from BiH, as the results 
demonstrate an equal spread of “no” answers across all three groups of respondents (high, mid 
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and low). However, Riesman and Glazer’s study (1965) which relates dissatisfaction/oppression 
to political participation is confirmed, just as it was in the case of Jews.  
 
Age and Education as General Predictors for the Category of “Voters” among Poles 
 
Age  
Age was also considered a relevant predictor for examining the level and trigger factors for 
political engagement among Bosnian Poles. Its relevance, was once again, especially important 
for the previously mentioned supposition that in comparison to middle-aged and retired 
population, young participants are less inclined towards voting. Hence, this predictor remains 
relevant also for the category of “voters”. The following age groups were present among Polish 
examinees:  
# Age Reponses % 
1 18-30   
 
22% 
2 31-50   
 
35% 
3 51-70   
 
31% 
4 71-90   
 
12% 
 Total  100% 
 
Figure 7 
Age groups of Polish participants 
 
Out of 22 participants from the youngest age group (18-30), 14 of them or 64% either agreed or 
strongly agreed with the statement “I take part in elections by voting”. A higher rate of voters 
was recorded among the respondents of the second age group (31-50), where out of 35 
participants 25 or 74% vote in elections. Yet higher was the rate among the participants aged 51-
70 where out of 31 respondents, 27 or 87% of them vote. A slightly lower rate of voters was 
recorded for the last group of participants aged 71-90, where out of 12 participants 83% vote. 
Considering the difference in numbers of participants between the last two groups, and the fact 
that the oldest group of participants had 10 respondents who strongly agree with the statement on 
their voting practices, the theoretical assumptions of classical studies437 are confirmed for the 
group of Bosnian Poles. This means that older generations of Poles are more likely to engage in 
                                                          
437 See Chapter 2.  
201 
 
voting practices. Not least, it can be concluded that middle-aged to older Poles are more inclined 
to vote and that their commitment to voting is generally very similar (only 4% difference 
between these two age groups). The differences in numbers between the most active and least 
active voters amount to 23% for this group, compared to 14% rate among Jews.  
 
Figure 8 
Percentage of Regular Polish Voters by Age 
Education 
  
The primary hypothesis when it comes to participants’ education that was used for Bosnian Jews 
remained the same for Polish examinees; hence, the supposition that the higher the education 
level of an individual, the more he/she will belong to the category of active participants or at 
least voters. Considering the results of the survey, and related to the category of “voters”, we can 
conclude that, just as among Jews, Poles who are more educated (have higher education degrees) 
are more inclined to vote than those less educated (elementary school). The following are the 
results of the question “what type of education have you completed?”: 
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# Education degree Responses % 
1 Elementary school   
 
9% 
2 Secondary school 
 
   
 
37% 
3 Bachelor’s degree   
 
34% 
4 Master’s degree   
 
13% 
5 Doctoral degree   
 
7% 
 Total  100% 
 
Figure 9 
Education level of Polish participants 
 
Out of 9% of respondents who completed elementary education, 67% either agreed or strongly 
agreed with the statement “I take part in elections by voting”. Participants with secondary school 
degrees, 37 of them (70%) either agreed or strongly agreed. On the other hand, out of 54 
respondents with some type of university degree, 46 of them or 85% vote. The same practice 
among holders of master or doctoral degrees that was noted among Jewish participants, also 
holds true for Poles – all but three participants with master degrees (9 out of 13) strongly agree, 
while a stunning 100% of respondents with doctoral degrees agreed with the statement. Thus, the 
hypothesis that the higher the education levels of participants, the higher their voting instance is 
also confirmed in the case of Poles. Differentiating between the levels of education of university 
educated participants this hypothesis is approved even further, just as it was the case with the 
Jewish population.  
 
Discussion: Transformations and Group Characteristics of Formal Political Participation 
of Poles in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
In an attempt to conceptualize and frame a debate on formal political participation of 
Poles within broader post-Dayton political reality in BiH, several general, but also more specific 
conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, Poles represent a very active community, which is surprising 
considering their very low level of involvement in Yugoslav politics, but also during previous 
regimes. Interestingly, despite a very strong connection with their kin-state, their political 
participation is not at least influenced by events in their distant homeland, but is rather tied to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina itself. Data gathered both through focus groups and questionnaires 
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proved that it is more the individuals, albeit his/her close ties with the community that influence 
the political processes. Hence, the nature of political engagement actions that Poles employ are 
individualized, non-permanent reactions to current socio-economic circumstances. This means 
that Poles do not have a continuum in political participation, but rather that their involvement 
depends on the time and space in which problems concerning their own group become 
actualized. Thus, it can be claimed that formal political participation of Poles in BiH is sporadic. 
However, the reasons or better trigger factors behind this group’s political activism 
cannot be generalized on group level, as it is, once again, the individual that decides. The results 
of this work reveal two observable trends among Poles that participated in the research. Despite 
the fact that the historical narrative proves otherwise, Polish political participation today 
transcends former trigger-factors for formal political participation and it can be said that their 
political activism has become both more complex and inter-linked with other groups. Both trends 
are new and typical of today’s Polish minority group. The first trend can be observed as a sole 
act of communication, which represents the most significant mode of political participation 
which is closely interlinked with more complex (high) political acts. The second trend shows a 
relatively significant number of Poles in political parties and support activities, which reveals 
that they engage in politics precisely because of dissatisfaction with the present political and 
economic system. Naturally, on individual level, both communication and highly engaging acts 
of political activism occur for different political reasons, but in general both middle and high 
political actions engage different generations, just as it was the case with Jews. I will, therefore, 
give some attention to this trend, all with the purpose of explaining the reasons behind more 
specific acts of political behaviour of Polish minority in BiH.  
 
 
 
Political Participation of Poles in BiH: What Motives Them? 
 
Unlike Jewish formal political participation which often occurs under the auspices of Jewish 
associations, this trend was not at all observable among members of the Polish community. 
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Alternatively, the first discernible trend among Poles who were both members and non-members 
of Polish associations across BiH, reveal that Poles prefer to get involved in politics for personal 
reasons, meaning that they are motivated by factors that transcend group issues. A male 
participant from a village near Prijedor, aged 34, explains his motivations to engage in formal 
politics: 
 
“I joined a political party when I was 25. I realized that political engagement would bring 
me personal benefits, that I would probably be able to find employment much faster and that 
I would be able to influence certain decisions. I also realized that for my village and my 
community I would be a source of hope, somebody who would fight for their well-being. 
Despite of my general involvement in local politics, I chose to stay outside of state-level 
politics. As a member of a national minority I am aware of the fact that I cannot participate 
in ‘higher politics’. This is fine. I think politics is more important on local level, so that 
change is visible to each member of the community.”  
 
A female focus group participant, aged 44, from Banja Luka, adds: 
 
 “My involvement in politics is twofold – I engage for personal reasons that I will not talk 
about, but also to advance the well-being of all citizens in my city. Participation in local politics 
was the only available option and at first I engaged in one of the ruling parties here in Republic 
of Srpska. I was never discriminated for being Polish, but it was easier for me to say that I am 
Serb, because my mother is a Serb and my father is Polish. So, I say that I am Serb of Polish 
origin. I know this is not easy for other members of my (Polish) community. I did this, as I said, 
for personal reasons, but my main aim was to influence projects and decisions that involved 
socio-economic issues, especially those related to access to health care in small villages in 
Krajina, national minority associations funding and infrastructure projects related to rural 
development. This is where I see myself as being able to make a difference.  
 
Of course, the results shown in the first part of this section demonstrate that Poles 
communicate with political authorities in order to address socio-economic issues, but only 27% 
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do so. The other 71%438 do not engage for these reasons, but more personal ones. Although I did 
not inquire into such individual motives for political involvement, especially those who are 
highly active, three interesting answers among this group of Polish participants emerged during 
focus groups: a) engagement in order to change things for better, not just for the minority group, 
but the whole country, b) engagement to improve minority statuses across BiH and c) 
engagement to advance cultural rights of Poles. Related to the status the first finding, a few 
interesting conclusions emerge also from the focus groups. A female participant from Gradiška, 
aged 36, summarizes this observation shortly: 
 
“It would be stupid to fight only for Polish rights. Of course, for me, as a Pole, this is 
important, but if the rights of Roma, Jews, Albanians, Ukrainians, etc. are not taken care of, 
the rights of Poles are also endangered. We are all “others” under the present Constitution 
and to advance the rights of one group implies advancing the rights of others. This especially 
relates to our right to political participation on all levels.”  
 
Another male participant from Prnjavor, aged 41, adds:  
 
“What is important for us Poles, if we are to talk about our political engagement is only and 
only a positive outcome of the “Sejdić-Finci” case. Why? Because this case represents a 
precedent for all minority groups. If we all cared enough, and by ‘we’ I mean all national 
minority groups, we would be able to come up with different proposals on how to implement 
the Court’s decision. However, I think that the problem lies in the fact that we do not see 
further than our own backyard, we do not understand, as groups, not as individuals, the 
importance of political participation and this is why there has been a complete stalemate for 
years.”  
 
Eleven other respondents from all focus groups offered similar views on why they engage in 
politics. All of them realize that Poles are a small minority, which means that the influence they 
can assert on the decision-making processes is minimal. What is more important, however, is the 
fact that Poles who participated in this research view themselves as members of a wider group, 
                                                          
438 Two respondents were neutral and said that they neither agree nor disagree. 
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the “others”, hence their motivation to participate is highly influenced by “discriminatory 
constitutional provisions”, “socio-economic status of second-class citizens” and “generally bad 
social, political and economic standing of all national minorities in BiH”439. Interestingly, only 
one reason cited by Polish participants is strictly tied to this group. A male participant from 
Prijedor, aged 46, explains this trend: 
 
“I am highly engaged in politics. As a member of the Polish community in BiH, I must 
say that I am mostly concerned with issues that regard the religious rights of Poles in the 
Republic of Srpska. We can practice Catholicism freely, but acts of religious hatred do 
happen sometimes. This is what I concentrate on in my political work. Also, we are 
mostly a rural community and you understand and know the difficult position of our 
farmers and villagers. What is pressing me the most is the fact that most of our Polish 
youth is ready to leave the country if things do not change for better. So, this is why I 
think we need to concentrate more on Polish issues in RS.” 
 
Another female participant, aged 61, also from Prijedor adds shortly: 
 
“This is not to say that other groups do not matter. However, we are a close community 
and we care for each other. This is what we grew up with and this is what they teach us 
in schools and churches. Communal engagement is more important than trying to resolve 
issues of high politics. Locally, we can change things for Poles...on the state level...well, 
that will be difficult.”  
 
These views suggest that although most Poles from BiH realize that the advancement of all 
minorities’ rights is essential also for Polish political empowerment, there are individuals who 
may not always recognize the opportunity that general advancement of political rights of persons 
belonging to national minority groups represents for their group. However, these views were 
isolated and mentioned exclusively by less educated and highly religious participants who came 
mostly from rural areas.  
                                                          
439 Quoted phrases emerged out of focus groups. They were mentioned five or more times by different participants.  
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Generally, however, the above results demonstrate that today, unlike in the past, Poles are 
more oriented towards the well-being of the regions and territories in which they live and the 
advancement of general national minority rights to political engagement, than individual Polish 
issues. These triggers complement the findings that 71% of Poles state that they are not 
optimistic about the future of the domestic political system. A 37 year old female participant 
from Gradiška, who claims to be highly politically active, explains: 
 
“This is not surprising. Of course we are concerned about the general well being of our 
community, but if the situation is bad for everybody, regardless of their ethnic belonging, this 
means that it is bad for us too. The situation in our town and in the country is generally very 
bad, many people, especially in rural areas, live on the margins of poverty, so to care about 
only Polish issues, our churches, festivals, associations, youth would be selfish and snobbish, 
to say the least.” 
 
Yet, the general dissatisfaction rate is still higher among Jews than Poles (29% of them are more 
optimistic), and this is more probably due to trends a) and b) outlined above. In relations to this, 
it is also interesting to note that out of 56 respondents in the focus group, 32 of them mentioned 
that if “things do not get better in the country, they can always go to Poland”. Hence, unlike 
Jews, Poles are presented with an alternative that might, at least in part, explain why they feel 
optimistic in general; the reasoning is the following – I will try and I am optimistic, but if things 
fall short of results, I have other equally optimistic options440. And although, just as all other 
national minority groups in BiH, Poles are a constitutionally marginalized group, their principal 
reasons for (non) activism do not principally relate to political isolation, but rather issues of 
socio-economic nature. Lastly, it should be noted that Polish participants mainly fell into the age 
group from 31 to 70, not all of whom were active members of Polish associations in their cities 
or towns, but also members of other political or social organizations.  
Yet, just like in the case of Jews, a second group among Polish respondents that emerged and 
that should not be disregarded comprised of individuals between 18 to 30 years of age. 
Nevertheless, unlike Jewish respondents of this age, they do not seem to engage in the highest 
forms of political participation. This group was not significantly small as it had 22 participants. 
                                                          
440 This was the explanation that was given by 30 respondents.  
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However, only 8 of them stated that they have or would engage in political acts classified as high 
activism. A male and female participant from Prnjavor, both aged 19, explain their views: 
 
“In this country, young do not succeed in politics. So, we think that the young must 
concentrate on going to school, getting a decent job and starting a family. We both tried the 
youth club of this one party, but that was just ridiculous. You cannot influence anything and 
even if you become a candidate for the elections nobody will vote for you.” 
 
“We should just leave the country and go to Poland, we all speak Polish anyway and have 
relatives there”, adds a 22 year old young man also from Prnjavor. 
 
These views, in part, explain the trends observed among the first group, but also generally reflect 
youth apathy towards political engagement observed in post-Cold War CEE states.441 
Furthermore, all 22 participants in this group were members of Polish associations, meaning that 
they were more closely linked to their community. One of the reasons for this is that all of these 
participants were from rural and predominantly Polish villages, hence the feelings of closeness 
and inability to engage in higher political acts originate from these instances. Two participants 
from predominantly Polish villages near Gradiška, a male and a female, both aged 27 make 
mention of this relationship: 
 
“Poles are a small, but very connected community. We grew up on very strict religious 
traditions and our Polish origin was very much manifested during our childhood. I am 
not surprised that the results show this. You see, we both grew up in our villages during 
the war, we could not go anywhere, so we naturally grew closer together”. 
 
“During these days, we very close to the church, we learned Polish, so in case we had a 
chance to leave the country, we would at least speak Polish. If we were not here during 
the war, maybe the situation would have been different in terms of how we view and 
understand political participants.” 
 
                                                          
441 See Wattenberg, M (2002). Where have all the Voters Gone? London: Harvard University Press.  
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Alternatively, it is important to note that 10% of the participants from this group stated that they 
have confidence in the decisions made by government officials. Considering that 17% of all 
respondents from this group agreed with this statement, this is a total of 58%, a number that 
cannot be disregarded. This, again, might coincide with the above mentioned reasons, but also 
the fact that this group was among the least educated (mostly high school degrees or students). 
Thus, it can be concluded that this group prefers to be active as part of group organizations, and 
that the trigger factors in their case lie in group-activism that is closely related to popular 
political trends that emerge within their associations and broader communities. This group also 
has the lowest electoral engagement rate, where 64% of participants regularly engage in voting.  
Hence, it can be concluded that the trends in formal political participation of Poles in 
present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina obviously do not follow a specific pattern, but occur as 
products of different socio-political economic and personal reasons, which are not only tied to 
minority marginalization and inequalities resulting from discriminating constitutional provisions, 
but also group-specific reasons and individual motivations. Conventional political engagement 
appears to be rather popular among middle-aged Poles living in BiH, especially those actions 
that include political party membership, communication with government officials and electoral 
practices. Consequently, just as it was the case with Jews, the findings of Riesman and Glazer 
(1965) are also confirmed through the case study of Poles. Bosnian Poles, just like Jews, 
evidently choose to observe politics as an act that goes way beyond voting or discussion and 
realize that there are more direct ways of influencing the majority-led political system and 
decision-making groups, despite the fact that channels for such engagement are stringently 
confined and inadequate. Not considering this, it can be concluded that Poles are not an isolated 
minority group that acts in a vacuum of its own citizen-led groups and associations, but an 
increasingly important political actor that originates from the national minority-realm in a 
majority-dominated state.  
 
Conclusion 
The main aim of this chapter was to examine the determinants of formal political participation of 
Jews and Poles in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to reach an understanding of the reasons behind their 
choices and how they compare to each other. The first part of the chapter examined current 
patterns of political participation among the Jewish community in BiH and also reported on the 
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type of participants. In the following section, political engagement in post-Dayton reality of the 
Polish minority in BiH was examined. In both sections I employed descriptive statistics and 
qualitative data to build up on the knowledge on the individual level of participation of Jews and 
Poles. Both qualitative and quantitative findings suggest that there are essential differences in the 
patterns of political participation of these two groups, while the type of participants variable is 
similar for both groups. In particular, there is a cross-generational absence of significant 
involvement in political acts that are considered high active.  
Building on from this finding, the results showed that the older generations of Jews and 
Poles exhibit completely different behaviours. Conversely, older members of Jewish 
communities from BiH are predominantly active members in of Jewish associations, meaning 
that they participate in associations events, but more importantly use the associations as a 
channel to further their political, social and economic goals. This group of older Jews prefers to 
engage in politics for group reasons, whereby issues that pertain to the group (Jews) transcend 
individual interests, while the factors that trigger political participation are rest with great 
dissatisfaction with the current political (80% are unoptimistic) and economic (78% are 
unoptimistic) systems. On the other hand, older generations of Poles present a completely 
different picture. They are not active members of Polish associations and are motivated to 
participate by factors that transcend group interests. The research has shown that Poles engage in 
politics for three different reasons: a) to change things for better not just for the minority group, 
but the whole country, to improve minority statuses and to advance cultural rights of Poles. 
Alternatively, this chapter also examines the trends present among Jewish and Polish youth. 
Young Jews, if they choose to engage in politics, do so outside the Jewish associations. In short, 
unlike the older generations, they do not see associations as channels for furthering their or their 
group’s political, social and/or economic goals. This group of respondents represented the highly 
active group. Quite strikingly, younger Poles were low active political participants, but, unlike 
younger Jews, they were very active in their organizations. They were among the least educated 
participants who prefer to be active within Polish associations.  
In addition to these results, it is important to reiterate that neither of the groups can be 
termed as disengaged in politics. However, they are not highly engaged either. Consequently, 
both are considered to be “political communicators”, with a slightly higher rate of such 
participants among Bosnian Poles. Both groups also exhibit very high levels of engagement 
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when it comes to voting practices. The findings further reveal that the principal reasons for the 
absence of highly active forms of political participation among these groups rests in the 
alienation from the political system and the ability to induce change, which, again stems from the 
constitutional limits. The results presented in this chapter represent the basis for the concluding 
discussion on the current trends and transformations that might be observed in the future, a 
discussion of which follows in the last chapter of this dissertation.   
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUDING REMARKS - BROADER 
IMPLICATIONS OF JEWISH AND POLISH FORMAL 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN POST-DAYTON 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
 
This experimental and exploratory thesis has investigated the complexities of the right to 
conventional political participation of national minority groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
through the case study of two representative and influential minority groups by using the post-
Dayton political realities and constitutional provisions as a framework for investigating the level 
and trigger factors of their political engagement. It has done so against the background that the 
Dayton Constitution and its subsequent amendments relating to participation rights of the 
constitutional category of “others” have failed the members of national minority groups. As a 
result, these groups are disinterested in engaging in active modes of political participation, the 
reasons for which primarily lie in their constitutional marginalization, but also weak individual 
triggers, fears and feelings of isolation, all of which are spurred by constitutionally prescribed 
political exclusion. The thesis has argued that one of the main obstacles to greater political 
participation of national minority groups in BiH is embedded in the fact that both international 
and local actors engaged in post-Dayton political processes in BiH rely too heavily or almost 
exclusively, on a wrong interpretation of the term “minority”, whereby the concept is applied 
against the territorial presence of the three constituent groups with full constitutional rights to 
political participation on all levels and through all forms. Hence, this notion has been used as 
starting point in this thesis, which proposes a move away from the concept of territorial 
minorities when considering formal political participation of national minority groups. This 
heavy reliance on addressing minority political participation in BiH has resulted in an empty 
literature and research gap within the field of national minority studies in a state which is 
precisely a “country of minorities”. Consequently, there are no major global studies of political 
participation of any national minorities in BiH or the region.  
I have, on several occasions in this thesis, argued that in less established democracies, 
many national minorities feel isolated or excluded from the political system, this feeling 
translating not into “complete disengagement from politics but rather a critical attitude towards 
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institutional politics”.442 This is precisely what the empirical research in this work has proved. 
There is a cross-generational absence of significant involvement in political acts that are 
considered high active, but interestingly neither of the groups is completely disengaged, but is 
considered to fall under the category of “political communicators”, with a slightly higher rate of 
such participants among Bosnian Poles. Alternatively, both groups significantly engage in voting 
practices, but both also escape formal high level participation. This research has revealed that the 
reasons for the latter lie in alienation from the political system, notably in influential state-level 
organs, and the inability to induce change, a trend blamed on constitutional limits set for 
members of national minority groups. On the other hand, these factors can be termed as principal 
triggers for national minority formal political participation. Aside from geo-territorial traits 
related to urban vs. rural groups, individual motivations which are deeply imbedded in these 
feelings of isolation, are also indispensable.  
However, when compared to the limited research conducted on political participation in 
newly established, post-communist countries, formal political participation of Jews in BiH marks 
a stark contrast. Studies of newer democracies have found low levels of participation in formal 
forms of political involvement across all age groups.443 Research conducted on youth political 
participation in Poland and Romania, for example, concludes that youth population’s exit from 
formal political participation is not coupled with informal involvement: “…legacies of 
communism and the rapid nature of post-communist political and socioeconomic transformation 
continue to negatively influence youth political participation in Poland and Romania.”444  It is 
not within the scope of this study to speculate on why formal political participation of Bosnian 
Jewish youth, for example, is higher than that of youth in other post-communist countries, but it 
is interesting to note that the younger generation of Bosnian Jews has actively engaged in the 
highest means of political expression outside of Jewish associations. And although they do 
believe that national minority associations are there to preserve the tradition and keep the 
community together, they realize that the potential for any type of political activism cannot 
                                                          
442 Lamprianou, I., 2013. Contemporary Political Participation Research: A Critical Assessment. In Democracy in 
Transition. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. pp. 28-29. 
443 Robertson, F. M., 2009. A Study of Youth Political Participation in Poland and Romania (Doctoral dissertation, 
UCL (University College London). p.177.  
444 Ibid, p. 3.  
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originate from these institutions, but through involvement in majority parties.445 This is a trend 
that was observed among Jewish youth in BiH in the past, notably in the interwar and post-
World War II period.446 Not least, Polish youth, although significantly less involved in formal 
political participation than Jewish youth, does not demonstrate extremely low levels of 
participation or any strong movement away from such engagement either. Rather, the reasons 
which emerged for such trends among Polish youth lie in geo-territorial isolation and the fact 
that the largest number of younger respondents in this group lived in rural areas with low or no 
access to formal political channels, aside from electoral engagement.  
 Alternatively, what this research has discovered is a decline in active involvement in 
minority group associations among younger generations of Poles, but also Jews in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. This stands as an interesting occurrence in light of existing literature that discusses 
networks of association and political participation. Social ties through networks of association, 
both formal and informal, have been seen to produce greater civic participation and engagement 
through a variety of factors, including enhancement of democratic virtues, development of 
individual-level resources, and community attachment.447 Some scholars even contend 
“associational experiences may have a greater impact on cooperative activities than traditional, 
individualized political participation.”448 While formal political participation of the older 
generations of Bosnian Jews and Poles upholds this body of research, younger generations have 
obviously remained politically active without necessarily being active (aside from just 
membership) in their group’s associations. As I noted previously, the aim of this thesis was not 
to measure the specific impact of this causal mechanism. However, it is worth reiterating that 
younger generations of Bosnian Jews, and especially Poles, substantially engage in formal 
political participation in a manner that was atypical during any of the previous political systems 
that existed in Bosnian history.  
                                                          
445 See Chapter 5 for more details. 
 
446 See Chapter 6 for more details.  
 
447 Kwak, N., Shah, D. V., & Holbert, R. L., 2004. Connecting, Trusting, and Participating: The Direct and 
Interactive Effects of Social Associations. Political Research Quarterly, 57(4). pp. 643-4. 
448 Ibid., 643.  
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Although, political participation rates and demands of self-aware national minority groups 
have been linked to different waves of citizen mobilization, here referring to other, more 
informal practices of political engagement, which is often the case in countries with a longer 
history of democratic consolidation, the trends in political behaviour of national minorities 
considered in this work do not reveal such practices. Hence, it can be concluded that in BiH, 
formal political engagement of national minority groups, at least in the current statistical 
showings, demonstrate only different characteristics of participation among participatory groups. 
Considering that both groups are considered middle active “political communicators” and active 
“voters”, mobilization is not a trend that will emerge out of these behaviours, at least not in the 
short to medium run. This is because mobilization requires much more energy and time involved 
in more complex and demanding acts of formal political participation. Due to the scope of this 
research, I am aware that informal practices must also be considered in order to assume broader 
conclusions about the outcome of future minority mobilizations, thus I will only note that formal 
political participation as observed among Jews and Poles in post-Dayton BiH does not carry a 
significant mobilization trend in the near future. However, the patterns of behaviour identified in 
this study can certainly be used as a starting point for future research in that a) they proved 
effective in examining the level and trigger factors for general formal political participation and 
b) feed future political and historical empirical research on Jewish and Polish political 
behaviour. Hence, the trends observed here can be useful for examining other national minority 
groups in BiH and the region,449 but also deem to contribute to observing informal political 
practices of these groups through the use of several indicators outlined in this study. 
Methodologically, the Six Position Model, thus, stands as a viable empirical model for studying 
national minority groups both in BiH and in the region.  
But, what can the consideration of two groups’ political participation levels tell us about 
the ties between groups’ historical circumstances, individual motives, current trigger factors and 
participation? First, consider the relevance of one of the most pressing questions in minority 
studies: Do high levels of political engagement imply a change in state’s political set-up? A 
positive answer to this query is certainly of much worry to majority leaders, especially when 
considering a fragmented state where two or more groups are already present in the pre-
                                                          
449 Provided that “old” minorities are considered and that they share common historical and socio-political trends 
with the two groups observed here. However, this is indeed the case with all national minorities that inhabit the 
countries of former Yugoslavia.  
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determined power-sharing model (Lijphart, 1995) where a threat to the existing state apparatus 
would signify an alarm to the groups in power. Translate this scenario to post-Dayton reality of 
BiH450 and one will come across a growing pressure from self-aware groups whose political 
participation is far from superficial and insignificant. To dig deeper into this problematic, I 
reveal results that are not insignificant, but contrary to popular belief, national minorities in BiH, 
at least so the groups considered in this study, do show significant political involvement. 
Although engaged in quite “quiet” methods, these groups do not shy away. As a 23 year old Pole 
from a village near Gradiška said: 
 
“I don’t feel that we are marginalized. I never felt like I was isolated from the political life of 
my country. Of course, yes, I cannot run for president, but presidents in this country are only 
puppets, symbolical representations of their grand groups. Political change comes from 
within. So, in my opinion, a quiet group achieves much more than well-versed politicians... it 
starts from the bottom, from workers, peasants, students... History teaches us that major 
changes occurred with the incentive of groups that are considered “weak”. I am surprised by 
the fact that many young people in my town are now discovering their Polish origin. And 
what happens – they become proud, they visit Poland, they start learning Polish, they 
become self-aware and push for their rights. So, a lurking Polish activist might just be 
somewhere here. You have to look at the changing identities, and national minorities in this 
country are becoming increasingly self-aware. I know quite a few Hungarians and 
Ukrainians, the same is going on in their families – as grandparents die, the young become 
so self-aware...”451 
 
Much of political participation narrative is indeed concerned with identity and historical 
evidence. As I was nearing the end of my writing process, I non-intentionally ended-up 
performing national minority songs at the MinorityFest held in Sarajevo in December of 2015. I 
approached not Jews and Poles, this time, but representatives of a few other groups. It was 
striking how, in an informal and non-strictly politically oriented conversation, the theme of 
political participation emerged in some form or other. So, just as the case of Jews and Poles 
                                                          
450 E.g. Sejdić-Finci case.  
 
451 Notes from the focus group with members of the Polish Association “Mak” from Gradiška.  
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demonstrate, no national minority group is completely immune to constitutional limitations and 
importance of change that comes from within. Just as theoretical works considered in this study 
suggest452, groups that are tightly-knit into formal associations tend to represent the core 
platform for national minority awareness about the importance of exercising different forms of 
political participation. Yet, young minority group members in BiH appear to separate minority 
association membership from political participation. So, in answering the query from the 
beginning of this work, I can conclude that national minority groups in BiH are becoming 
increasingly politically self-conscious, are organized into strong communities, with an ardent 
support of kin-states and relatively active youth, all trends which imply that the current political 
system in BiH will have to accommodate these groups. Furthermore, the hypothesis that “Jews 
and Poles are not active participants in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political life” that was tested in 
this study is hereby dismissed.  
 A closely related normative question concerning political participation rights and relating 
to regional examples of such practices453, the likeliness for the formation of minority political 
parties in BiH, was the next question I posed. Although both case studies confirm Riesman’s and 
Glazer’s (1965) statement that dissatisfaction and oppression motivate participants to engage in 
politics, the research results from both groups quite clearly illustrate the fact that political party 
membership, as the highest form of political activism, remains an unpopular mode of political 
engagement among minority groups. The focus group research with members of Jewish and 
Polish respondents suggest that the core reasons for such low national minority engagement in 
political parties are: 
 
1. Existing political parties are majority-oriented; 
2. Political party membership does not translate into national minority representation; 
3. Members of national minorities cannot run for higher offices even if they are members 
of a political party; 
                                                          
452 See works of Putnam (1993) and Foley and Edwards (1996).  
 
453 See Chapter 6, Part II.  
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4. Ideological streamlines are too ethnically narrow and call for a complete abandoning of 
minority ethnic identity454; 
5. Consultation of national minorities in political processes, in case in which they are 
party members, is symbolic and formally weak. 
 
Hence, the results of this research suggest that constitutional inadequacies in form of adequately 
applied laws and weak consultation mechanisms lie at the core of low political party engagement 
among members of national minorities in BiH. So, the reasons are not religious, not inexistent 
legal principles, not strict minority adherence to their cultural practices and not even the 
engagement of the kin-state, but major institutional absence of minority group inclusion norms or 
diversity-oriented policies. Not least, my interviews with those national minority members who 
do engage in political parties and disregard the five “norms” for disengagement outlined above 
reveal factors that prompt their active behaviour: duty (a sense of having to change something 
for their group), indignation towards phlegmatic engagement of the minority community and 
morality (all of them citing civic duty and defence of minority rights as their primary moral 
reason for such activism). Hence, in answering my main question I had to account for two groups 
- those who do not engage in political parties and those who do. Why? The reasons for this are 
twofold: first, this approach reveals that the studied national minority groups in BiH are self-
motivated, or better stimulated only by individual reasons and thus opt not to participate because 
they, as individuals do not benefit, while others are community-oriented and are inclined to 
abandon their individual beliefs in favour of the group. Any of these factors can provide the 
impetus for moral political action, but the probability for the formation of minority political party 
is considered low. Again, there are a few reasons for this, all of which emerge directly out of my 
research and some of which were trends that I observed during focus groups and interviews: 
 
1. Self-motivated individuals show no interest in minority political party formation because 
the reasons for their political activism are always spurred by individual problems. Hence, 
they engage sporadically. 
 
                                                          
454 E.g.: A Jew must declare him/her self as a Bosniak, Serb or Croat in order to run for higher offices.  
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2. Community-oriented individuals show no interest in minority political party formation 
because: such parties would have low membership, would lack core ideology due to 
differing ideological orientations, would lean towards fragmentation of national minority 
groups, would have sporadic territorial representation (exist in distant parts of the 
country, as national minority groups in BiH are scattered around the whole country with 
no predominant minority-inhabited regions).455  
 
Thus, the differing trigger mechanisms for the formation of minority political parties are weak 
and the implication of such political behaviour is that Bosnia and Herzegovina, unlike its 
neighbouring states, is unlikely to experience the emergence of national minority political 
parties. The level of their engagement, as demonstrated through the case study of Jews and Poles, 
is still not high and combined with geo-territorial, ideological and motivational factors, this type 
of political change in BiH can be dismissed.  
More specifically, what is the relevance of these findings for understanding political 
participation of national minority groups? In an attempt to answer this question, I chose to 
provide an explanation to the query of whether both groups exhibit the same behaviour. The aim 
of this approach was to single out or equally so, dismiss, factors that prove irrelevant, or that 
show a complete presence or absence across both groups. My attempt was, thus, to further or 
narrow down the traditional indicators used in studies of Verba, Nie and Kim (1979) that offered 
a starting point for my research. Of all the explanations offered for relative absence of high 
modes of political activism, there was one astonishing reaction: lack of opportunity and choice. 
A staggering 98% of all focus group participants said that they never had the opportunity to join 
a party that would offer a platform for minority inclusion, while the choice of political parties 
was limited to majority-led and often radical or scandal-prone party with non-existent minority 
inclusion/issue agendas. So, it was again, the trigger factors mentioned above that influenced 
these decisions – individual-oriented group vs. community oriented group. Surprisingly, the 
latter agreed that most parties are majority-led and radical, ethnically divided and oriented 
towards issues of “vital national interest” of the constituent groups. Therefore, both groups 
exhibit similar behaviour, but this trend can be said to be tied with the current political set up and 
weak legal frameworks within the field. Hence, it is the situational variables tied to orientations 
                                                          
455 Both observations emerged during individual interviews and focus groups.  
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and scope of the existing majority parties, as well as their lack of concern towards the issue of 
minority inclusion that severely limit high political participation of national minority groups in 
BiH. Consequently, it would be useful for future studies of similar nature to modify or even omit 
examining high acts political participation in political contexts where such modes of 
participation are low not because of a complete absence of interest, but because of institutional 
insufficiencies to implement and allow for such minority political participation and inclusion.  
The political participation theory outlined in this work, thus, only intends to form a 
micro-foundation for a modified approach to examining political participation of national 
minority groups which are small in number and live in an ethnically fragmented state. The 
examination of historical triggers which contributed to group’s (dis)engagement are as equally 
essential as using traditional indicators for studying political engagement. Thus, the combination 
of history, modified approach to traditional measures of formal political participation, as well as 
no exclusive reliance on a single methodology is what I encourage scholars of similar interest to 
apply. In doing so, we need more information on the very processes that occur in a particular 
state, as in many cases studying national minority political participation in post-communist 
states, we must avoid the supposition of entirely western concepts on traditionally authoritarian 
and non-western societies. The same is true of studying such groups in other more distant 
cultures and spaces. We need to know more about the role played by national minority 
associations and the power that lies within these formal minority institutions, and while this 
study offers such perspectives on two national minority groups living in BiH, the same is advised 
in other studies. The historical expectations and patterns of participation, traditional ideals, 
ethnic cultures in relations to ideologies and connections to the kin-state (where applicable) all 
form a platform for this new approach to examining, but also measuring political participation.  
As I constructed my research framework, in many instances I thought of the ethical 
perspective that is so deeply imbedded in all individuals with whom I conducted my interviews 
and focus groups. The feeling of group closeness was very typical for both groups, but it 
appeared that Jews were less prone to this feeling, and although the feeling of “Jewish bond” was 
not entirely absent, they proved very morally salient; for them, the well-being of all citizens in 
BiH was very important, and as outlined on several occasions in this dissertation, there is also a 
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notable bond456 between Jews and the constituents. The same was not, however, so true of the 
Polish group, mainly because my respondents live in closely-knit rural areas and are not 
constantly exposed to majority groups in terms of sharing the same problems or even contacts. 
So, moral salience can also be one of the factors to account for in the processes of examining 
political participation behaviour of specific groups.  
Finally, what does the study of political participation of national minority groups in a 
post-conflict country really contribute to the discipline? The study of political behaviour and its 
most essential formal modes that are applicable in a post-conflict, multi-ethnic state, notably in 
the form that was used in my research, show an alternative way of viewing political behaviour 
through a specific prism that uses a combination of traditional approaches to examining political 
participation to framing it for a post-conflict state and applying it to a specific context of small 
national minority groups. What is more, the historical narrative plays the key in determining the 
modes that were used to study present-day behaviours, but also to draw a line between trigger 
factors that existed then and now. This bond between history and political participation is a new 
approach offered for future studies of national minority or other minority political behaviours, 
not only in the area of conventional, but also informal and seemingly more popular forms of 
engagement in today’s world. In fact, this approach raises interesting questions in terms of ethnic 
and cultural ties and their connectedness to already applied methods of approaching political 
participation. Not least, this work provides important policy conclusions for the study of national 
minority political participation, but I will outline only a few in order to avoid a policy-oriented 
narrative that might turn this work into a policy-option constructing and analysis platform. The 
critical factors that emerged out of this work were the connection of historically-embedded 
elements and individual orientations (individual versus community orientation). Although the 
traditional methods of examining political participation of Jews and Poles, in my case, were 
extremely beneficial and prove useful for studying other groups, the historical narrative 
combined with individual orientations and trigger factors for participation are key options which 
need further incorporation into the classical political participation frameworks. Some of the 
policy questions that remain open are how can they be developed as indicators? How can they be 
incorporated into traditional measures of political participation? Are they equally useful for 
                                                          
456 These bonds include economic and political bonds, cultural influences, notably in music and applied arts, as well 
as personal bonds, such as social connectedness through close friendships, relationships and marriages.  
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studying non-conventional participation, as a newly popular method of citizen engagement? Can 
existing classifications/categorization systems be reversed to incorporate these two elements? If 
so, how? What causes these elements to emerge as relevant factors in a post-war society? 
Answering these questions will carry implications for works on political participation, minority 
and cultural studies, political psychology and public policies that surround the issue of political 
participation of national minorities. This work, thus, provides a link to applied work that 
concerns the fundamental right to political participation of all groups, and concludes that, despite 
the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina’s national minorities are marginalized, it, just as many 
states of the post-communist world in Eastern Europe did in the aftermath of the Cold War, faces 
an increased pressure from self-aware minority groups which seek their right to collective 
political participation. 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire on Political Participation of 
Jews and Poles (in local language as originally distributed) 
PRISTANAK NA UČESTOVANJE U ISTRAŽIVAČKOM PROJEKTU  
Formalno političko učestvovanje Jevreja i Poljaka u Bosni i Hercegovini 
Pozvani ste učestvovati u istraživačkom projektu koji vodi magistrica Maja Savić-Bojanić,  
doktorska kandidatkinja na Fakultetu političkih nauka Univerziteta u Buckinghamu.  Podaci 
skupljeni tokom ovog projekta koristit će se prije svega kao temelj trenutnog istraživanja 
formalnog političkog učešća Jevreja i Poljaka u BiH. Istraživanje se provodi u svrhu izrade 
doktorske disertacije pod radnim naslovom „Formalno političko učešće Jevreja i Poljaka u BiH“. 
Osim toga podaci prikupljeni tokom ovog istraživanja  mogu biti predstavljeni u stručnim 
člancima, prezentacijama na konferencijama, ili u budućem radu. Vi možete učestvovati u ovom 
projektu ako ste član neke od udruženja ovih manjinskih grupa u BiH ili se izjašnjavate kao 
Jevrej ili Poljak.  
SVRHA PROJEKTA 
Glavni cilj ovog istraživanja je da analizira nivo političkog učešća Jevreja i Poljaka u BiH, kao i 
razloge za njihovo političko uključenje u BiH. Želim saznati zašto učestvujete ili ne učestvujete 
u nekim od glavnih oblika političke participacije, odnosno koji su Vaši motivi za to, kao i doći 
do određenih korelacija između Vaših godina, spola, nivoa obrazovanja i ekonomskog stanja i 
nivoa i razloga za političko učešće.  
PROCEDURE 
Ako budete htjeli učestvovati u ovom projektu, zamolit ću Vas da odvojite 10-tak minta vremena 
i ispunite upitnik koji je priložen. Svi odgovori su anonimni. 
MOGUĆI RIZICI I NEUGODNOSTI 
Projekt ne predstavlja nikakav zdravstveni niti moralni rizik.  
P1. Vaš spol:  
  Muški 
  Ženski 
 
P2. Vaše godine:   ___________ (upišite odgovor na praznu liniju). 
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P3. Vaš nivo obrazovanja: 
  Osnovna škola 
  Gimnazija ili stručna srednja škola 
  Fakultet 
  Magistarski studij 
  Doktorski studij 
 
P4. Da li ste trenutno zaposleni 
  Da 
  Ne 
  Penzioner/-ka sam 
 
P5. Ako ste na prethodno pitanje odgovorili sa da, koje je Vaše zanimanje: 
________________________________ (upišite odgovor u prazan prostor) 
Molim Vas da na sljedeća pitanja odgovorite tako što ćete zaokružiti broj koji najbliže 
označava Vaše trenutno mišljenje/ponašanje. Broj 5 znači da se u potpunosti slažete sa 
navedenom tvrdnjom, dok broj 1 označava potpuno neslaganje. 
P6. Glasam na izborima:  
1. Uopšte se ne slažem              2. Ne slažem se           3. Ne znam          4. Slažem se            
5. U potpunosti se slažem 
 
P7. Da bih se informisao/-la o politici čitam novine: 
1. Uopšte se ne slažem              2. Ne slažem se           3. Ne znam          4. Slažem se            
5. U potpunosti se slažem 
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P8. Da bih se informisao/-la o politici gledam TV: 
1. Uopšte se ne slažem              2. Ne slažem se           3. Ne znam          4. Slažem se            
5. U potpunosti se slažem 
2.  
P9. Da bih se informisao/-la o politici slušam radio: 
1. Uopšte se ne slažem              2. Ne slažem se           3. Ne znam          4. Slažem se           
5. U potpunosti se  
slažem 
P10. Pričam o dešavanjima u politici ili diskutujem o politici sa drugim ljudima: 
1. Uopšte se ne slažem              2. Ne slažem se           3. Ne znam          4. Slažem se            
5. U potpunosti se slažem 
 
P11. Pokušavam uvjeriti prijatelje i/ili druge ljude da su moja politička uvjerenja 
ispravna: 
1. Uopšte se ne slažem              2. Ne slažem se           3. Ne znam          4. Slažem se            
5. U potpunosti se slažem 
 
P12. Tražio/-la sam pomoć od političara kako bih riješio/-la probleme u našem društvu koji 
me muče: 
1. Uopšte se ne slažem              2. Ne slažem se           3. Ne znam          4. Slažem se            
5. U potpunosti se slažem 
 
P13. Tražio/-la sam pomoć od političara kako bih riješio/-la ekononmske probleme u 
našem društvu koji me muče: 
1. Uopšte se ne slažem              2. Ne slažem se           3. Ne znam          4. Slažem se            
5. U potpunosti se slažem 
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P14. Razgovarao/-la sam sa članovima političkih stranaka ili pokreta o politici: 
2. Uopšte se ne slažem              2. Ne slažem se           3. Ne znam          4. Slažem se            
5. U potpunosti se slažem 
 
P15: Finansijski sam podržao/-la određeni društveni/politički pokret, političku stranku, 
političara ili političkog predstavnika: 
1. Uopšte se ne slažem              2. Ne slažem se           3. Ne znam          4. Slažem se            
5. U potpunosti se slažem 
 
P16: Kroz učestovovanje u političkoj kampanji podržao/-la određeni društveni/politički 
pokret, političku stranku, političara ili političkog predstavnika: 
1. Uopšte se ne slažem              2. Ne slažem se           3. Ne znam          4. Slažem se            
5. U potpunosti se slažem 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Molim Vas da odgovorite sa DA ili NE na sljedeća pitanja: 
P17: Aktivan sam član društvene/političke organizacije ili stranke: 
  Da                
  Ne 
P18: Ako se ne bih slažio sa odlukom Vlade, bio/-la bih spreman/-na napisati pismo u 
kojem izražavam svoje mišljenje predstavniku Vlade: 
  Da                
  Ne 
P19: Kada se družim sa ljudima koje ne poznajem, spreman/-na sam izraziti svoje 
mišljenje o društvenim mrežama kojima pripadam: 
  Da                
  Ne 
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P20: Jasno izražavam svoju i zabrinutost moje zajednice političarima: 
  Da                
  Ne 
P21: Imam povjerenje u odluke koje donose političari i/ili drugi vladini službenici: 
  Da                
  Ne 
P22: Vjerujem da je trenutni politički poredak u BiH dobro funkcionisao u zadnj četiri 
godine: 
  Da                
  Ne 
P23: Optimista sam kada je riječ o budućnosti politike u BiH: 
  Da                
  Ne 
P24: Vjerujem da je unutrašnji ekonomski sistem funkcionisao dobro u zadnje četiri 
godine: 
  Da                
  Ne 
P25: Optimista sam kada je riječ o budućnosti ekonomskog napretka BiH: 
  Da                
  Ne 
______________________________________________________________________________
Molim Vas da izaberete opciju koja Vam je najbliža 
P26:  
  Veoma sam informisan/-na o trenutnim dešavanjima u BH politici 
  Djelimično sam informisan/-na o trenutnim dešavanjima u BH politici 
  Nisam dobro informisan/-na o trenutnim dešavanjima u BH politici 
  Ne zainteresovan/-a sam za trenutna dešavanja u BH politici 
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P27: 
  U potpunosti razumijem način na koji funkcionišu BH političke i pravne institucije 
  Djelimično razumijem način na koji funkcionišu BH političke i pravne institucije 
  Ne razumijem razumijem način na koji funkcionišu BH političke i pravne institucije   
   
P28: Molim Vas da izaberete odgovor koji na najbolji način prikazuje Vaše ekonomsko 
stanje u zadnje četiri godine 
  Nisam imao/-la dovoljno novca da podržim sebe i svoju porodicu 
  Imao/-la sam jedva dovoljno novca da podržim sebe i svoju porodicu 
  Imao/-la sam više novca nego što mi je bilo potrebno 
 
P29: Molim Vas da predvidite svoje buduće ekonomsko stanje: 
  Imat ću manje novca za sebe i svoju porodicu 
  Imat ću jednaku količinu novca za sebe i svoju porodicu 
  Imat ću više novca za sebe i svoju porodicu 
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